| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Even when there is no error the CREATE_CHILD_SA response should be sent
in the context of the existing IKE_SA.
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The destroy() method sets the IKE_SA on the bus to NULL, we reset it to
the current IKE_SA so any events and log messages that follow happen in
the correct context.
A practical example where this is problematic is a DH group mismatch,
which causes the first CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to fail. Because the SA
was not reset previously, the message() hook for the CREATE_CHILD_SA
response, for instance, was triggered outside the context of an IKE_SA,
that is, the ike_sa parameter was NULL, which is definitely not expected
by several plugins.
Fixes #862.
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This will allow us to uninstall shunts before unloading the
kernel-interface plugins.
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When flush() is called there might be threads in install() waiting for
trap policies to get installed (without holding the lock). We have to
wait until they updated the entries with the respective CHILD_SAs before
destroying the list.
We also have to prevent further trap policy installations (and wait until
threads in install() are really finished), otherwise we might end up
destroying CHILD_SA objects after the kernel interface implementations
have already been unloaded (avoiding this is the whole point of calling
flush() before unloading the plugins).
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This fixes potential race conditions in case complete() or flush() is
executed before or concurrently with a thread that handles an acquire.
It will also simplify tracking multiple acquires created for the same
trap policy in the future.
Also fixes the behavior in some error situations.
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This basically reverts f4e822c1b422 ("trap-manager: don't check-in
nonexisting IKE_SA if acquire fails"). As checkout_by_config() could
return an already existing and established IKE_SA we have to properly
destroy it, for instance, in case other threads are waiting to check
it out. checkin_and_destroy() should handle the case of a new SA
properly (it produces a log message on level 1, though).
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In some situations it might be valid for a host that configures
right=%any to reestablish or reauthenticate an IKE_SA. Using %any would
immediately abort the initiation causing the new SA to fail (which
might already have the existing CHILD_SAs assigned).
Fixes #1027.
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If static local addresses are configured we should use their address family
as a hint when resolving the remote address.
We don't do this if %any is configured as this might break existing
configurations (%any4 and %any6 are however used as hint).
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Threads might still be allocating SPIs (e.g. triggered by an acquire or
an inbound message) while the main thread calls flush(). If there is a
context switch right after such a thread successfully checked this->rng
in get_spi() and the main thread destroys the RNG instance right then,
that worker thread will cause a segmentation fault when it continues and
attempts to call get_bytes().
Fixes #1014.
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authentication
Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an
initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were
complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK
authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate
and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid
certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted.
Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other
aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not
enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue
responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client.
And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into
sending plaintext passwords.
This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's
authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator
starts with its own authentication.
Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
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Global reqid allocation (94eb09ac) broke fixed reqid allocation. Resupport them
by bypassing allocation in the kernel if a fixed reqid has been configured.
Fixes #976.
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This fixes a DoS and potential remote code execution vulnerability that was
caused because the original payload type that was returned previously was
used to cast such payload objects to payloads of the indicated type (e.g.
when logging notify payloads with a payload type for the wrong IKE version).
Fixes CVE-2015-3991.
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Since another nonce gets allocated later (if any was allocated already)
this would have resulted in a leaked nonce context ID when used in charon-tkm.
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As with ike-init we can't return NULL in the task constructor.
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Returning FAILED in the constructor is wrong, but returning NULL doesn't work
either as it's currently assumed tasks always can be created.
Therefore, delay this check until we actually try to allocate a nonce.
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This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the
ike init task. In the TKM use-case the nonce generator cannot be
destroyed before the ike init task is finalized, otherwise the created
nonce is detected as stale.
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This allows to control the life-cycle of a nonce in the context of the
child create task. In the TKM use-case, it is required to reset the
nonce context if the created nonce is not consumed. This happens if the
child SA negotiation fails and it is detected before the SA is
established via the TKM kernel plugin (i.e. rekey collision).
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The parameter indicates if the alert is raised upon failure to establish
the first CHILD SA of an IKE SA.
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Real AEADs directly provide a suitable IV generator, but traditional crypters
do not. For some (stream) ciphers, we should use sequential IVs, for which
we pass an appropriate generator to the AEAD wrapper.
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This is needed to handle DELETEs properly, which was previously done via
CHILD_REKEYING, which we don't use anymore since 5c6a62ceb6 as it prevents
reauthentication.
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Fixes Quick Mode negotiation when PFS is in use.
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While such a change is not unproblematic, keeping status_t makes the API
inconsistent once we introduce return values for the public value operations.
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OpenBSD's isakmpd uses the latest ISAKMP SA to delete other expired SAs.
This caused strongSwan to delete e.g. a rekeyed SA even though isakmpd
meant to delete the old one.
What isakmpd does might not be standard compliant. As RFC 2408 puts
it:
Deletion which is concerned with an ISAKMP SA will contain a
Protocol-Id of ISAKMP and the SPIs are the initiator and responder
cookies from the ISAKMP Header.
This could either be interpreted as "copy the SPIs from the ISAKMP
header of the current message to the DELETE payload" (which is what
strongSwan assumed, and the direction IKEv2 took it, by not sending SPIs
for IKE), or as clarification that ISAKMP "cookies" are actually the
SPIs meant to be put in the payload (but that any ISAKMP SA may be
deleted).
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The specific traffic selectors from the acquire events, which are derived
from the triggering packet, are usually prepended to those from the
config. Some implementations might not be able to handle these properly.
References #860.
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Some clients like iOS/Mac OS X don't do a mode config exchange on the
new SA during re-authentication. If we don't adopt the previous virtual
IP Quick Mode rekeying will later fail.
If a client does do Mode Config we directly reassign the VIPs we migrated
from the old SA, without querying the attributes framework.
Fixes #807, #810.
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Since we keep them around until they finally expire they otherwise would block
IKE_SA rekeying/reauthentication.
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untrapped policies
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If additional tasks get queued before/while rekeying an IKE_SA, these get
migrated to the new IKE_SA. We previously did not trigger initiation of these
tasks, though, leaving the task unexecuted until a new task gets queued.
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We are actually not in rekeying state, but just trigger a separate, new IKE_SA
as a replacement for the current IKE_SA. Switching to the REKEYING state
disables the invocation of both IKE and CHILD_SA updown hooks as initiator,
preventing the removal of any firewall rules.
Fixes #885.
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The current "inbound" flag is used for two purposes: To define the actual
direction of the SA, but also to determine the operation used for SA
installation. If an SPI has been allocated, an update operation is required
instead of an add.
While the inbound flag normally defines the kind of operation required, this
is not necessarily true in all cases. On the HA passive node, we install inbound
SAs without prior SPI allocation.
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While the the meaning of the "inbound" flag on the kernel_interface->add_sa()
call is not very clear, we still need that update logic to allow installation of
inbound SAs without SPI allocation. This is used in the HA plugin as a passive
node.
This reverts commit 698ed656.
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functions
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Previously, we failed without recovery if a private key did not support
a selected signature scheme (based on key strength and the other peer's
supported hash algorithms).
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The payload we sent before is not compliant with RFC 2407 and thus some
peers might abort negotiation (e.g. with an INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID error).
Fixes #819.
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