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* ikev1: Inverse check when applying received KE value during Quick Mode5.3.0rc1Martin Willi2015-03-241-1/+1
| | | | Fixes Quick Mode negotiation when PFS is in use.
* diffie-hellman: Add a bool return value to set_other_public_value()Martin Willi2015-03-234-6/+53
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* diffie-hellman: Add a bool return value to get_my_public_value()Martin Willi2015-03-234-5/+22
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* encoding: Allow ke_payload_create_from_diffie_hellman() to failMartin Willi2015-03-234-12/+58
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* diffie-hellman: Use bool instead of status_t as get_shared_secret() return valueMartin Willi2015-03-232-4/+4
| | | | | While such a change is not unproblematic, keeping status_t makes the API inconsistent once we introduce return values for the public value operations.
* ikev1: Make sure SPIs in an IKEv1 DELETE payload match the current SATobias Brunner2015-03-231-0/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenBSD's isakmpd uses the latest ISAKMP SA to delete other expired SAs. This caused strongSwan to delete e.g. a rekeyed SA even though isakmpd meant to delete the old one. What isakmpd does might not be standard compliant. As RFC 2408 puts it: Deletion which is concerned with an ISAKMP SA will contain a Protocol-Id of ISAKMP and the SPIs are the initiator and responder cookies from the ISAKMP Header. This could either be interpreted as "copy the SPIs from the ISAKMP header of the current message to the DELETE payload" (which is what strongSwan assumed, and the direction IKEv2 took it, by not sending SPIs for IKE), or as clarification that ISAKMP "cookies" are actually the SPIs meant to be put in the payload (but that any ISAKMP SA may be deleted).
* trap-manager: Add option to ignore traffic selectors from acquire eventsTobias Brunner2015-03-231-1/+8
| | | | | | | | The specific traffic selectors from the acquire events, which are derived from the triggering packet, are usually prepended to those from the config. Some implementations might not be able to handle these properly. References #860.
* ikev1: Adopt virtual IPs on new IKE_SA during re-authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-192-32/+111
| | | | | | | | | | | Some clients like iOS/Mac OS X don't do a mode config exchange on the new SA during re-authentication. If we don't adopt the previous virtual IP Quick Mode rekeying will later fail. If a client does do Mode Config we directly reassign the VIPs we migrated from the old SA, without querying the attributes framework. Fixes #807, #810.
* ikev1: Mark rekeyed CHILD_SAs as INSTALLEDTobias Brunner2015-03-191-0/+2
| | | | | Since we keep them around until they finally expire they otherwise would block IKE_SA rekeying/reauthentication.
* child-sa: Remove policies before states to avoid acquire events for ↵Tobias Brunner2015-03-191-16/+16
| | | | untrapped policies
* ikev2: Migrate MOBIKE additional peer addresses to new SA after IKE_SA rekeyingMartin Willi2015-03-181-0/+6
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* ikev2: Immediately initiate queued tasks after establishing rekeyed IKE_SAMartin Willi2015-03-181-0/+29
| | | | | | If additional tasks get queued before/while rekeying an IKE_SA, these get migrated to the new IKE_SA. We previously did not trigger initiation of these tasks, though, leaving the task unexecuted until a new task gets queued.
* ikev2: Don't set old IKE_SA to REKEYING state during make-before-break reauthMartin Willi2015-03-111-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | We are actually not in rekeying state, but just trigger a separate, new IKE_SA as a replacement for the current IKE_SA. Switching to the REKEYING state disables the invocation of both IKE and CHILD_SA updown hooks as initiator, preventing the removal of any firewall rules. Fixes #885.
* kernel-interface: Add a separate "update" flag to add_sa()Martin Willi2015-03-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | The current "inbound" flag is used for two purposes: To define the actual direction of the SA, but also to determine the operation used for SA installation. If an SPI has been allocated, an update operation is required instead of an add. While the inbound flag normally defines the kind of operation required, this is not necessarily true in all cases. On the HA passive node, we install inbound SAs without prior SPI allocation.
* Revert "child-sa: Remove the obsolete update logic"Martin Willi2015-03-091-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | While the the meaning of the "inbound" flag on the kernel_interface->add_sa() call is not very clear, we still need that update logic to allow installation of inbound SAs without SPI allocation. This is used in the HA plugin as a passive node. This reverts commit 698ed656.
* ikev2: Move code in pubkey authenticator's build() method into separate ↵Tobias Brunner2015-03-091-85/+123
| | | | functions
* ikev2: Try all eligible signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-091-34/+71
| | | | | | Previously, we failed without recovery if a private key did not support a selected signature scheme (based on key strength and the other peer's supported hash algorithms).
* ikev1: Set protocol ID and SPIs in INITIAL-CONTACT notification payloadsTobias Brunner2015-03-061-2/+13
| | | | | | | The payload we sent before is not compliant with RFC 2407 and thus some peers might abort negotiation (e.g. with an INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID error). Fixes #819.
* ikev2: Try all RSA signature schemes if none is configuredTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+19
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* ikev2: Consider signature schemes in rightauth when sending hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-041-14/+54
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* keymat: Use hash algorithm setTobias Brunner2015-03-041-29/+7
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* ikev2: Add an option to disable constraints against signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-041-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | If this is disabled the schemes configured in `rightauth` are only checked against signature schemes used in the certificate chain and signature schemes used during IKEv2 are ignored. Disabling this could be helpful if existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 use signature schemes in `rightauth` to verify certificate chains.
