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* ike-rekey: Add the name/ID of the redundant IKE_SAs to the log messagesTobias Brunner2016-06-171-8/+13
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* ike-rekey: Establish new IKE_SA earlier as responder, but only if no collisionTobias Brunner2016-06-171-3/+8
| | | | | | Moving to the new SA only after receiving the DELETE for the old SA was not ideal as it rendered the new SA unusable (because it simply didn't exist in the manager) if the DELETE was delayed/got dropped.
* child-delete: Check if the deleted CHILD_SA is the redundant SA of a collisionTobias Brunner2016-06-171-4/+39
| | | | | | This happens if the peer deletes the redundant SA before we are able to handle the response. The deleted SA will be in state CHILD_INSTALLED but we don't want to trigger the child_updown() event for it or recreate it.
* child-rekey: Add method to check for the redundant SA created in a collisionTobias Brunner2016-06-172-18/+37
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* child-rekey: Don't change state to INSTALLED if it was already REKEYINGTobias Brunner2016-06-171-3/+5
| | | | | This happens if there is a rekey collision and the peers disagree on the DH group.
* ikev2: Use CHILD_REKEYED for replaced CHILD_SAs after rekeyingTobias Brunner2016-06-172-9/+12
| | | | This allows handling collisions better, in particular with deletions.
* child-rekey: Use more appropriate error notifies if CHILD_SA is not found or ↵Tobias Brunner2016-06-171-3/+8
| | | | | | getting deleted These are the notifies we should return according to RFC 7296.
* child-rekey: Recreate the CHILD_SA if we receive a CHILD_SA_NOT_FOUND notifyTobias Brunner2016-06-171-0/+28
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* child-create: Handle TEMPORARY_FAILURE notify as failureTobias Brunner2016-06-172-4/+5
| | | | | We will later add code to retry creating the CHILD_SA if we are not rekeying. Rekeying is already rescheduled as with any other errors.
* child-delete: Remove unnecessary call to destroy_child_sa()Tobias Brunner2016-06-171-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Generally, we will not find the CHILD_SA by searching for it with the outbound SPI (the initiator of the DELETE sent its inbound SPI) - and if we found a CHILD_SA it would most likely be the wrong one (one in which we used the same inbound SPI as the peer used for the one it deletes). And we don't actually want to destroy the CHILD_SA at this point as we know we already initiated a DELETE ourselves, which means that task still has a reference to it and will destroy the CHILD_SA when it receives the response from the other peer.
* ikev2: Handle INITIAL_CONTACT notifies also when peer is authenticated with EAPTobias Brunner2016-06-061-16/+5
| | | | Fixes #1380.
* Use standard unsigned integer typesAndreas Steffen2016-03-2413-44/+44
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* ikev2: Add task that verifies a peer's certificateTobias Brunner2016-03-102-0/+171
| | | | | | On failure the SA is deleted and reestablished as configured. The task is activated after the REAUTH_COMPLETE task so a make-before-break reauth is completed before the new SA might get torn down.
* ikev2: Diversify signature scheme ruleThomas Egerer2016-03-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | This allows for different signature schemes for IKE authentication and trustchain verification. Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* ike-init: Verify REDIRECT notify before processing IKE_SA_INIT messageTobias Brunner2016-03-041-7/+51
| | | | | | An attacker could blindly send a message with invalid nonce data (or none at all) to DoS an initiator if we just destroy the SA. To prevent this we ignore the message and wait for the one by the correct responder.
* ike-init: Ignore notifies related to redirects during rekeyingTobias Brunner2016-03-041-3/+13
| | | | Also don't query redirect providers in this case.
* ike-redirect: Add task to redirect active IKE_SAsTobias Brunner2016-03-042-0/+204
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* ike-auth: Handle REDIRECT notifies during IKE_AUTHTobias Brunner2016-03-041-22/+44
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* ike-auth: Send REDIRECT notify during IKE_AUTH if requested by providersTobias Brunner2016-03-041-27/+51
| | | | | | To prevent the creation of the CHILD_SA we set a condition on the IKE_SA. We also schedule a delete job in case the client does not terminate the IKE_SA (which is a SHOULD in RFC 5685).
* ike-config: Do not assign attributes for redirected IKE_SAsTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+5
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* child-create: Don't create CHILD_SA if the IKE_SA got redirected in IKE_AUTHTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+4
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* ike-init: Handle REDIRECTED_FROM similar to REDIRECT_SUPPORTED as serverTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+17
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* ike-init: Send REDIRECTED_FROM instead of REDIRECT_SUPPORTED if appropriateTobias Brunner2016-03-041-1/+19
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* ikev2: Add option to disable following redirects as clientTobias Brunner2016-03-041-1/+8
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* ikev2: Handle REDIRECT notifies during IKE_SA_INITTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+22
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* ike-init: Send REDIRECT notify during IKE_SA_INIT if requested by providersTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+17
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* ike-init: Send REDIRECT_SUPPORTED as initiatorTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+5
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* ike-init: Enable redirection extension if client sends REDIRECT_SUPPORTED notifyTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+4
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* libhydra: Move kernel interface to libcharonTobias Brunner2016-03-034-18/+12
| | | | This moves hydra->kernel_interface to charon->kernel.
