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-rw-r--r--main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch31
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0023b9b0b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 89dd3f49e1248d7f39401ecc9eecb4e82885e629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
+Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol
+
+If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination
+after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line
+buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are
+using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack.
+
+Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
+---
+ lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
++++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -255,8 +255,12 @@
+ Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and
+ only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */
+ if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) {
++ char tmpline[6];
++
+ result = TRUE;
+- *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10));
++ memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline));
++ memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3));
++ *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10));
+
+ /* Make sure real server never sends internal value */
+ if(*resp == 1)