main/openssl: security fix for CVE-2016-2177, CVE-2016-2178

3 files changed, 395 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
index fbc436fec..8426176d8 100644
--- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
 pkgname=openssl
 pkgver=1.0.2h
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Toolkit for SSL v2/v3 and TLS v1"
 url="http://openssl.org"
 depends=
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ source="http://www.openssl.org/source/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz
 	1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch
 	1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch
 	1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch
+	CVE-2016-2177.patch
+	CVE-2016-2178.patch
 	"
 
 _builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
@@ -125,7 +127,9 @@ ed6e779e9799aeb7e029929a5719e631  0005-fix-parallel-build.patch
 742ee13d88b13414248f329a09f9a92d  0010-ssl-env-zlib.patch
 25091afb907de2b504f8bad6bf70002c  1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch
 aa16c89b283faf0fe546e3f897279c44  1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch
-57cca845e22c178c3b317010be56edf0  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch"
+57cca845e22c178c3b317010be56edf0  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch
+1accc0880b6e95726ea9f668808cd8ba  CVE-2016-2177.patch
+5c8e962b3d7e0082c1af432f6d0ad221  CVE-2016-2178.patch"
 sha256sums="1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919  openssl-1.0.2h.tar.gz
 b449fb998b5f60a3a1779ac2f432b2c7f08ae52fc6dfa98bca37d735f863d400  0002-busybox-basename.patch
 c3e6a9710726dac72e3eeffd78961d3bae67a480f6bde7890e066547da25cdfd  0003-use-termios.patch
@@ -138,7 +142,9 @@ c934b5d1a2cb58b5235da2dfee423f0f66bb83e1d479f511b444751899637c37  0007-reimpleme
 fa2e3101ca7c6daed7ea063860d586424be7590b1cec4302bc2beee1a3c6039f  0010-ssl-env-zlib.patch
 2eddcb7ab342285cb637ce6b6be143cca835f449f35dd9bb8c7b9167ba2117a7  1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch
 aee88a24622ce9d71e38deeb874e58435dcf8ff5690f56194f0e4a00fb09b260  1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch
-c10b8aaf56a4f4f79ca195fc587e0bb533f643e777d7a3e6fb0350399a6060ea  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch"
+c10b8aaf56a4f4f79ca195fc587e0bb533f643e777d7a3e6fb0350399a6060ea  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch
+e321860623758c8a98b15dfa0b4671244e2cff34b5c62a489c43437d1053ed06  CVE-2016-2177.patch
+7abe837d39953d0c0f694013a54f444e6f9ca0db8b98ca8aaf1d58683086784e  CVE-2016-2178.patch"
 sha512sums="780601f6f3f32f42b6d7bbc4c593db39a3575f9db80294a10a68b2b0bb79448d9bd529ca700b9977354cbdfc65887c76af0aa7b90d3ee421f74ab53e6f15c303  openssl-1.0.2h.tar.gz
 2244f46cb18e6b98f075051dd2446c47f7590abccd108fbab707f168a20cad8d32220d704635973f09e3b2879f523be5160f1ffbc12ab3900f8a8891dc855c5c  0002-busybox-basename.patch
 58e42058a0c8086c49d681b1e226da39a8cf8cb88c51cf739dec2ff12e1bb5d7208ac5033264b186d58e9bdfe992fe9ddb95701d01caf1824396b2cefe30c0a4  0003-use-termios.patch
@@ -151,4 +157,6 @@ fc4e383ec85c6543e4e82520904122a5a5601c68042ece1e95a0cae95e02d89174f06f78ba2f8aac
 5febe20948e3f12d981e378e1f4ea538711657aacb6865a1aa91339d4a04277e250f490a1f2abc2c6f290bdc2b1bffdba1d00983b4c09f7ea983eef8163f9420  0010-ssl-env-zlib.patch
 8c181760d7a149aa18d246d50f1c0438ffb63c98677b05306dfc00400ad0429b47d31e7c8d85126005c67f743d23e7a8a81174ffe98556f4caf9cf6b04d9ff17  1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch
 a3555440b5f544bfd6b9ad97557d8f4c1d673f6a35219f65056a72035d186be5f354717ddf9784899b602464d48657b090ade24379552d43af97609c0f48c389  1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch
-6353c7a94016c20db5d683dde37775f6780952ecdb1a5f39f878d04ba37f6ad79ae10fb6d65d181d912505a5d1e22463004cd855d548b364c00b120da2b0fdbc  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch"
+6353c7a94016c20db5d683dde37775f6780952ecdb1a5f39f878d04ba37f6ad79ae10fb6d65d181d912505a5d1e22463004cd855d548b364c00b120da2b0fdbc  1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch
+6e149213d1c4cbab06e0aedeb04562f96c1430e6e8f9b9836ff4ddd79da361db2bcfbdf83f6615369e8feaaefecfc0dc5f9cee3b56c2eeeca57233a2daf25d2c  CVE-2016-2177.patch
+9a90ee6b6329dea17a70c6cd62fbf349289b4beab74137adc2448c54652501c2ff47694b9154da6e610e8b947ff2070e0460fe2754b62301a6a439e16eb6fd1b  CVE-2016-2178.patch"
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ca934c20a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+A common idiom in the codebase is:
+
+if (p + len > limit)
+{
+    return; /* Too long */
+}
+
+Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+limit == p + SIZE
+
+"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+message).
