aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src/libcharon
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
...
* vici: Expose Session as a top-level symbol in python packageBjörn Schuberg2015-03-181-0/+1
|
* vici: Introduce main API Session class in python packageBjörn Schuberg2015-03-181-1/+244
|
* vici: Add a python vici command execution handlerBjörn Schuberg2015-03-182-1/+134
|
* vici: Add vici python protocol handlerBjörn Schuberg2015-03-184-0/+199
|
* encoding: Verify the length of KE payload data for known groupsMartin Willi2015-03-181-0/+67
| | | | | | | IKE is very strict in the length of KE payloads, and it should be safe to strictly verify their length. Not doing so is no direct threat, but allows DDoS amplification by sending short KE payloads for large groups using the target as the source address.
* ikev2: Migrate MOBIKE additional peer addresses to new SA after IKE_SA rekeyingMartin Willi2015-03-181-0/+6
|
* ikev2: Immediately initiate queued tasks after establishing rekeyed IKE_SAMartin Willi2015-03-185-0/+176
| | | | | | If additional tasks get queued before/while rekeying an IKE_SA, these get migrated to the new IKE_SA. We previously did not trigger initiation of these tasks, though, leaving the task unexecuted until a new task gets queued.
* vici: Use %u to print stats returned by mallinfo(3)Tobias Brunner2015-03-131-4/+4
| | | | Fixes #886.
* stroke: Use %u to print stats returned by mallinfo(3)Tobias Brunner2015-03-131-1/+1
| | | | References #886.
* eap-radius: Increase Acct-Session-ID string bufferMartin Willi2015-03-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | As the startup timestamp needs 10 characters, we only have left 4 characters for the IKE_SA unique identifier. This is insufficient when having 10000 IKE_SAs or more established, resulting in non-unique session identifiers. Fixes #889.
* ikev2: Don't set old IKE_SA to REKEYING state during make-before-break reauthMartin Willi2015-03-111-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | We are actually not in rekeying state, but just trigger a separate, new IKE_SA as a replacement for the current IKE_SA. Switching to the REKEYING state disables the invocation of both IKE and CHILD_SA updown hooks as initiator, preventing the removal of any firewall rules. Fixes #885.
* ha: Destroy synced IKE_SA if no configuration is found during updateMartin Willi2015-03-101-0/+3
|
* ikev1: Don't handle DPD timeout job if IKE_SA got passiveMartin Willi2015-03-101-0/+6
| | | | | | While a passively installed IKE_SA does not queue a DPD timeout job, one that switches from active to passive might execute it. Ignore such a queued job if the IKE_SA is in passive state.
* libipsec: Pass separate inbound/update flags to the IPsec SA managerMartin Willi2015-03-091-1/+2
| | | | | Similar to other kernel interfaces, the libipsec backends uses the flag for different purposes, and therefore should get separate flags.
* kernel-interface: Add a separate "update" flag to add_sa()Martin Willi2015-03-094-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | The current "inbound" flag is used for two purposes: To define the actual direction of the SA, but also to determine the operation used for SA installation. If an SPI has been allocated, an update operation is required instead of an add. While the inbound flag normally defines the kind of operation required, this is not necessarily true in all cases. On the HA passive node, we install inbound SAs without prior SPI allocation.
* Revert "child-sa: Remove the obsolete update logic"Martin Willi2015-03-091-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | While the the meaning of the "inbound" flag on the kernel_interface->add_sa() call is not very clear, we still need that update logic to allow installation of inbound SAs without SPI allocation. This is used in the HA plugin as a passive node. This reverts commit 698ed656.
* Revert "ha: Always install the CHILD_SAs with the inbound flag set to FALSE"Martin Willi2015-03-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | While this change results in the correct add/update flag during installation, it exchanges all other values in the child_sa->install() call. We should pass the correct flag, but determine the add/update flag by other means. This reverts commit e722ee5d.
* ikev2: Move code in pubkey authenticator's build() method into separate ↵Tobias Brunner2015-03-091-85/+123
| | | | functions
* ikev2: Try all eligible signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-091-34/+71
| | | | | | Previously, we failed without recovery if a private key did not support a selected signature scheme (based on key strength and the other peer's supported hash algorithms).
* daemon: Remove scheduled jobs before unloading pluginsTobias Brunner2015-03-091-1/+2
| | | | | | | Especially callback jobs might refer to memory that gets invalid after the plugins got unlaoded, so make sure we destroy these jobs before. References #840.
* Make access requestor IP address available to TNC serverAndreas Steffen2015-03-082-12/+39
|
* ikev1: Set protocol ID and SPIs in INITIAL-CONTACT notification payloadsTobias Brunner2015-03-061-2/+13
| | | | | | | The payload we sent before is not compliant with RFC 2407 and thus some peers might abort negotiation (e.g. with an INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID error). Fixes #819.
