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* ikev2: Delay online revocation checks during make-before-break reauthenticationTobias Brunner2016-03-101-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We do these checks after the SA is fully established. When establishing an SA the responder is always able to install the CHILD_SA created with the IKE_SA before the initiator can do so. During make-before-break reauthentication this could cause traffic sent by the responder to get dropped if the installation of the SA on the initiator is delayed e.g. by OCSP/CRL checks. In particular, if the OCSP/CRL URIs are reachable via IPsec tunnel (e.g. with rightsubnet=0.0.0.0/0) the initiator is unable to reach them during make-before-break reauthentication as it wouldn't be able to decrypt the response that the responder sends using the new CHILD_SA. By delaying the revocation checks until the make-before-break reauthentication is completed we avoid the problems described above. Since this only affects reauthentication, not the original IKE_SA, and the delay until the checks are performed is usually not that long this doesn't impose much of a reduction in the overall security.
* ikev2: Add task that verifies a peer's certificateTobias Brunner2016-03-103-0/+176
| | | | | | On failure the SA is deleted and reestablished as configured. The task is activated after the REAUTH_COMPLETE task so a make-before-break reauth is completed before the new SA might get torn down.
* ikev2: Initiate other tasks after a no-op taskTobias Brunner2016-03-101-1/+1
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* ikev2: Don't do online revocation checks in pubkey authenticator if requestedTobias Brunner2016-03-101-1/+8
| | | | We also update the auth config so the constraints are not enforced.
* credential-manager: Make online revocation checks optional for public key ↵Tobias Brunner2016-03-101-1/+1
| | | | enumerator
* ikev2: Always store signature scheme in auth-cfgTobias Brunner2016-03-041-12/+1
| | | | As we use a different rule we can always store the scheme.
* ikev2: Diversify signature scheme ruleThomas Egerer2016-03-042-3/+4
| | | | | | | This allows for different signature schemes for IKE authentication and trustchain verification. Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* ike-init: Verify REDIRECT notify before processing IKE_SA_INIT messageTobias Brunner2016-03-041-7/+51
| | | | | | An attacker could blindly send a message with invalid nonce data (or none at all) to DoS an initiator if we just destroy the SA. To prevent this we ignore the message and wait for the one by the correct responder.
* ikev2: Allow tasks to verify request messages before processing themTobias Brunner2016-03-041-4/+47
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* ikev2: Allow tasks to verify response messages before processing themTobias Brunner2016-03-041-1/+27
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* ike-init: Ignore notifies related to redirects during rekeyingTobias Brunner2016-03-041-3/+13
| | | | Also don't query redirect providers in this case.
* ike-redirect: Add task to redirect active IKE_SAsTobias Brunner2016-03-043-0/+215
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* ike-auth: Handle REDIRECT notifies during IKE_AUTHTobias Brunner2016-03-041-22/+44
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* ike-auth: Send REDIRECT notify during IKE_AUTH if requested by providersTobias Brunner2016-03-041-27/+51
| | | | | | To prevent the creation of the CHILD_SA we set a condition on the IKE_SA. We also schedule a delete job in case the client does not terminate the IKE_SA (which is a SHOULD in RFC 5685).
* ike-config: Do not assign attributes for redirected IKE_SAsTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+5
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* child-create: Don't create CHILD_SA if the IKE_SA got redirected in IKE_AUTHTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+4
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* ike-init: Handle REDIRECTED_FROM similar to REDIRECT_SUPPORTED as serverTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+17
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* ike-init: Send REDIRECTED_FROM instead of REDIRECT_SUPPORTED if appropriateTobias Brunner2016-03-041-1/+19
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* ikev2: Add option to disable following redirects as clientTobias Brunner2016-03-041-1/+8
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* ikev2: Handle REDIRECT notifies during IKE_SA_INITTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+22
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* ike-init: Send REDIRECT notify during IKE_SA_INIT if requested by providersTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+17
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* ike-init: Send REDIRECT_SUPPORTED as initiatorTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+5
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* ike-init: Enable redirection extension if client sends REDIRECT_SUPPORTED notifyTobias Brunner2016-03-041-0/+4
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* libhydra: Move kernel interface to libcharonTobias Brunner2016-03-034-18/+12
| | | | This moves hydra->kernel_interface to charon->kernel.
* ikev2: Use config value for sending of vendor IDsThomas Egerer2016-03-011-13/+43
| | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* ikev2: Add debug message about failed IKE authenticationThomas Egerer2016-02-021-0/+4
| | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* child-rekey: Suppress updown event when deleting redundant CHILD_SAsTobias Brunner2016-02-011-1/+10
| | | | | | | | | When handling a rekey collision we might have to delete an already installed redundant CHILD_SA (or expect the other peer to do so). We don't want to trigger updown events for these as neither do we do so for successfully rekeyed CHILD_SAs. Fixes #853.
