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* ike-sa-manager: Safely access the RNG instance with an rwlockTobias Brunner2015-07-141-5/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | Threads might still be allocating SPIs (e.g. triggered by an acquire or an inbound message) while the main thread calls flush(). If there is a context switch right after such a thread successfully checked this->rng in get_spi() and the main thread destroys the RNG instance right then, that worker thread will cause a segmentation fault when it continues and attempts to call get_bytes(). Fixes #1014.
* ikev2: Derive additional 4 byte CHILD_SA nonce keymat for ChaCha20-Poly1305Martin Willi2015-06-291-0/+1
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* ikev2: Use four byte salt for ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEADMartin Willi2015-06-291-0/+1
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* ikev2: Enforce remote authentication config before proceeding with own ↵Martin Willi2015-06-051-0/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted. Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client. And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into sending plaintext passwords. This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator starts with its own authentication. Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
* child-sa: Use any fixed reqid configured on the CHILD_SA configMartin Willi2015-06-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | Global reqid allocation (94eb09ac) broke fixed reqid allocation. Resupport them by bypassing allocation in the kernel if a fixed reqid has been configured. Fixes #976.
* unknown-payload: Use a new private payload type and make original type availableTobias Brunner2015-06-011-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | This fixes a DoS and potential remote code execution vulnerability that was caused because the original payload type that was returned previously was used to cast such payload objects to payloads of the indicated type (e.g. when logging notify payloads with a payload type for the wrong IKE version). Fixes CVE-2015-3991.
* ikev1: Trigger children_migrate event if CHILD_SAs are adoptedTobias Brunner2015-05-212-1/+8
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* child-create: Destroy nonceg in migrate()Tobias Brunner2015-05-051-1/+2
| | | | | Since another nonce gets allocated later (if any was allocated already) this would have resulted in a leaked nonce context ID when used in charon-tkm.
* child-create: Fix error handling if nonceg can't be createdTobias Brunner2015-05-051-14/+12
| | | | As with ike-init we can't return NULL in the task constructor.
* ike-init: Fix error handling if nonceg can't be createdTobias Brunner2015-05-051-13/+21
| | | | | | Returning FAILED in the constructor is wrong, but returning NULL doesn't work either as it's currently assumed tasks always can be created. Therefore, delay this check until we actually try to allocate a nonce.
* ike-init: Fix compiler warningTobias Brunner2015-05-051-2/+0
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* ike-init: Make nonceg a member of ike_init structReto Buerki2015-05-041-20/+17
| | | | | | | This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the ike init task. In the TKM use-case the nonce generator cannot be destroyed before the ike init task is finalized, otherwise the created nonce is detected as stale.
* child-create: Make nonceg a member of child_create structReto Buerki2015-05-041-12/+16
| | | | | | | | This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the child create task. In the TKM use-case, it is required to reset the nonce context if the created nonce is not consumed. This happens if the child SA negotiation fails and it is detected before the SA is established via the TKM kernel plugin (i.e. rekey collision).
* Add bool param to ALERT_KEEP_ON_CHILD_SA_FAILURE alertAdrian-Ken Rueegsegger2015-05-041-2/+6
| | | | | The parameter indicates if the alert is raised upon failure to establish the first CHILD SA of an IKE SA.
* ike-vendor: Add some Microsoft vendor IDsTobias Brunner2015-04-211-0/+10
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* utils: Use chunk_equals_const() for all cryptographic purposesMartin Willi2015-04-144-4/+4
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* aead: Create AEAD using traditional transforms with an explicit IV generatorMartin Willi2015-04-131-4/+11
| | | | | | Real AEADs directly provide a suitable IV generator, but traditional crypters do not. For some (stream) ciphers, we should use sequential IVs, for which we pass an appropriate generator to the AEAD wrapper.
* Fixed some typos, courtesy of codespellTobias Brunner2015-03-251-1/+1
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* child-sa: Add a new state to track rekeyed IKEv1 CHILD_SAsTobias Brunner2015-03-254-2/+9
| | | | | | This is needed to handle DELETEs properly, which was previously done via CHILD_REKEYING, which we don't use anymore since 5c6a62ceb6 as it prevents reauthentication.
* ikev1: Inverse check when applying received KE value during Quick Mode5.3.0rc1Martin Willi2015-03-241-1/+1
| | | | Fixes Quick Mode negotiation when PFS is in use.
* diffie-hellman: Add a bool return value to set_other_public_value()Martin Willi2015-03-234-6/+53
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* diffie-hellman: Add a bool return value to get_my_public_value()Martin Willi2015-03-234-5/+22
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* encoding: Allow ke_payload_create_from_diffie_hellman() to failMartin Willi2015-03-234-12/+58
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* diffie-hellman: Use bool instead of status_t as get_shared_secret() return valueMartin Willi2015-03-232-4/+4
| | | | | While such a change is not unproblematic, keeping status_t makes the API inconsistent once we introduce return values for the public value operations.
* ikev1: Make sure SPIs in an IKEv1 DELETE payload match the current SATobias Brunner2015-03-231-0/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OpenBSD's isakmpd uses the latest ISAKMP SA to delete other expired SAs. This caused strongSwan to delete e.g. a rekeyed SA even though isakmpd meant to delete the old one. What isakmpd does might not be standard compliant. As RFC 2408 puts it: Deletion which is concerned with an ISAKMP SA will contain a Protocol-Id of ISAKMP and the SPIs are the initiator and responder cookies from the ISAKMP Header. This could either be interpreted as "copy the SPIs from the ISAKMP header of the current message to the DELETE payload" (which is what strongSwan assumed, and the direction IKEv2 took it, by not sending SPIs for IKE), or as clarification that ISAKMP "cookies" are actually the SPIs meant to be put in the payload (but that any ISAKMP SA may be deleted).
