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From f468184963e53feda848853c4aefd0197b2cc116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2013 23:36:13 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] integer overflow in XResQueryClientResources()
 [CVE-2013-1988 2/2]

The CARD32 rep.num_types needs to be bounds checked before multiplying
by sizeof(XResType) to avoid integer overflow leading to underallocation
and writing data from the network past the end of the allocated buffer.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
---
 src/XRes.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/XRes.c b/src/XRes.c
index c989985..51e905f 100644
--- a/src/XRes.c
+++ b/src/XRes.c
@@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ Status XResQueryClientResources (
     }
 
     if(rep.num_types) {
-        if((typs = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResType) * rep.num_types))) {
+        if (rep.num_types < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XResType)))
+            typs = Xmalloc(sizeof(XResType) * rep.num_types);
+        else
+            typs = NULL;
+
+        if (typs != NULL) {
             xXResType scratch;
             int i;
 
-- 
1.8.2.3