* traffic-selector: Don't end printf'ed list of traffic selectors with a spaceTobias Brunner2015-11-102-4/+4
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* ike-natd: Create fake NAT-D payloads in a more static wayTobias Brunner2015-11-091-20/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In some scenarios an IKE_SA might get restarted multiple times (e.g. due to retransmits and delayed INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notifies) so that two IKE_SA_INIT messages might be sent that only differ in the previously randomly generated NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP payload. This could cause an authentication failure on the responder if the two peers don't use the same IKE_SA_INIT message in their InitiatorSignedOctets. While the payload is generated in a reproducible way it will still change when the daemon is restarted, which should make detecting the payloads as fake a bit harder (compared to e.g. just using 0.0.0.0:0 as address). Fixes #1131.
* ikev2: Fix size of key material for CAMELLIA-CTRTobias Brunner2015-10-301-0/+1
| | | | Like AES in CTR mode it includes a 4 byte nonce.
* ike-mobike: Send retransmits to the current local and remote addressesTobias Brunner2015-10-301-1/+5
| | | | | | These might have changed by a peer-initiated MOBIKE address update. Fixes #1125.
* child-rekey: Don't add a REKEY_SA notify if the child-create task is ↵Tobias Brunner2015-08-211-6/+9
| | | | deleting the SA
* child-create: Cache proposed IPsec protocolTobias Brunner2015-08-211-10/+13
| | | | | This allows us to DELETE CHILD_SAs on failures that occur before we retrieved the selected proposal.
* child-create: Don't attempt to delete the SA if we don't have all the ↵Tobias Brunner2015-08-211-8/+10
| | | | | | | information Since we only support single protocols we could probably guess it and always send a DELETE.
* child-rekey: Remove redundant migrate() call for child-create sub-taskTobias Brunner2015-08-211-2/+1
| | | | | | | When retrying due to a DH group mismatch this is already done by the child-create task itself. And in other cases where the task returns NEED_MORE we actually will need access to a possible proposal to properly delete it.
* child-create: Fix crash when retrying CHILD_SA rekeying due to a DH group ↵Tobias Brunner2015-08-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | mismatch If the responder declines our KE payload during a CHILD_SA rekeying migrate() is called to reuse the child-create task. But the child-rekey task then calls the same method again. Fixes: 32df0d81fb46 ("child-create: Destroy nonceg in migrate()")
* ikev2: Store outer EAP method used to authenticate remote peer in auth-cfgTobias Brunner2015-08-191-0/+9
| | | | | | | This allows symmetric configuration of EAP methods (i.e. the same value in leftauth and rightauth) when mutual EAP-only authentication is used. Previously the client had to configure rightauth=eap or rightauth=any, which prevented it from using this same config as responder.
* Initialize variables that some compilers seem to warn aboutTobias Brunner2015-08-131-1/+1
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* ike-rekey: Fix cleanup() callTobias Brunner2015-07-271-2/+2
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* ike-rekey: Reset IKE_SA on bus before sending CREATE_CHILD_SA responseTobias Brunner2015-07-271-1/+2
| | | | | Even when there is no error the CREATE_CHILD_SA response should be sent in the context of the existing IKE_SA.
* ike-rekey: Reset IKE_SA on the bus after destroying new IKE_SATobias Brunner2015-07-271-16/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The destroy() method sets the IKE_SA on the bus to NULL, we reset it to the current IKE_SA so any events and log messages that follow happen in the correct context. A practical example where this is problematic is a DH group mismatch, which causes the first CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to fail. Because the SA was not reset previously, the message() hook for the CREATE_CHILD_SA response, for instance, was triggered outside the context of an IKE_SA, that is, the ike_sa parameter was NULL, which is definitely not expected by several plugins. Fixes #862.
* ikev2: Derive additional 4 byte CHILD_SA nonce keymat for ChaCha20-Poly1305Martin Willi2015-06-291-0/+1
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* ikev2: Use four byte salt for ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEADMartin Willi2015-06-291-0/+1
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* ikev2: Enforce remote authentication config before proceeding with own ↵Martin Willi2015-06-051-0/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted. Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client. And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into sending plaintext passwords. This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator starts with its own authentication. Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
* unknown-payload: Use a new private payload type and make original type availableTobias Brunner2015-06-011-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | This fixes a DoS and potential remote code execution vulnerability that was caused because the original payload type that was returned previously was used to cast such payload objects to payloads of the indicated type (e.g. when logging notify payloads with a payload type for the wrong IKE version). Fixes CVE-2015-3991.
* child-create: Destroy nonceg in migrate()Tobias Brunner2015-05-051-1/+2
| | | | | Since another nonce gets allocated later (if any was allocated already) this would have resulted in a leaked nonce context ID when used in charon-tkm.
* child-create: Fix error handling if nonceg can't be createdTobias Brunner2015-05-051-14/+12
| | | | As with ike-init we can't return NULL in the task constructor.
* ike-init: Fix error handling if nonceg can't be createdTobias Brunner2015-05-051-13/+21
| | | | | | Returning FAILED in the constructor is wrong, but returning NULL doesn't work either as it's currently assumed tasks always can be created. Therefore, delay this check until we actually try to allocate a nonce.
* ike-init: Fix compiler warningTobias Brunner2015-05-051-2/+0
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* ike-init: Make nonceg a member of ike_init structReto Buerki2015-05-041-20/+17
| | | | | | | This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the ike init task. In the TKM use-case the nonce generator cannot be destroyed before the ike init task is finalized, otherwise the created nonce is detected as stale.
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