* ikev2: Try all RSA signature schemes if none is configuredTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+19
|
* ikev2: Consider signature schemes in rightauth when sending hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-041-14/+54
|
* keymat: Use hash algorithm setTobias Brunner2015-03-041-29/+7
|
* ikev2: Add an option to disable constraints against signature schemesTobias Brunner2015-03-041-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | If this is disabled the schemes configured in `rightauth` are only checked against signature schemes used in the certificate chain and signature schemes used during IKEv2 are ignored. Disabling this could be helpful if existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 use signature schemes in `rightauth` to verify certificate chains.
* stroke: Enable BLISS-based public key constraintsTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+19
|
* ikev2: Fall back to SHA-1 signatures for RSATobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+7
| | | | | This is really just a fallback to "classic" IKEv2 authentication if the other peer supports no stronger hash algorithms.
* ikev2: Select a signature scheme appropriate for the given keyTobias Brunner2015-03-041-18/+13
| | | | | By enumerating hashes we'd use SHA-1 by default. This way stronger signature schemes are preferred.
* ikev2: Log the actual signature scheme used for RFC 7427 authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+6
|
* ikev2: Store signature scheme used to verify peer in auth_cfgTobias Brunner2015-03-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | This enables late connection switching based on the signature scheme used for IKEv2 and allows to enforce stronger signature schemes. This may break existing connections with peers that don't support RFC 7427 if signature schemes are currently used in `rightauth` for certificate chain validation and if the configured schemes are stronger than the default used for IKE (e.g. SHA-1 for RSA).
* ikev2: Add a global option to disable RFC 7427 signature authenticationTobias Brunner2015-03-041-2/+12
| | | | This is mostly for testing.
* ikev2: Remove private AUTH_BLISS methodTobias Brunner2015-03-043-18/+1
| | | | | | We use the new signature authentication instead for this. This is not backward compatible but we only released one version with BLISS support, and the key format will change anyway with the next release.
* ikev2: Handle RFC 7427 signature authentication in pubkey authenticatorTobias Brunner2015-03-042-49/+179
|
* ikev2: Enable signature authentication by transmitting supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-4/+88
|
* keymat: Add facility to store supported hash algorithmsTobias Brunner2015-03-042-1/+70
|
* ikev2: Add SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify payloadTobias Brunner2015-03-042-6/+18
|
* ikev2: Add new authentication method defined by RFC 7427Tobias Brunner2015-03-042-3/+9
|
* ikev2: Only accept initial messages in specific statesTobias Brunner2015-03-041-10/+9
| | | | | | | The previous code allowed an attacker to slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with both SPIs and MID 1 set when an IKE_AUTH would be expected instead. References #816.
* ike-sa-manager: Make sure the message ID of initial messages is 0Tobias Brunner2015-03-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is mandated by the RFCs and it is expected by the task managers. Initial messages with invalid MID will be treated like regular messages, so no IKE_SA will be created for them. Instead, if the responder SPI is 0 no SA will be found and the message is rejected with ALERT_INVALID_IKE_SPI. If an SPI is set and we do find an SA, then we either ignore the message because the MID is unexpected, or because we don't allow initial messages on established connections. There is one exception, though, if an attacker can slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with both SPIs set before the client's IKE_AUTH is handled by the server, it does get processed (see next commit). References #816.
* ikev2: Don't destroy the SA if an IKE_SA_INIT with unexpected MID is receivedTobias Brunner2015-03-041-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts 8f727d800751 ("Clean up IKE_SA state if IKE_SA_INIT request does not have message ID 0") because it allowed to close any IKE_SA by sending an IKE_SA_INIT with an unexpected MID and both SPIs set to those of that SA. The next commit will prevent SAs from getting created for IKE_SA_INIT messages with invalid MID. Fixes #816.
* ikev2: Don't adopt any CHILD_SA during make-before-break reauthenticationMartin Willi2015-03-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | While the comment is rather clear that we should not adopt live CHILD_SAs during reauthentication in IKEv2, the code does nonetheless. Add an additional version check to fix reauthentication if the reauth responder has a replace uniqueids policy. Fixes #871.
* stroke: Support public key constraints for EAP methodsMartin Willi2015-03-031-1/+8
|
* eap-ttls: Support EAP auth information getter in EAP-TTLSMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+7
|
* eap-tls: Support EAP auth information getter in EAP-TLSMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+7
|
* ikev2: Merge EAP client authentication details if EAP methods provides themMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+7
|
* eap: Add an optional authentication details getter to the EAP method interfaceMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+12
|
* stroke: Serve ca section CA certificates directly, not over central CA setMartin Willi2015-03-033-5/+85
| | | | | | | This makes these CA certificates independent from the purge issued by reread commands. Certificates loaded by CA sections can be removed through ipsec.conf update/reread, while CA certificates loaded implicitly from ipsec.d/cacerts can individually be reread using ipsec rereadcacerts.
* stroke: Purge existing CA/AA certificates during rereadMartin Willi2015-03-031-0/+4
|
* stroke: Use separate credential sets for CA/AA certificatesMartin Willi2015-03-031-3/+21
|
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-08-08 22:07:20 +0000