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From ac0b38fb285fad3165560a26afeeeaf23d850c1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 16:18:18 +1300
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-16851 ldap_server: Check ret before manipulating
blob
In the case of hitting the talloc ~256MB limit, this causes a crash in
the server.
Note that you would actually need to load >256MB of data into the LDAP.
Although there is some generated/hidden data which would help you reach that
limit (descriptors and RMD blobs).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13674
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
---
source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.c b/source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.c
index d9f24e0817c..e5e9688ed98 100644
--- a/source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.c
+++ b/source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.c
@@ -669,13 +669,13 @@ static void ldapsrv_call_writev_start(struct ldapsrv_call *call)
ret = data_blob_append(call, &blob, b.data, b.length);
data_blob_free(&b);
- talloc_set_name_const(blob.data, "Outgoing, encoded LDAP packet");
-
if (!ret) {
ldapsrv_terminate_connection(conn, "data_blob_append failed");
return;
}
+ talloc_set_name_const(blob.data, "Outgoing, encoded LDAP packet");
+
DLIST_REMOVE(call->replies, call->replies);
}
--
2.18.1
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