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* ike-rekey: Add the name/ID of the redundant IKE_SAs to the log messagesTobias Brunner2016-06-171-8/+13
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* ike-sa-manager: Make sure rng is defined before destroying it in flush()Tobias Brunner2016-06-171-1/+1
| | | | This allows calling flush() multiple times.
* ike-rekey: Establish new IKE_SA earlier as responder, but only if no collisionTobias Brunner2016-06-171-3/+8
| | | | | | Moving to the new SA only after receiving the DELETE for the old SA was not ideal as it rendered the new SA unusable (because it simply didn't exist in the manager) if the DELETE was delayed/got dropped.
* child-delete: Check if the deleted CHILD_SA is the redundant SA of a collisionTobias Brunner2016-06-171-4/+39
| | | | | | This happens if the peer deletes the redundant SA before we are able to handle the response. The deleted SA will be in state CHILD_INSTALLED but we don't want to trigger the child_updown() event for it or recreate it.
* child-rekey: Add method to check for the redundant SA created in a collisionTobias Brunner2016-06-172-18/+37
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* child-rekey: Don't change state to INSTALLED if it was already REKEYINGTobias Brunner2016-06-171-3/+5
| | | | | This happens if there is a rekey collision and the peers disagree on the DH group.
* ikev2: Use CHILD_REKEYED for replaced CHILD_SAs after rekeyingTobias Brunner2016-06-172-9/+12
| | | | This allows handling collisions better, in particular with deletions.
* child-rekey: Use more appropriate error notifies if CHILD_SA is not found or ↵Tobias Brunner2016-06-171-3/+8
| | | | | | getting deleted These are the notifies we should return according to RFC 7296.
* child-rekey: Recreate the CHILD_SA if we receive a CHILD_SA_NOT_FOUND notifyTobias Brunner2016-06-171-0/+28
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* child-create: Handle TEMPORARY_FAILURE notify as failureTobias Brunner2016-06-172-4/+5
| | | | | We will later add code to retry creating the CHILD_SA if we are not rekeying. Rekeying is already rescheduled as with any other errors.
* child-delete: Remove unnecessary call to destroy_child_sa()Tobias Brunner2016-06-171-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Generally, we will not find the CHILD_SA by searching for it with the outbound SPI (the initiator of the DELETE sent its inbound SPI) - and if we found a CHILD_SA it would most likely be the wrong one (one in which we used the same inbound SPI as the peer used for the one it deletes). And we don't actually want to destroy the CHILD_SA at this point as we know we already initiated a DELETE ourselves, which means that task still has a reference to it and will destroy the CHILD_SA when it receives the response from the other peer.
* quick-mode: Fix reporting lifebytes if lifetime is configuredTobias Brunner2016-06-171-2/+2
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* child-sa: Use non-static variable to store generated unique markTobias Brunner2016-06-061-1/+2
| | | | | | If two CHILD_SAs with mark=%unique are created concurrently they could otherwise end up with either the same mark or different marks in both directions.
* ike: Don't trigger message hook when fragmenting pre-generated messagesTobias Brunner2016-06-061-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | This is the case for the IKE_SA_INIT and the initial IKEv1 messages, which are pre-generated in tasks as at least parts of it are used to generate the AUTH payload. The IKE_SA_INIT message will never be fragmented, but the IKEv1 messages might be, so we can't just call generate_message(). Fixes #1478.
* task-manager: Add retransmit cleared alertTobias Brunner2016-06-062-0/+13
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* task-manager: Add retransmit count to retransmit send alertThomas Egerer2016-06-062-2/+4
| | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* ikev1: Queue INFORMATIONAL messages during XAuthTobias Brunner2016-06-061-5/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Some peers send an INITIAL_CONTACT notify after they received our XAuth username. The XAuth task waiting for the third XAuth message handles this incorrectly and closes the IKE_SA as no configuration payloads are contained in the message. We queue the INFORMATIONAL until the XAuth exchange is complete to avoid this issue. Fixes #1434.
