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From e00632c06f088bfe4bd110686faa4a7e01a5667b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2018 14:20:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/spec_ctrl: Rename bits of infrastructure to avoid NATIVE
and VMEXIT
In hindsight, using NATIVE and VMEXIT as naming terminology was not clever.
A future change wants to split SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST into PV and HVM
specific implementations, and using VMEXIT as a term is completely wrong.
Take the opportunity to fix some stale documentation in spec_ctrl_asm.h. The
IST helpers were missing from the large comment block, and since
SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST was introduced, we've gained a new piece of
functionality which currently depends on the fine grain control, which exists
in lieu of livepatching. Note this in the comment.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit d9822b8a38114e96e4516dc998f4055249364d5d)
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 2 +-
xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 4 ++--
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
7 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
index 7c91595..d0e9171 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ UNLIKELY_END(svm_trace)
mov VCPU_arch_spec_ctrl(%rbx), %eax
/* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */
- SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
+ SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_HVM /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
pop %r15
pop %r14
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ UNLIKELY_END(svm_trace)
GET_CURRENT(bx)
- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMEXIT /* Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
+ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM /* Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
/* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
mov VCPU_svm_vmcb(%rbx),%rcx
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
index f823850..bdcd3ca 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ ENTRY(vmx_asm_vmexit_handler)
movb $1,VCPU_vmx_launched(%rbx)
mov %rax,VCPU_hvm_guest_cr2(%rbx)
- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMEXIT /* Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
+ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM /* Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
/* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
mov %rsp,%rdi
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ UNLIKELY_END(realmode)
mov VCPU_arch_spec_ctrl(%rbx), %eax
/* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */
- SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
+ SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_HVM /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
mov VCPU_hvm_guest_cr2(%rbx),%rax
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index b62cfcc..015a9e2 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ static enum ind_thunk {
THUNK_JMP,
} opt_thunk __initdata = THUNK_DEFAULT;
static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1;
-static bool __initdata opt_rsb_native = true;
-static bool __initdata opt_rsb_vmexit = true;
+static bool __initdata opt_rsb_pv = true;
+static bool __initdata opt_rsb_hvm = true;
bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true;
uint8_t __read_mostly default_xen_spec_ctrl;
uint8_t __read_mostly default_spec_ctrl_flags;
@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ static int __init parse_bti(const char *s)
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
opt_ibpb = val;
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("rsb_native", s, ss)) >= 0 )
- opt_rsb_native = val;
+ opt_rsb_pv = val;
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("rsb_vmexit", s, ss)) >= 0 )
- opt_rsb_vmexit = val;
+ opt_rsb_hvm = val;
else
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ? " IBRS+" :
" IBRS-" : "",
opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "",
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_NATIVE) ? " RSB_NATIVE" : "",
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT) ? " RSB_VMEXIT" : "");
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV) ? " RSB_NATIVE" : "",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ? " RSB_VMEXIT" : "");
printk("XPTI: %s\n",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NO_XPTI) ? "disabled" : "enabled");
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
* If a processors speculates to 32bit PV guest kernel mappings, it is
* speculating in 64bit supervisor mode, and can leak data.
*/
- if ( opt_rsb_native )
+ if ( opt_rsb_pv )
{
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_NATIVE);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV);
default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_rsb;
}
@@ -317,8 +317,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
* HVM guests can always poison the RSB to point at Xen supervisor
* mappings.
*/
- if ( opt_rsb_vmexit )
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+ if ( opt_rsb_hvm )
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM);
/* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */
if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) )
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
index c538643..63cd51f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
mov VCPU_arch_spec_ctrl(%rbx), %eax
/* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */
- SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
+ SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
RESTORE_ALL adj=8 compat=1
.Lft0: iretq
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
index 7004f52..cdf5090 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ restore_all_guest:
mov %r15d, %eax
/* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */
- SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
+ SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV /* Req: a=spec_ctrl %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: cd */
RESTORE_ALL
testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
index 6119bab..1353fe5 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
@@ -29,6 +29,6 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IND_THUNK_LFENCE,(FSCAPINTS+0)*32+15) /* Use IND_THUNK_LFENCE */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(IND_THUNK_JMP, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+16) /* Use IND_THUNK_JMP */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBPB, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+17) /* IBRSB || IBPB */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+18) /* MSR_SPEC_CTRL used by Xen */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(RSB_NATIVE, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+20) /* RSB overwrite needed for native */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(RSB_VMEXIT, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+21) /* RSB overwrite needed for vmexit */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_PV, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+20) /* RSB overwrite needed for PV */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+21) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(NO_XPTI, (FSCAPINTS+0)*32+22) /* XPTI mitigation not in use */
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
index 941aeb7..b330e20 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
@@ -72,11 +72,14 @@
*
* The following ASM fragments implement this algorithm. See their local
* comments for further details.
- * - SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMEXIT
+ * - SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM
* - SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV
* - SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR
+ * - SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
+ * - SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN_IST
* - SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN
- * - SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST
+ * - SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV
+ * - SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_HVM
*/
.macro DO_OVERWRITE_RSB tmp=rax
@@ -117,7 +120,7 @@
mov %\tmp, %rsp /* Restore old %rsp */
.endm
-.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMEXIT
+.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM
/*
* Requires %rbx=current, %rsp=regs/cpuinfo
* Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx
@@ -216,23 +219,23 @@
.endm
/* Use after a VMEXIT from an HVM guest. */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMEXIT \
+#define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM \
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP40), \
- DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT; \
+ DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM; \
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP36), \
- DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMEXIT, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR
+ DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR
/* Use after an entry from PV context (syscall/sysenter/int80/int82/etc). */
#define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV \
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP40), \
- DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_RSB_NATIVE; \
+ DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV; \
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP25), \
__stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=0), X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR
/* Use in interrupt/exception context. May interrupt Xen or PV context. */
#define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR \
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP40), \
- DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_RSB_NATIVE; \
+ DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV; \
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP33), \
__stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1), X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR
@@ -241,12 +244,22 @@
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP17), \
DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR
-/* Use when exiting to guest context. */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST \
+/* Use when exiting to PV guest context. */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV \
ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP24), \
DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR
-/* TODO: Drop these when the alternatives infrastructure is NMI/#MC safe. */
+/* Use when exiting to HVM guest context. */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_HVM \
+ ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ASM_NOP24), \
+ DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR
+
+/*
+ * Use in IST interrupt/exception context. May interrupt Xen or PV context.
+ * Fine grain control of SCF_ist_wrmsr is needed for safety in the S3 resume
+ * path to avoid using MSR_SPEC_CTRL before the microcode introducing it has
+ * been reloaded.
+ */
.macro SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
/*
* Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end
@@ -293,6 +306,7 @@ UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise):
UNLIKELY_END(\@_serialise)
.endm
+/* Use when exiting to Xen in IST context. */
.macro SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN_IST
/*
* Requires %rbx=stack_end
--
2.1.4
|
