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From 1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>
Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 10:41:56 +0200
Subject: Fix cookie injection (CVE-2018-0494)
* src/http.c (resp_new): Replace \r\n by space in continuation lines
Fixes #53763
"Malicious website can write arbitrary cookie entries to cookie jar"
HTTP header parsing left the \r\n from continuation line intact.
The Set-Cookie code didn't check and could be tricked to write
\r\n into the cookie jar, allowing a server to generate cookies at will.
Patch-Source: https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
---
src/http.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http.c b/src/http.c
index c8960f1..77bdbbe 100644
--- a/src/http.c
+++ b/src/http.c
@@ -613,9 +613,9 @@ struct response {
resp_header_*. */
static struct response *
-resp_new (const char *head)
+resp_new (char *head)
{
- const char *hdr;
+ char *hdr;
int count, size;
struct response *resp = xnew0 (struct response);
@@ -644,15 +644,23 @@ resp_new (const char *head)
break;
/* Find the end of HDR, including continuations. */
- do
+ for (;;)
{
- const char *end = strchr (hdr, '\n');
+ char *end = strchr (hdr, '\n');
+
if (end)
hdr = end + 1;
else
hdr += strlen (hdr);
+
+ if (*hdr != ' ' && *hdr != '\t')
+ break;
+
+ // continuation, transform \r and \n into spaces
+ *end = ' ';
+ if (end > head && end[-1] == '\r')
+ end[-1] = ' ';
}
- while (*hdr == ' ' || *hdr == '\t');
}
DO_REALLOC (resp->headers, size, count + 1, const char *);
resp->headers[count] = NULL;
--
cgit v1.0-41-gc330
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