* ikev2: Handle INITIAL_CONTACT notifies also when peer is authenticated with EAPTobias Brunner2016-06-061-16/+5
| | | | Fixes #1380.
* child-sa: Install "outbound" FWD policy with lower priorityTobias Brunner2016-05-061-1/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This provides a fix if symmetrically overlapping policies are installed as e.g. the case in the ikev2/ip-two-pools-db scenario: carol 10.3.0.1/32 ----- 10.3.0.0/16, 10.4.0.0/16 moon alice 10.4.0.1/32 ----- 10.3.0.0/16, 10.4.0.0/16 moon Among others, the following FWD policies are installed on moon: src 10.3.0.1/32 dst 10.4.0.0/16 ... tmpl ... src 10.4.0.0/16 dst 10.3.0.1/32 ... src 10.4.0.1/32 dst 10.3.0.0/16 ... tmpl ... src 10.3.0.0/16 dst 10.4.0.1/32 ... Because the network prefixes are the same for all of these they all have the same priority. Due to that it depends on the install order which policy gets used. For instance, a packet from 10.3.0.1 to 10.4.0.1 will match the first as well as the last policy. However, when handling the inbound packet we have to use the first one as the packet will otherwise be dropped due to a template mismatch. And we can't install templates with the "outbound" FWD policies as that would prevent using different IPsec modes or e.g. IPComp on only one of multiple SAs. Instead we install the "outbound" FWD policies with a lower priority than the "inbound" FWD policies so the latter are preferred. But we use a higher priority than default drop policies would use (in case they'd be defined with the same subnets).
* trap-manager: Allow local address to be unspecifiedTobias Brunner2016-05-061-3/+1
| | | | | | | | If there is currently no route to reach the other peer we just default to left=%any. The local address is only really used to resolve leftsubnet=%dynamic anyway (and perhaps for MIPv6 proxy transport mode). Fixes #1375.
* ikev1: Activate DELETE tasks before other tasks in state ESTABLISHEDTobias Brunner2016-05-061-7/+7
| | | | Fixes #1410.
* ikev1: Don't use rekeyed CHILD_SAs for rekey detectionTobias Brunner2016-05-061-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | An old (already rekeyed) CHILD_SA would get switched back into CHILD_REKEYING state. And we actually want to change the currently installed CHILD_SA to that state and later CHILD_REKEYED and properly call e.g. child_rekey() and not do this again with an old CHILD_SA. Instead let's only check installed or currently rekeying CHILD_SAs (in case of a rekey collision). It's also uncommon that there is a CHILD_SA in state CHILD_REKEYED but none in state CHILD_INSTALLED or CHILD_REKEYING, which could happen if e.g. a peer deleted and recreated a CHILD_SA after a rekeying. But in that case we don't want to treat the new CHILD_SA as rekeying (e.g. in regards to events on the bus).
* ikev1: Don't call updown hook etc. when deleting redundant CHILD_SAsTobias Brunner2016-05-061-0/+1
| | | | Fixes #1421.
* vici list-conns sends reauthentication and rekeying time informationAndreas Steffen2016-05-042-2/+2
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* Implemented IPsec policies restricted to given network interfaceAndreas Steffen2016-04-092-2/+20
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* Support manually-set IPsec policy prioritiesAndreas Steffen2016-04-092-20/+43
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* shunt-manager: Install "outbound" FWD policyTobias Brunner2016-04-091-2/+8
| | | | | | If there is a default drop policy forwarded traffic might otherwise not be allowed by a specific passthrough policy (while local traffic is allowed).
* child-sa: Install "outbound" FWD policyTobias Brunner2016-04-091-0/+16
| | | | | | | If there is a DROP shunt that matches outbound forwarded traffic it would get dropped as the FWD policy we install only matches decrypted inbound traffic. That's because the Linux kernel first checks the FWD policies before looking up the OUT policy and SA to encrypt the packets.
