diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch | 31 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0023b9b0b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 89dd3f49e1248d7f39401ecc9eecb4e82885e629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> +Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol + +If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination +after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line +buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are +using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack. + +Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs) +--- + lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++-- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/smtp.c ++++ b/lib/smtp.c +@@ -255,8 +255,12 @@ + Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and + only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */ + if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) { ++ char tmpline[6]; ++ + result = TRUE; +- *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10)); ++ memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline)); ++ memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3)); ++ *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10)); + + /* Make sure real server never sends internal value */ + if(*resp == 1) |