| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Fixes: af16b5afb0ee ("Use random ports in NetworkManager backend")
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Rename the crypt() method to avoid conflict with POSIX crypt(). Fixes the
following build failure with musl libc:
In file included from ../../../../src/libstrongswan/utils/utils.h:53:0,
from ../../../../src/libstrongswan/library.h:101,
from af_alg_ops.h:24,
from af_alg_ops.c:16:
af_alg_ops.c:110:22: error: conflicting types for 'crypt'
METHOD(af_alg_ops_t, crypt, bool,
^
../../../../src/libstrongswan/utils/utils/object.h:99:13: note: in definition of macro 'METHOD'
static ret name(union {iface *_public; this;} \
^
In file included from af_alg_ops.c:18:0:
.../host/usr/x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/unistd.h:144:7: note: previous declaration of 'crypt' was here
char *crypt(const char *, const char *);
^
Closes strongswan/strongswan#72.
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The secret storage flag wasn't being saved when using smartcard
authentication, resulting in the PIN being stored.
Fixes #2166.
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Closes strongswan/strongswan#70.
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Closes strongswan/strongswan#69.
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If we jump to `end` without this we crash (not necessarily visibly) due
to a double free and the actual error message is not printed.
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Line 66 yields "TypeError: can't concat bytes to str" using Python 3.4.
"requestdata" was introduced in 22f08609f1b6 but is not actually used.
Since the original "request" is not used anywhere else this can be changed
to be similar to the other UTF-8 encoding changes in that commit.
Fixes: 22f08609f1b6 ("vici: Explicitly set the Python encoding type").
Closes strongswan/strongswan#66.
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responses
When constructing the result, all responses from Netlink were concatenated
iteratively, i.e. for each response, the previously acquired result was
copied to newly allocated memory and the current response appended to it.
This results in O(n^2) copy operations. Instead, we now check for the
total final length of the result and copy the individual responses to it
in one pass, i.e. in O(n) copy operations. In particular, this issue caused
very high CPU usage in memcpy() function as the result is copied over and
over. Common way how to hit the issue is when having 1000+ routes and 5+
connecting clients a second. In that case, the memcpy() function can
take 50%+ of one CPU thread on a decent CPU and the whole charon daemon
is stuck just reading routes and concatenating them together (connecting
clients are blocked in that particular case as this is done under mutex).
Closes strongswan/strongswan#65.
References #2055.
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Only the tests with client authentication failed, the client accepted
the trusted self-signed certificate even when it was expired. On the
server the lookup (based on the pre-configured SAN) first found the ECDSA
cert, which it dismissed for the RSA authentication the client used, and
since only the first "pretrusted" cert is considered the following RSA
cert was verified more thoroughly.
The lookup on the client always uses the full DN of the server certificate
not the pre-configured identity so it found the correct certificate on
the first try.
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Fixes: 05ccde0a8bd9 ("pki: Add generic 'priv' key type that loads any
type of private key")
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If a the original responder narrows the selectors of its peer in addrblock,
the peer gets a subset of that selectors. However, once the original responder
initiates rekeying of that CHILD_SA, it sends the full selectors to the peer,
and then narrows the received selectors locally for the installation, only.
This is insufficient, as the peer ends up with wider selectors, sending traffic
that the original responder will reject to the stricter IPsec policy. So
additionally narrow the selectors when rekeying CHILD_SAs before sending the
TS list to the peer.
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This is different if `ike` and `child` are provided and uninstall()
fails as we call that without knowing whether a matching shunt exists.
But if `ike` is not provided we explicitly search for a matching shunt
and if found don't need to look for a trap policy.
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narrowing
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The tpm plugin can be used to derive true random numbers from a
TPM 2.0 device. The get_random method must be explicitly enabled
in strongswan.conf with the plugin.tpm.use_rng = yes option.
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This provides a solution for configs where there is e.g. a catch-all %any
PSK, while more specific PSKs would be found by the identities of configs
that e.g. use FQDNs as local/remote addresses.
Fixes #2223.
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Memory is allocated with calloc, hence set to zero, thus assigning the
numerical value 0 is not required.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
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The aikpub2 tool has been replaced by pki --pub|--req --keyid hex ..
where keyid indicates the TPM 2.0 private key object handle. Thus
either the public key in PKCS#1 format can be extracted or a PKCS#10
certificate request signed by the TPM private key can be generated.
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pki --keyid
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The initiator's address was sent back twice previously.
Fixes #2268.
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RFC 4303 reserves the SPIs between 1 and 255 for future use. This also
avoids an overflow and a division by zero if spi_min is 0 and spi_max is
0xffffffff.
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We actually want to wait until the IKE_SA is destroyed, not any of the
CHILD_SAs (even though there might not be that much of a difference
depending on the number of CHILD_SAs).
Fixes #2261.
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Fixes #2252.
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Previously, the client had to propose no wider selectors than the certificate
permits, otherwise the complete CHILD_SA was rejected. However, with IKEv2
we can dynamically narrow the selectors to what the certificate allows. This
makes client and gateway configurations very simple by just proposing 0.0.0.0/0,
narrowed to selectors the client is permitted to route into the network.
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This allows a gateway to enforce the addrblock policy on certificates that
actually have the extension only. For (legacy) certificates not having the
extension, traffic selectors are validated/narrowed by other means, most
likely by the configuration.
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Usually, %dynamic is used as traffic selector for transport mode SAs,
however, if wildcard traps are used then the remote TS will be a subnet.
With strongSwan at the remote end that usually works fine as the local
%dynamic TS narrows the proposed TS appropriately. But some
implementations reject non-host TS for transport mode SAs.
Another problem could be if several distinct subnets are configured for a
wildcard trap, as we'd then propose unrelated subnets on that transport
mode SA, which might be problematic even for strongSwan (switch to tunnel
mode and duplicate policies).
Closes strongswan/strongswan#61.
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Users may check is_host(), is_dynamic() or includes() before calling this
if restrictions are required (most actually already do).
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While RFC 3779 says we SHOULD mark it is critical, this has severe side effects
in practice. The addrblock extension is not widely used nor implemented, and
only a few applications can handle this extension. By marking it critical,
none of these applications can make use of such certificates where included
addrblocks do not matter, such as TLS/HTTPS.
If an application wants to make use of addrblocks, that is usually an explicit
decision. Then the very same application obviously can handle addrblocks, and
there is no need for the extension to be critical. In other words, for local
policy checks it is a local matter to handle the extension, hence making it
critical is usually not of much help.
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