* ikev2: Fall back to SHA-1 signatures for RSATobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+7
| | | | | This is really just a fallback to "classic" IKEv2 authentication if the other peer supports no stronger hash algorithms.
* ikev2: Select a signature scheme appropriate for the given keyTobias Brunner2015-03-041-18/+13
| | | | | By enumerating hashes we'd use SHA-1 by default. This way stronger signature schemes are preferred.
* ikev2: Log the actual signature scheme used for RFC 7427 authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+6
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* ikev2: Store signature scheme used to verify peer in auth_cfgTobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | This enables late connection switching based on the signature scheme used for IKEv2 and allows to enforce stronger signature schemes. This may break existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 if signature schemes are currently used in `rightauth` for certificate chain validation and if the configured schemes are stronger than the default used for IKE (e.g. SHA-1 for RSA).
* ikev2: Add a global option to disable RFC 7427 signature authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-2/+12
| | | | This is mostly for testing.
* ikev2: Remove private AUTH_BLISS methodTobias Brunner2015-03-043-18/+1
| | | | | | We use the new signature authentication instead for this. This is not backward compatible but we only released one version with BLISS support, and the key format will change anyway with the next release.
* ikev2: Handle RFC 7427 signature authentication in pubkey authenticatorTobias Brunner2015-03-042-49/+179
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* ikev2: Enable signature authentication by transmitting supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-4/+88
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* keymat: Add facility to store supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-1/+70
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* ikev2: Add new authentication method defined by RFC 7427Tobias Brunner2015-03-042-3/+9
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* ikev2: Only accept initial messages in specific statesTobias Brunner2015-03-041-10/+9
| | | | | | | The previous code allowed an attacker to slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with both SPIs and MID 1 set when an IKE_AUTH would be expected instead. References #816.
* ike-sa-manager: Make sure the message ID of initial messages is 0Tobias Brunner2015-03-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is mandated by the RFCs and it is expected by the task managers. Initial messages with invalid MID will be treated like regular messages, so no IKE_SA will be created for them. Instead, if the responder SPI is 0 no SA will be found and the message is rejected with ALERT_INVALID_IKE_SPI. If an SPI is set and we do find an SA, then we either ignore the message because the MID is unexpected, or because we don't allow initial messages on established connections. There is one exception, though, if an attacker can slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with both SPIs set before the client's IKE_AUTH is handled by the server, it does get processed (see next commit). References #816.
* ikev2: Don't destroy the SA if an IKE_SA_INIT with unexpected MID is receivedTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts 8f727d800751 ("Clean up IKE_SA state if IKE_SA_INIT request does not have message ID 0") because it allowed to close any IKE_SA by sending an IKE_SA_INIT with an unexpected MID and both SPIs set to those of that SA. The next commit will prevent SAs from getting created for IKE_SA_INIT messages with invalid MID. Fixes #816.
* ikev2: Don't adopt any CHILD_SA during make-before-break reauthenticationMartin Willi2015-03-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | While the comment is rather clear that we should not adopt live CHILD_SAs during reauthentication in IKEv2, the code does nonetheless. Add an additional version check to fix reauthentication if the reauth responder has a replace uniqueids policy. Fixes #871.
* ikev2: Merge EAP client authentication details if EAP methods provides themMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+7
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* eap: Add an optional authentication details getter to the EAP method interfaceMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+12
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* ikev2: Schedule a timeout for the delete message following passive IKE rekeyingMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Under some conditions it can happen that the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange for rekeying the IKE_SA initiated by the peer is successful, but the delete message does not follow. For example if processing takes just too long locally, the peer might consider us dead, but we won't notice that. As this leaves the old IKE_SA in IKE_REKEYING state, we currently avoid actively initiating any tasks, such as rekeying or scheduled DPD. This leaves the IKE_SA in a dead and unusable state. To avoid that situation, we schedule a timeout to wait for the DELETE message to follow the CREATE_CHILD_SA, before we actively start to delete the IKE_SA. Alternatively we could start a liveness check on the SA after a timeout to see if the peer still has that state and we can expect the delete to follow. But it is unclear if all peers can handle such messages in this very special state, so we currently don't go for that approach. While we could calculate the timeout based on the local retransmission timeout, the peer might use a different scheme, so a fixed timeout works as well. Fixes #742.
* bus: Add an ike_update() hook invoked when peer endpoints changeMartin Willi2015-02-201-0/+2
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* ikev2: Schedule a make-before-break completion task to delete old IKE_SAMartin Willi2015-02-206-1/+172
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* ikev2: Allow task to skip exchange by setting undefined exchange typeMartin Willi2015-02-201-0/+5
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* ikev2: Trigger make-before-break reauthentication instead of reauth taskMartin Willi2015-02-202-2/+79
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* ike-sa-manager: Use IKEv1 uniqueness reauthentication detection for IKEv2, tooMartin Willi2015-02-201-12/+8
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* attribute-manager: Pass full IKE_SA to handler methodsMartin Willi2015-02-203-9/+5
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* attribute-manager: Pass the full IKE_SA to provider methodsMartin Willi2015-02-203-10/+8
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* attributes: Move the configuration attributes framework to libcharonMartin Willi2015-02-203-25/+24
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* ike: Consistently log CHILD_SAs with their unique_id instead of their reqidMartin Willi2015-02-205-8/+10
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* ike-sa-manager: Remove IKE_SA checkout by CHILD_SA reqidMartin Willi2015-02-202-36/+13
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* inactivity-job: Schedule job by CHILD_SA unique ID instead of reqidMartin Willi2015-02-202-13/+7
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