| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This is mostly for testing.
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We use the new signature authentication instead for this. This is not
backward compatible but we only released one version with BLISS support,
and the key format will change anyway with the next release.
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The previous code allowed an attacker to slip in an IKE_SA_INIT with
both SPIs and MID 1 set when an IKE_AUTH would be expected instead.
References #816.
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It is mandated by the RFCs and it is expected by the task managers.
Initial messages with invalid MID will be treated like regular messages,
so no IKE_SA will be created for them. Instead, if the responder SPI is 0
no SA will be found and the message is rejected with ALERT_INVALID_IKE_SPI.
If an SPI is set and we do find an SA, then we either ignore the message
because the MID is unexpected, or because we don't allow initial messages
on established connections.
There is one exception, though, if an attacker can slip in an IKE_SA_INIT
with both SPIs set before the client's IKE_AUTH is handled by the server,
it does get processed (see next commit).
References #816.
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This reverts 8f727d800751 ("Clean up IKE_SA state if IKE_SA_INIT request
does not have message ID 0") because it allowed to close any IKE_SA by
sending an IKE_SA_INIT with an unexpected MID and both SPIs set to those
of that SA.
The next commit will prevent SAs from getting created for IKE_SA_INIT messages
with invalid MID.
Fixes #816.
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While the comment is rather clear that we should not adopt live CHILD_SAs
during reauthentication in IKEv2, the code does nonetheless. Add an additional
version check to fix reauthentication if the reauth responder has a replace
uniqueids policy.
Fixes #871.
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This makes these CA certificates independent from the purge issued by reread
commands. Certificates loaded by CA sections can be removed through ipsec.conf
update/reread, while CA certificates loaded implicitly from ipsec.d/cacerts
can individually be reread using ipsec rereadcacerts.
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Under some conditions it can happen that the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange for
rekeying the IKE_SA initiated by the peer is successful, but the delete message
does not follow. For example if processing takes just too long locally, the
peer might consider us dead, but we won't notice that.
As this leaves the old IKE_SA in IKE_REKEYING state, we currently avoid actively
initiating any tasks, such as rekeying or scheduled DPD. This leaves the IKE_SA
in a dead and unusable state. To avoid that situation, we schedule a timeout
to wait for the DELETE message to follow the CREATE_CHILD_SA, before we
actively start to delete the IKE_SA.
Alternatively we could start a liveness check on the SA after a timeout to see
if the peer still has that state and we can expect the delete to follow. But
it is unclear if all peers can handle such messages in this very special state,
so we currently don't go for that approach.
While we could calculate the timeout based on the local retransmission timeout,
the peer might use a different scheme, so a fixed timeout works as well.
Fixes #742.
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Referencing $(srcdir) in the gemspec is not really an option, as "gem build"
includes the full path in the gem, so we need to build in $(srcdir). As there
does not seem to be a way to control the output of "gem build", we manually
move the gem to $(builddir) in OOT builds.
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The inbound flag is used to determine if we have to install an update or a new
SA in the kernel. As we do not have allocated SPIs and therefore can't update
an existing SA in the HA plugin, always set the flag to FALSE.
Before 698ed656 we had extra logic for that case, but handling it directly in
the HA plugin is simpler.
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On Travis we compile with -Werror.
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This ensures the library is available. On Debian/Ubuntu it is a dynamic
library provided by the iptables-dev package.
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Currently supports transport mode connections using IPv4 only, and requires
a unique mark configured on the connection.
To select the correct outbound SA when multiple connections match (i.e.
multiple peers connected from the same IP address / NAT router) marks must be
configured. This mark should usually be unique, which can be configured in
ipsec.conf using mark=0xffffffff.
The plugin inserts CONNMARK netfilter target rules: Any peer-initiated flow
is tagged with the assigned mark as connmark. On the return path, the mark
gets restored from the conntrack entry to select the correct outbound SA.
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As with other configuration backends, XAuth is activated with a two round
client authentication using pubkey and xauth. In load-tester, this is configured
with initiator_auth=pubkey|xauth.
Fixes #835.
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With make-before-break IKEv2 re-authentication, virtual IP addresses must be
assigned overlapping to the same peer. With the remote IKE address, the backend
can detect re-authentication attempts by comparing the remote host address and
port. This allows proper reassignment of the virtual IP if it is re-requested.
This change removes the mem-pool.reassign_online option, as it is obsolete now.
IPs get automatically reassigned if a peer re-requests the same address, and
additionally connects from the same address and port.
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While it has some tests that we don't directly cover with the new unit tests,
most of them require special infrastructure and therefore have not been used
for a long time.
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Since pluto is gone, all existing users build upon libcharon.
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When handling thousands of IKE_SAs, the unique ID based lookup is rather slow,
as we have no indexing.
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