Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | ||
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* | Add a return value to keymat_v1_t.{get,update,confirm}_iv | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -13/+31 | |
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* | Add a return value to crypter_t.set_key() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -5/+22 | |
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* | Add a return value to crypter_t.decrypt() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -2/+1 | |
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* | Add a return value to crypter_t.encrypt | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -2/+1 | |
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* | Check rng return value when generating ME CONNECT_ID and KEY | Tobias Brunner | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -2/+14 | |
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* | Check rng return value when generating IKEv1 message IDs | Tobias Brunner | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -8/+20 | |
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* | Check rng return value when generating COOKIE2 during MOBIKE | Tobias Brunner | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -6/+11 | |
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* | Check rng return value when generating fake NAT detection payloads | Tobias Brunner | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -4/+5 | |
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* | Check rng return value when generating SPIs in ike_sa_manager_t | Tobias Brunner | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -35/+67 | |
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* | Nonce: Let get_nonce, allocate_nonce return boolean | Reto Buerki | 2012-07-16 | 4 | -5/+31 | |
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* | Add a return value to prf_t.set_key() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -23/+41 | |
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* | Add a return value to prf_t.allocate_bytes() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -22/+71 | |
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* | Use a bool return value in keymat_v1_t.get_hash_phase2() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -27/+27 | |
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* | Add a return value to keymat_v1_t.get_hash() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 4 | -17/+35 | |
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* | Add a return value to keymat_v2_t.get_auth_octets() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 3 | -17/+24 | |
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* | Add a return value to keymat_v2_t.get_psk_sig() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 4 | -24/+39 | |
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* | Add a return value to prf_t.get_bytes() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -9/+19 | |
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* | prf_plus_create() can return NULL on failure | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -0/+20 | |
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* | Add a return value to prf_plus_t.allocate_bytes() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -17/+76 | |
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* | Add a return value to signer_t.set_key() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -2/+14 | |
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* | Add a return value to aead_t.set_key() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 2 | -3/+12 | |
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* | Add a return value to aead_t.encrypt() | Martin Willi | 2012-07-16 | 1 | -1/+2 | |
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* | Simplify NAT-D payload creation if UDP encapsulation is forced | Tobias Brunner | 2012-07-13 | 1 | -2/+2 | |
| | | | | | We don't need any address lookups in that case as the content of the payload is generated randomly anyway. | |||||
* | Send cert request based on peers configured authentication class | Martin Willi | 2012-07-10 | 1 | -3/+30 | |
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* | Don't send CERTREQs when initiating aggressive mode PSK | Martin Willi | 2012-07-09 | 1 | -0/+4 | |
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* | As a responder, don't start a TRANSACTION request if we expect one from the ↵ | Martin Willi | 2012-06-29 | 2 | -2/+4 | |
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* | Defer quick mode initiation if we expect a mode config request | Martin Willi | 2012-06-27 | 1 | -1/+20 | |
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* | Queue a mode config task as responder if we need a virtual IP | Martin Willi | 2012-06-27 | 2 | -4/+16 | |
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* | Add basic support for XAuth responder authentication | Martin Willi | 2012-06-27 | 2 | -8/+10 | |
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* | Ignore a received %any virtual IP for installation | Martin Willi | 2012-06-26 | 1 | -1/+2 | |
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* | Centralized thread cancellation in processor_t | Tobias Brunner | 2012-06-25 | 1 | -8/+19 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | This ensures that no threads are active when plugins and the rest of the daemon are unloaded. callback_job_t was simplified a lot in the process as its main functionality is now contained in processor_t. The parent-child relationships were abandoned as these were only needed to simplify job cancellation. | |||||
* | support Cisco Unity VID | Andreas Steffen | 2012-06-25 | 2 | -3/+11 | |
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* | Enforce uniqueids=keep based on XAuth identity | Martin Willi | 2012-06-25 | 1 | -0/+6 | |
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* | Don't send XAUTH_OK if a hook prevents SA to establish | Martin Willi | 2012-06-25 | 1 | -4/+14 | |
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* | Enforce uniqueids=keep only for non-XAuth Main/Agressive Modes | Martin Willi | 2012-06-25 | 2 | -28/+28 | |
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* | Use XAuth/EAP remote identity for uniqueness check | Martin Willi | 2012-06-25 | 2 | -2/+4 | |
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* | Add missing XAuth name variable when complaining about missing XAuth backend | Martin Willi | 2012-06-25 | 1 | -1/+1 | |
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* | Fix SIGSEGV if kernel install fails during Quick Mode as responder. | Tobias Brunner | 2012-06-22 | 1 | -4/+8 | |
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* | Adopt children as XAuth initiator (which is IKE responder) | Martin Willi | 2012-06-14 | 1 | -2/+2 | |
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* | Require a scary option to respond to Aggressive Mode PSK requests | Martin Willi | 2012-06-14 | 1 | -0/+17 | |
| | | | | | | | | While Aggressive Mode PSK is widely used, it is known to be subject to dictionary attacks by passive attackers. We don't complain as initiator to be compatible with existing (insecure) setups, but require a scary strongswan.conf option if someone wants to use it as responder. | |||||
* | implemented the right|leftallowany feature | Andreas Steffen | 2012-06-08 | 2 | -10/+15 | |
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* | Enforce uniqueness policy in IKEv1 main and aggressive modes | Martin Willi | 2012-06-08 | 2 | -0/+29 | |
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* | Try to rekey without KE exchange if peer returns INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD(NONE) | Martin Willi | 2012-06-08 | 1 | -1/+8 | |
| | | | | | | According to RFC5996, implementations should just ignore the KE payload if they select a non-PFS proposals. Some implementations don't, but return MODP_NONE in INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, hence we accept that, too. | |||||
* | While checking for redundant quick modes, compare traffic selectors | Martin Willi | 2012-06-08 | 1 | -0/+22 | |
| | | | | | If a configuration is instanced more than once using narrowing, we should keep all unique quick modes up during rekeying. | |||||
* | Store shorter soft lifetime of in- and outbound SAs only | Martin Willi | 2012-06-08 | 1 | -1/+8 | |
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* | Initiate quick mode rekeying with narrowed traffic selectors | Martin Willi | 2012-06-08 | 1 | -1/+18 | |
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* | Use traffic selectors passed to quick mode constructor as initiator | Martin Willi | 2012-06-08 | 1 | -2/+10 | |
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* | Instead of rekeying, delete a quick mode if we have a fresher instance | Martin Willi | 2012-06-08 | 1 | -6/+42 | |
| | | | | | | | | If both peers initiate quick mode rekeying simultaneously, we end up with duplicate SAs for a configuration. This can't be avoided, nor do the standards provide an appropriate solution. Instead of closing one SA immediately, we keep both. But once rekeying triggers, we don't refresh the SA with the shorter soft lifetime, but delete it. | |||||
* | As responder, enforce the same configuration while rekeying CHILD_SAs | Martin Willi | 2012-06-06 | 3 | -1/+19 | |
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* | Mark CHILD_SAs used for trap policies to uninstall them properly. | Tobias Brunner | 2012-06-04 | 1 | -6/+13 | |
| | | | | | | | If the installation failed the state is not CHILD_ROUTED which means the wrong priority is used to uninstall the policies. This is a problem for kernel interfaces that keep track of installed policies as now the proper policy is not found (if the priority is considered). |