+
+The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+undefined behaviour.
+
+For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
+
+Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
+
+CVE-2016-2177
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/s3_srvr.c  | 14 +++++++-------
+ ssl/ssl_sess.c |  2 +-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c   | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ 
+-        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
++        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     /* get the session-id */
+     j = *(p++);
+ 
+-    if (p + j > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < j) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
+@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+         /* cookie stuff */
+-        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+         }
+         cookie_len = *(p++);
+ 
+-        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
+@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     }
+ 
+     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+-    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     /* compression */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+index b182998..54ee783 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     int r;
+ #endif
+ 
+-    if (session_id + len > limit) {
++    if (limit - session_id < len) {
+         fatal = 1;
+         goto err;
+     }
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fb64607..cdac011 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+     };
+ 
+-    if (data >= (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data <= 2)
+         return;
+     data += 2;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 4))
++    if (limit - data < 4)
+         return;
+     n2s(data, type);
+     n2s(data, size);
+@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+         return;
+ 
+-    if (data + size > limit)
++    if (limit - data < size)
+         return;
+     data += size;
+ 
+@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+             return;
+@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     } else {
+         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+             return;
+@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+     if (data == limit)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data < 2)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     n2s(data, len);
+ 
+-    if (data + len != limit)
++    if (limit - data != len)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (limit))
++        if (limit - data < size)
+             goto err;
+ # if 0
+         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
+@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
+     if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
+         return 1;
+ 
+-    if (data >= limit - 2)
++    if (limit - data <= 2)
+         return 1;
+     n2s(data, len);
+ 
+-    if (data > limit - len)
++    if (limit - data < len)
+         return 1;
+ 
+-    while (data <= limit - 4) {
++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > limit)
++        if (limit - data < size)
+             return 1;
+         if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+             return 0;
+@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ # endif
+ 
+-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
++    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+     n2s(data, length);
+-    if (data + length != d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - data != length) {
+         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
++    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (d + n))
++        if ((d + n) - data < size)
+             goto ri_check;
+ 
+         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+         i = *(p++);
+-        p += i;
+-        if (p >= limit)
++
++        if (limit - p <= i)
+             return -1;
++
++        p += i;
+     }
+     /* Skip past cipher list */
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p > limit)
++    if (limit - p < i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Now at start of extensions */
+-    if ((p + 2) >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= 2)
+         return 0;
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
++    while (limit - p >= 4) {
+         unsigned short type, size;
+         n2s(p, type);
+         n2s(p, size);
+-        if (p + size > limit)
++        if (limit - p < size)
+             return 0;
+         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+             int r;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8b8f46eab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
+Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+
+Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+CVE-2016-2178
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+index efc4f1b..b29eb4b 100644
+--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+             goto err;
+     while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+-    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+-        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+-    }
+ 
+     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+         }
+ 
+         K = &kq;
++
++        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+     } else {
+         K = &k;
+     }
++
+     DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
+                    dsa->method_mont_p);
+     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+From b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 09:12:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+
+The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
+the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
+BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.
+
+CVE-2016-2178
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+index b29eb4b..58013a4 100644
+--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -247,7 +247,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+     do
+         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+             goto err;
+-    while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
++    while (BN_is_zero(&k));
++
++    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
++        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++    }
++
+ 
+     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+@@ -261,6 +266,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+         if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
+             goto err;
+ 
++        BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++
+         /*
+          * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
+          * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
+@@ -276,8 +283,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+         }
+ 
+         K = &kq;
+-
+-        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+     } else {
+         K = &k;
+     }
+-- 
+1.9.1
+