* kernel: Use structs to pass information to the kernel-ipsec interfaceTobias Brunner2016-04-092-97/+236
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* Use standard unsigned integer typesAndreas Steffen2016-03-2451-337/+337
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* ike-sa-manager: Avoid memory leak if IKE_SAs get checked in after flush() ↵Tobias Brunner2016-03-231-23/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | was called A thread might check out a new IKE_SA via checkout_new() or checkout_by_config() and start initiating it while the daemon is terminating and the IKE_SA manager is flushed by the main thread. That SA is not tracked yet so the main thread is not waiting for it and the other thread is able to check it in and creating an entry after flush() already terminated causing a memory leak. Fixes #1348.
* Fix some Doxygen issuesTobias Brunner2016-03-111-1/+1
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* ike-sa: Improve interaction between flush_auth_cfg and delayed revocation checksTobias Brunner2016-03-101-26/+37
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* ikev2: Delay online revocation checks during make-before-break reauthenticationTobias Brunner2016-03-101-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We do these checks after the SA is fully established. When establishing an SA the responder is always able to install the CHILD_SA created with the IKE_SA before the initiator can do so. During make-before-break reauthentication this could cause traffic sent by the responder to get dropped if the installation of the SA on the initiator is delayed e.g. by OCSP/CRL checks. In particular, if the OCSP/CRL URIs are reachable via IPsec tunnel (e.g. with rightsubnet=0.0.0.0/0) the initiator is unable to reach them during make-before-break reauthentication as it wouldn't be able to decrypt the response that the responder sends using the new CHILD_SA. By delaying the revocation checks until the make-before-break reauthentication is completed we avoid the problems described above. Since this only affects reauthentication, not the original IKE_SA, and the delay until the checks are performed is usually not that long this doesn't impose much of a reduction in the overall security.
* ikev2: Add task that verifies a peer's certificateTobias Brunner2016-03-105-0/+179
| | | | | | On failure the SA is deleted and reestablished as configured. The task is activated after the REAUTH_COMPLETE task so a make-before-break reauth is completed before the new SA might get torn down.
* ikev2: Initiate other tasks after a no-op taskTobias Brunner2016-03-101-1/+1
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* ikev2: Don't do online revocation checks in pubkey authenticator if requestedTobias Brunner2016-03-101-1/+8
| | | | We also update the auth config so the constraints are not enforced.
* ike-sa: Add condition to suspend online certificate revocation checks for an ↵Tobias Brunner2016-03-101-0/+5
| | | | IKE_SA
* ike-sa: Add method to verify certificates in completed authentication roundsTobias Brunner2016-03-102-0/+111
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* credential-manager: Make online revocation checks optional for public key ↵Tobias Brunner2016-03-102-2/+2
| | | | enumerator
* ike-sa-manager: Log a checkin/failure message for every checkoutThomas Egerer2016-03-071-8/+32
| | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* ike-sa-manager: Log some additional details like SPIs when checking out SAsTobias Brunner2016-03-041-7/+16
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* ikev2: Always store signature scheme in auth-cfgTobias Brunner2016-03-041-12/+1
| | | | As we use a different rule we can always store the scheme.
* ikev2: Diversify signature scheme ruleThomas Egerer2016-03-042-3/+4
| | | | | | | This allows for different signature schemes for IKE authentication and trustchain verification. Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
* ike-init: Verify REDIRECT notify before processing IKE_SA_INIT messageTobias Brunner2016-03-041-7/+51
| | | | | | An attacker could blindly send a message with invalid nonce data (or none at all) to DoS an initiator if we just destroy the SA. To prevent this we ignore the message and wait for the one by the correct responder.
* ikev2: Allow tasks to verify request messages before processing themTobias Brunner2016-03-041-4/+47
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* ikev2: Allow tasks to verify response messages before processing themTobias Brunner2016-03-041-1/+27
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* task: Add optional pre_process() methodTobias Brunner2016-03-041-1/+13
| | | | | This will eventually allow tasks to pre-process and verify received messages.
* ike-init: Ignore notifies related to redirects during rekeyingTobias Brunner2016-03-041-3/+13
| | | | Also don't query redirect providers in this case.
* ike-sa: Add limit for the number of redirects within a defined time periodTobias Brunner2016-03-042-0/+54
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