| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This new flag gives the kernel-interface a hint how it should priorize the
use of newly installed SAs during rekeying.
Consider the following rekey procedure in IKEv2:
Initiator --- Responder
I1 -------CREATE-------> R1
I2 <------CREATE--------
-------DELETE-------> R2
I3 <------DELETE--------
SAs are always handled as pairs, the following happens at the SA level:
* Initiator starts the exchange at I1
* Responder installs new SA pair at R1
* Initiator installs new SA pair at I2
* Responder removes old SA pair at R2
* Initiator removes old SA pair at I3
This makes sure SAs get installed/removed overlapping during rekeying. However,
to avoid any packet loss, it is crucial that the new outbound SA gets
activated at the correct position:
* as exchange initiator, in I2
* as exchange responder, in R2
This should guarantee that we don't use the new outbound SA before the peer
could install its corresponding inbound SA.
The new parameter allows the kernel backend to install the new SA with
appropriate priorities, i.e. it should:
* as exchange inititator, have the new outbound SA installed with higher
priority than the old SA
* as exchange responder, have the new outbound SA installed with lower
priority than the old SA
While we could split up the SA installation at the responder, this approach
has another advantage: it allows the kernel backend to switch SAs based on
other criteria, for example when receiving traffic on the new inbound SA.
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Fixes DPD with Cisco IOS sending the DPD vendor ID not in the first message.
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RFC 5996 compatible implementations MAY send an INFORMATIONAL message
with an AUTHENTICATION_FAILED if the initiator failed to authenticate us.
Handle such a message like a DELETE for an IKE_SA.
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According to RFC 5996, we MAY send an INFORMATIONAL message having an
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED. We don't do any retransmits, though, but just close
the IKE_SA after one message has been sent, avoiding the danger that an
unauthenticated IKE_SA stays alive.
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While this was problematic in earlier releases, it seems that it works just
fine the way we handle compression now. So there is no need to disable it over
NATed connections or when using forceencaps.
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The previous code did not properly check for the situation when the
DELETE for a redundant CHILD_SA created by a responder during a
CHILD_SA rekey collision arrives before the responder's answer to the
initiator's winning CREATE_CHILD_SA request.
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This lets the kernel backend decide what to do with it, and in fact all kernel
interfaces already handle this correctly.
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If two peers rekey Quick Modes at the same time, the original Quick Mode is
in REKEYING state and hence the requid is not reused. This is required though,
as two identical policies won't work if they have different requids.
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certain time frame
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It has to be selected explicitly with rightauth2=xauth-noauth.
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This XAuth backend does not do any authentication of client credentials
but simply sends a successful XAuth status to the client, thereby
concluding the XAuth exchange. This can be useful to fallback to basic
RSA authentication with clients that can not be configured without XAuth
authentication.
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packets
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Initial patch by Paul Stewart, fixes #289.
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Cisco 5505 firewalls don't return the port if we send a specific one, letting
the is_contained_in() checks fail. Using get_subset() selection builds the
Quick Mode correctly with the common subset of selectors.
Based on an initial patch from Paul Stewart.
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Fixes the use of EAP methods in the non-first authentication round if the
initiator demands mutual EAP. Also mutual EAP can now be enforced when the
initiator sets rightauth=eap, not only with rightauth=any.
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Migrates Quick Modes to the new Main Mode if an IKEv1 reauthentication replaces
the old Main Mode having a uniqueids=replace policy.
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Adds a %opaque port option and support for port ranges in left/rightprotoport.
Currently not supported by any of our kernel backends.
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Fixes retransmit of the last Main Mode or IKE_AUTH message, and correctly
queues Main Mode messages when processing of the last message is still in
progress.
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As the message ID is zero in all Main Mode messages, it can't be used to detect
if we are already processing a given message.
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When the last request message of the initial tunnel setup is retransmitted,
we must retransmit the response instead of ignoring the request.
Fixes #295.
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Introduces kernel backend features, sends ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED if
kernel does not support it.
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