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* ikev2: Don't set old IKE_SA to REKEYING state during make-before-break reauthMartin Willi2015-03-111-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | We are actually not in rekeying state, but just trigger a separate, new IKE_SA as a replacement for the current IKE_SA. Switching to the REKEYING state disables the invocation of both IKE and CHILD_SA updown hooks as initiator, preventing the removal of any firewall rules. Fixes #885.
* ha: Destroy synced IKE_SA if no configuration is found during updateMartin Willi2015-03-101-0/+3
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* ikev1: Don't handle DPD timeout job if IKE_SA got passiveMartin Willi2015-03-101-0/+6
| | | | | | While a passively installed IKE_SA does not queue a DPD timeout job, one that switches from active to passive might execute it. Ignore such a queued job if the IKE_SA is in passive state.
* libipsec: Pass separate inbound/update flags to the IPsec SA managerMartin Willi2015-03-091-1/+2
| | | | | Similar to other kernel interfaces, the libipsec backends uses the flag for different purposes, and therefore should get separate flags.
* kernel-interface: Add a separate "update" flag to add_sa()Martin Willi2015-03-094-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | The current "inbound" flag is used for two purposes: To define the actual direction of the SA, but also to determine the operation used for SA installation. If an SPI has been allocated, an update operation is required instead of an add. While the inbound flag normally defines the kind of operation required, this is not necessarily true in all cases. On the HA passive node, we install inbound SAs without prior SPI allocation.
* Revert "child-sa: Remove the obsolete update logic"Martin Willi2015-03-091-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | While the the meaning of the "inbound" flag on the kernel_interface->add_sa() call is not very clear, we still need that update logic to allow installation of inbound SAs without SPI allocation. This is used in the HA plugin as a passive node. This reverts commit 698ed656.
* Revert "ha: Always install the CHILD_SAs with the inbound flag set to FALSE"Martin Willi2015-03-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | While this change results in the correct add/update flag during installation, it exchanges all other values in the child_sa->install() call. We should pass the correct flag, but determine the add/update flag by other means. This reverts commit e722ee5d.
* ikev2: Move code in pubkey authenticator's build() method into separate ↵Tobias Brunner2015-03-091-85/+123
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* ikev2: Try all eligible signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-091-34/+71
| | | | | | Previously, we failed without recovery if a private key did not support a selected signature scheme (based on key strength and the other peer's supported hash algorithms).
* daemon: Remove scheduled jobs before unloading pluginsTobias Brunner2015-03-091-1/+2
| | | | | | | Especially callback jobs might refer to memory that gets invalid after the plugins got unlaoded, so make sure we destroy these jobs before. References #840.
* Make access requestor IP address available to TNC serverAndreas Steffen2015-03-082-12/+39
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* ikev1: Set protocol ID and SPIs in INITIAL-CONTACT notification payloadsTobias Brunner2015-03-061-2/+13
| | | | | | | The payload we sent before is not compliant with RFC 2407 and thus some peers might abort negotiation (e.g. with an INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID error). Fixes #819.
* ikev2: Try all RSA signature schemes if none is configuredTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+19
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* ikev2: Consider signature schemes in rightauth when sending hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-041-14/+54
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* keymat: Use hash algorithm setTobias Brunner2015-03-041-29/+7
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* ikev2: Add an option to disable constraints against signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-041-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | If this is disabled the schemes configured in `rightauth` are only checked against signature schemes used in the certificate chain and signature schemes used during IKEv2 are ignored. Disabling this could be helpful if existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 use signature schemes in `rightauth` to verify certificate chains.
* stroke: Enable BLISS-based public key constraintsTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+19
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* ikev2: Fall back to SHA-1 signatures for RSATobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+7
| | | | | This is really just a fallback to "classic" IKEv2 authentication if the other peer supports no stronger hash algorithms.
* ikev2: Select a signature scheme appropriate for the given keyTobias Brunner2015-03-041-18/+13
| | | | | By enumerating hashes we'd use SHA-1 by default. This way stronger signature schemes are preferred.
* ikev2: Log the actual signature scheme used for RFC 7427 authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+6
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* ikev2: Store signature scheme used to verify peer in auth_cfgTobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | This enables late connection switching based on the signature scheme used for IKEv2 and allows to enforce stronger signature schemes. This may break existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 if signature schemes are currently used in `rightauth` for certificate chain validation and if the configured schemes are stronger than the default used for IKE (e.g. SHA-1 for RSA).
* ikev2: Add a global option to disable RFC 7427 signature authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-2/+12
| | | | This is mostly for testing.
* ikev2: Remove private AUTH_BLISS methodTobias Brunner2015-03-043-18/+1
| | | | | | We use the new signature authentication instead for this. This is not backward compatible but we only released one version with BLISS support, and the key format will change anyway with the next release.
* ikev2: Handle RFC 7427 signature authentication in pubkey authenticatorTobias Brunner2015-03-042-49/+179
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* ikev2: Enable signature authentication by transmitting supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-4/+88
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* keymat: Add facility to store supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-1/+70
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* ikev2: Add SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify payloadTobias Brunner2015-03-042-6/+18
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* ikev2: Add new authentication method defined by RFC 7427Tobias Brunner2015-03-042-3/+9
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* ikev2: Only accept initial messages in specific statesTobias Brunner2015-03-041-10/+9
| | | | | | | The previous code allowed an attacker to slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with both SPIs and MID 1 set when an IKE_AUTH would be expected instead. References #816.