* trap-manager: Add option to ignore traffic selectors from acquire eventsTobias Brunner2015-03-231-1/+8
| | | | | | | | The specific traffic selectors from the acquire events, which are derived from the triggering packet, are usually prepended to those from the config. Some implementations might not be able to handle these properly. References #860.
* ikev1: Adopt virtual IPs on new IKE_SA during re-authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-192-32/+111
| | | | | | | | | | | Some clients like iOS/Mac OS X don't do a mode config exchange on the new SA during re-authentication. If we don't adopt the previous virtual IP Quick Mode rekeying will later fail. If a client does do Mode Config we directly reassign the VIPs we migrated from the old SA, without querying the attributes framework. Fixes #807, #810.
* ikev1: Mark rekeyed CHILD_SAs as INSTALLEDTobias Brunner2015-03-191-0/+2
| | | | | Since we keep them around until they finally expire they otherwise would block IKE_SA rekeying/reauthentication.
* child-sa: Remove policies before states to avoid acquire events for ↵Tobias Brunner2015-03-191-16/+16
| | | | untrapped policies
* ikev2: Migrate MOBIKE additional peer addresses to new SA after IKE_SA rekeyingMartin Willi2015-03-181-0/+6
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* ikev2: Immediately initiate queued tasks after establishing rekeyed IKE_SAMartin Willi2015-03-181-0/+29
| | | | | | If additional tasks get queued before/while rekeying an IKE_SA, these get migrated to the new IKE_SA. We previously did not trigger initiation of these tasks, though, leaving the task unexecuted until a new task gets queued.
* ikev2: Don't set old IKE_SA to REKEYING state during make-before-break reauthMartin Willi2015-03-111-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | We are actually not in rekeying state, but just trigger a separate, new IKE_SA as a replacement for the current IKE_SA. Switching to the REKEYING state disables the invocation of both IKE and CHILD_SA updown hooks as initiator, preventing the removal of any firewall rules. Fixes #885.
* kernel-interface: Add a separate "update" flag to add_sa()Martin Willi2015-03-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | The current "inbound" flag is used for two purposes: To define the actual direction of the SA, but also to determine the operation used for SA installation. If an SPI has been allocated, an update operation is required instead of an add. While the inbound flag normally defines the kind of operation required, this is not necessarily true in all cases. On the HA passive node, we install inbound SAs without prior SPI allocation.
* Revert "child-sa: Remove the obsolete update logic"Martin Willi2015-03-091-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | While the the meaning of the "inbound" flag on the kernel_interface->add_sa() call is not very clear, we still need that update logic to allow installation of inbound SAs without SPI allocation. This is used in the HA plugin as a passive node. This reverts commit 698ed656.
* ikev2: Move code in pubkey authenticator's build() method into separate ↵Tobias Brunner2015-03-091-85/+123
| | | | functions
* ikev2: Try all eligible signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-091-34/+71
| | | | | | Previously, we failed without recovery if a private key did not support a selected signature scheme (based on key strength and the other peer's supported hash algorithms).
* ikev1: Set protocol ID and SPIs in INITIAL-CONTACT notification payloadsTobias Brunner2015-03-061-2/+13
| | | | | | | The payload we sent before is not compliant with RFC 2407 and thus some peers might abort negotiation (e.g. with an INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID error). Fixes #819.
* ikev2: Try all RSA signature schemes if none is configuredTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+19
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* ikev2: Consider signature schemes in rightauth when sending hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-041-14/+54
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* keymat: Use hash algorithm setTobias Brunner2015-03-041-29/+7
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* ikev2: Add an option to disable constraints against signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-041-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | If this is disabled the schemes configured in `rightauth` are only checked against signature schemes used in the certificate chain and signature schemes used during IKEv2 are ignored. Disabling this could be helpful if existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 use signature schemes in `rightauth` to verify certificate chains.
* ikev2: Fall back to SHA-1 signatures for RSATobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+7
| | | | | This is really just a fallback to "classic" IKEv2 authentication if the other peer supports no stronger hash algorithms.
* ikev2: Select a signature scheme appropriate for the given keyTobias Brunner2015-03-041-18/+13
| | | | | By enumerating hashes we'd use SHA-1 by default. This way stronger signature schemes are preferred.
* ikev2: Log the actual signature scheme used for RFC 7427 authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+6
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* ikev2: Store signature scheme used to verify peer in auth_cfgTobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | This enables late connection switching based on the signature scheme used for IKEv2 and allows to enforce stronger signature schemes. This may break existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 if signature schemes are currently used in `rightauth` for certificate chain validation and if the configured schemes are stronger than the default used for IKE (e.g. SHA-1 for RSA).
* ikev2: Add a global option to disable RFC 7427 signature authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-2/+12
| | | | This is mostly for testing.
* ikev2: Remove private AUTH_BLISS methodTobias Brunner2015-03-043-18/+1
| | | | | | We use the new signature authentication instead for this. This is not backward compatible but we only released one version with BLISS support, and the key format will change anyway with the next release.
* ikev2: Handle RFC 7427 signature authentication in pubkey authenticatorTobias Brunner2015-03-042-49/+179
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* ikev2: Enable signature authentication by transmitting supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-4/+88
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* keymat: Add facility to store supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-1/+70
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