* ikev2: Use config value for sending of vendor IDsThomas Egerer2016-03-011-13/+43
| | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* child-rekey: Suppress updown event when deleting redundant CHILD_SAsTobias Brunner2016-02-011-1/+10
| | | | | | | | | When handling a rekey collision we might have to delete an already installed redundant CHILD_SA (or expect the other peer to do so). We don't want to trigger updown events for these as neither do we do so for successfully rekeyed CHILD_SAs. Fixes #853.
* traffic-selector: Don't end printf'ed list of traffic selectors with a spaceTobias Brunner2015-11-102-4/+4
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* ike-natd: Create fake NAT-D payloads in a more static wayTobias Brunner2015-11-091-20/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In some scenarios an IKE_SA might get restarted multiple times (e.g. due to retransmits and delayed INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notifies) so that two IKE_SA_INIT messages might be sent that only differ in the previously randomly generated NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP payload. This could cause an authentication failure on the responder if the two peers don't use the same IKE_SA_INIT message in their InitiatorSignedOctets. While the payload is generated in a reproducible way it will still change when the daemon is restarted, which should make detecting the payloads as fake a bit harder (compared to e.g. just using 0.0.0.0:0 as address). Fixes #1131.
* ike-mobike: Send retransmits to the current local and remote addressesTobias Brunner2015-10-301-1/+5
| | | | | | These might have changed by a peer-initiated MOBIKE address update. Fixes #1125.
* child-rekey: Don't add a REKEY_SA notify if the child-create task is ↵Tobias Brunner2015-08-211-6/+9
| | | | deleting the SA
* child-create: Cache proposed IPsec protocolTobias Brunner2015-08-211-10/+13
| | | | | This allows us to DELETE CHILD_SAs on failures that occur before we retrieved the selected proposal.
* child-create: Don't attempt to delete the SA if we don't have all the ↵Tobias Brunner2015-08-211-8/+10
| | | | | | | information Since we only support single protocols we could probably guess it and always send a DELETE.
* child-rekey: Remove redundant migrate() call for child-create sub-taskTobias Brunner2015-08-211-2/+1
| | | | | | | When retrying due to a DH group mismatch this is already done by the child-create task itself. And in other cases where the task returns NEED_MORE we actually will need access to a possible proposal to properly delete it.
* child-create: Fix crash when retrying CHILD_SA rekeying due to a DH group ↵Tobias Brunner2015-08-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | mismatch If the responder declines our KE payload during a CHILD_SA rekeying migrate() is called to reuse the child-create task. But the child-rekey task then calls the same method again. Fixes: 32df0d81fb46 ("child-create: Destroy nonceg in migrate()")
* ike-rekey: Fix cleanup() callTobias Brunner2015-07-271-2/+2
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* ike-rekey: Reset IKE_SA on bus before sending CREATE_CHILD_SA responseTobias Brunner2015-07-271-1/+2
| | | | | Even when there is no error the CREATE_CHILD_SA response should be sent in the context of the existing IKE_SA.
* ike-rekey: Reset IKE_SA on the bus after destroying new IKE_SATobias Brunner2015-07-271-16/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The destroy() method sets the IKE_SA on the bus to NULL, we reset it to the current IKE_SA so any events and log messages that follow happen in the correct context. A practical example where this is problematic is a DH group mismatch, which causes the first CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to fail. Because the SA was not reset previously, the message() hook for the CREATE_CHILD_SA response, for instance, was triggered outside the context of an IKE_SA, that is, the ike_sa parameter was NULL, which is definitely not expected by several plugins. Fixes #862.
* ikev2: Enforce remote authentication config before proceeding with own ↵Martin Willi2015-06-051-0/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted. Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client. And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into sending plaintext passwords. This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator starts with its own authentication. Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
* child-create: Destroy nonceg in migrate()Tobias Brunner2015-05-051-1/+2
| | | | | Since another nonce gets allocated later (if any was allocated already) this would have resulted in a leaked nonce context ID when used in charon-tkm.
* child-create: Fix error handling if nonceg can't be createdTobias Brunner2015-05-051-14/+12
| | | | As with ike-init we can't return NULL in the task constructor.
* ike-init: Fix error handling if nonceg can't be createdTobias Brunner2015-05-051-13/+21
| | | | | | Returning FAILED in the constructor is wrong, but returning NULL doesn't work either as it's currently assumed tasks always can be created. Therefore, delay this check until we actually try to allocate a nonce.
* ike-init: Fix compiler warningTobias Brunner2015-05-051-2/+0
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* ike-init: Make nonceg a member of ike_init structReto Buerki2015-05-041-20/+17
| | | | | | | This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the ike init task. In the TKM use-case the nonce generator cannot be destroyed before the ike init task is finalized, otherwise the created nonce is detected as stale.
* child-create: Make nonceg a member of child_create structReto Buerki2015-05-041-12/+16
| | | | | | | | This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the child create task. In the TKM use-case, it is required to reset the nonce context if the created nonce is not consumed. This happens if the child SA negotiation fails and it is detected before the SA is established via the TKM kernel plugin (i.e. rekey collision).
* Add bool param to ALERT_KEEP_ON_CHILD_SA_FAILURE alertAdrian-Ken Rueegsegger2015-05-041-2/+6
| | | | | The parameter indicates if the alert is raised upon failure to establish the first CHILD SA of an IKE SA.
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