* ike-sa-manager: Make sure the message ID of initial messages is 0Tobias Brunner2015-03-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is mandated by the RFCs and it is expected by the task managers. Initial messages with invalid MID will be treated like regular messages, so no IKE_SA will be created for them. Instead, if the responder SPI is 0 no SA will be found and the message is rejected with ALERT_INVALID_IKE_SPI. If an SPI is set and we do find an SA, then we either ignore the message because the MID is unexpected, or because we don't allow initial messages on established connections. There is one exception, though, if an attacker can slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with both SPIs set before the client's IKE_AUTH is handled by the server, it does get processed (see next commit). References #816.
* ikev2: Don't destroy the SA if an IKE_SA_INIT with unexpected MID is receivedTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts 8f727d800751 ("Clean up IKE_SA state if IKE_SA_INIT request does not have message ID 0") because it allowed to close any IKE_SA by sending an IKE_SA_INIT with an unexpected MID and both SPIs set to those of that SA. The next commit will prevent SAs from getting created for IKE_SA_INIT messages with invalid MID. Fixes #816.
* ikev2: Don't adopt any CHILD_SA during make-before-break reauthenticationMartin Willi2015-03-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | While the comment is rather clear that we should not adopt live CHILD_SAs during reauthentication in IKEv2, the code does nonetheless. Add an additional version check to fix reauthentication if the reauth responder has a replace uniqueids policy. Fixes #871.
* stroke: Support public key constraints for EAP methodsMartin Willi2015-03-031-1/+8
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* eap-ttls: Support EAP auth information getter in EAP-TTLSMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+7
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* eap-tls: Support EAP auth information getter in EAP-TLSMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+7
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* ikev2: Merge EAP client authentication details if EAP methods provides themMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+7
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* eap: Add an optional authentication details getter to the EAP method interfaceMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+12
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* stroke: Serve ca section CA certificates directly, not over central CA setMartin Willi2015-03-033-5/+85
| | | | | | | This makes these CA certificates independent from the purge issued by reread commands. Certificates loaded by CA sections can be removed through ipsec.conf update/reread, while CA certificates loaded implicitly from ipsec.d/cacerts can individually be reread using ipsec rereadcacerts.
* stroke: Purge existing CA/AA certificates during rereadMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+4
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* stroke: Use separate credential sets for CA/AA certificatesMartin Willi2015-03-031-3/+21
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* stroke: Refactor load_certdir functionMartin Willi2015-03-031-108/+158
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* vici: Don't use a default rand_time larger than half of rekey/reauth_timeMartin Willi2015-03-031-3/+11
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* vici: If a IKE reauth_time is configured, disable the default rekey_timeMartin Willi2015-03-031-1/+16
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* ikev2: Schedule a timeout for the delete message following passive IKE rekeyingMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Under some conditions it can happen that the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange for rekeying the IKE_SA initiated by the peer is successful, but the delete message does not follow. For example if processing takes just too long locally, the peer might consider us dead, but we won't notice that. As this leaves the old IKE_SA in IKE_REKEYING state, we currently avoid actively initiating any tasks, such as rekeying or scheduled DPD. This leaves the IKE_SA in a dead and unusable state. To avoid that situation, we schedule a timeout to wait for the DELETE message to follow the CREATE_CHILD_SA, before we actively start to delete the IKE_SA. Alternatively we could start a liveness check on the SA after a timeout to see if the peer still has that state and we can expect the delete to follow. But it is unclear if all peers can handle such messages in this very special state, so we currently don't go for that approach. While we could calculate the timeout based on the local retransmission timeout, the peer might use a different scheme, so a fixed timeout works as well. Fixes #742.
* vici: Support ruby gem out-of-tree buildsMartin Willi2015-02-271-1/+3
| | | | | | | Referencing $(srcdir) in the gemspec is not really an option, as "gem build" includes the full path in the gem, so we need to build in $(srcdir). As there does not seem to be a way to control the output of "gem build", we manually move the gem to $(builddir) in OOT builds.
* ha: Always install the CHILD_SAs with the inbound flag set to FALSEMartin Willi2015-02-271-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | The inbound flag is used to determine if we have to install an update or a new SA in the kernel. As we do not have allocated SPIs and therefore can't update an existing SA in the HA plugin, always set the flag to FALSE. Before 698ed656 we had extra logic for that case, but handling it directly in the HA plugin is simpler.
* forecast: Explicitly cast sockaddr to fix compiler warningTobias Brunner2015-02-231-1/+1
| | | | On Travis we compile with -Werror.
* configure: Use pkg-config to detect libiptc used by connmark/forecastTobias Brunner2015-02-232-4/+4
| | | | | This ensures the library is available. On Debian/Ubuntu it is a dynamic library provided by the iptables-dev package.
* forecast: Add the broadcast/multicast forwarding plugin called forecastMartin Willi2015-02-208-0/+1479
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* connmark: Add CONNMARK rules to select correct output SA based on conntrackMartin Willi2015-02-204-0/+611
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently supports transport mode connections using IPv4 only, and requires a unique mark configured on the connection. To select the correct outbound SA when multiple connections match (i.e. multiple peers connected from the same IP address / NAT router) marks must be configured. This mark should usually be unique, which can be configured in ipsec.conf using mark=0xffffffff. The plugin inserts CONNMARK netfilter target rules: Any peer-initiated flow is tagged with the assigned mark as connmark. On the return path, the mark gets restored from the conntrack entry to select the correct outbound SA.
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