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authorWilliam Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>2011-02-08 00:07:08 -0600
committerWilliam Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>2011-02-08 00:07:08 -0600
commit4e75b2fc40c44c49152adb497660f6189261a929 (patch)
tree28cce9c750130277da370ca2cb1087c6c0b6010b /main/gradm
parentb87391cc121aafd3de4c59466696a3b63dde8964 (diff)
downloadaports-4e75b2fc40c44c49152adb497660f6189261a929.tar.bz2
aports-4e75b2fc40c44c49152adb497660f6189261a929.tar.xz
testing/gradm: move to main
Diffstat (limited to 'main/gradm')
-rw-r--r--main/gradm/APKBUILD57
-rw-r--r--main/gradm/base.policyd133
-rw-r--r--main/gradm/grsec-rbac.initd14
-rw-r--r--main/gradm/policy211
4 files changed, 415 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/gradm/APKBUILD b/main/gradm/APKBUILD
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..08dbd3af0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/gradm/APKBUILD
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Contributor: William Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>
+# Maintainer: William Pitcock <nenolod@dereferenced.org>
+pkgname=gradm
+pkgver=2.2.0
+pkgrel=5
+pkgdesc="administrative utility for grsecurity kernels"
+url="http://www.grsecurity.org/"
+arch="all"
+license="GPL"
+makedepends="bison flex"
+install=""
+subpackages="$pkgname-doc"
+source="http://grsecurity.net/stable/gradm-2.2.0-201011061849.tar.gz
+ policy
+ base.policyd
+ grsec-rbac.initd"
+
+_builddir="$srcdir/gradm2"
+prepare() {
+ local i
+ cd "$_builddir"
+ for i in $source; do
+ case $i in
+ *.patch) msg $i; patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/$i || return 1;;
+ esac
+ done
+}
+
+build() {
+ cd "$_builddir"
+ make || return 1
+}
+
+package() {
+ cd "$_builddir"
+ make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install || return 1
+
+ # we don't want the grsecurity-recommended policy as it's old
+ # and non-modular.
+ rm "$pkgdir"/etc/grsec/policy
+
+ # install the base policy file which pulls in everything else.
+ install -m644 "$srcdir"/policy "$pkgdir"/etc/grsec/policy
+
+ # prepare and install base policy to /var/lib/grsec/policy.d
+ install -d -D "$pkgdir"/var/lib/grsec/policy.d
+ install -m644 "$srcdir"/base.policyd "$pkgdir"/var/lib/grsec/policy.d/00-base
+
+ # install grsec-rbac into initd
+ install -d -D "$pkgdir"/etc/init.d
+ install -m755 "$srcdir"/grsec-rbac.initd "$pkgdir"/etc/init.d/grsec-rbac
+}
+
+md5sums="081765637a407dd7e4cd07f95413d6b8 gradm-2.2.0-201011061849.tar.gz
+38ee3aef884bdcfe6a5b925760f6220b policy
+1d4a2c2e522b7124ad901ae102181e72 base.policyd
+2fc5d055dd43a2d9e1bed378dcab8641 grsec-rbac.initd"
diff --git a/main/gradm/base.policyd b/main/gradm/base.policyd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf66e7301
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/gradm/base.policyd
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+role admin sA
+subject / rvka
+ / rwcdmlxi
+
+role default G
+role_transitions admin
+subject / dpo
+ / r
+ /opt rx
+ /home rwxcd
+ /mnt rw
+ /dev
+ /dev/grsec h
+ /dev/urandom r
+ /dev/random r
+ /dev/zero rw
+ /dev/input rw
+ /dev/psaux rw
+ /dev/null rw
+ /dev/tty? rw
+ /dev/hvc? rw
+ /dev/console rw
+ /dev/tty rw
+ /dev/pts rw
+ /dev/ptmx rw
+ /dev/dsp rw
+ /dev/mixer rw
+ /dev/initctl rw
+ /dev/fd0 r
+ /dev/cdrom r
+ /dev/mem h
+ /dev/kmem h
+ /dev/port h
+ /bin rx
+ /sbin rx
+ /lib rx
+ /usr rx
+ /etc rx
+ /proc rwx
+ /proc/slabinfo h
+ /proc/kcore h
+ /proc/kallsyms h
+ /proc/modules h
+ /proc/sys r
+ /root r
+ /tmp rwcd
+ /var rwxcd
+ /var/tmp rwcd
+ /var/log r
+ /boot h
+ /lib/modules h
+ /etc/grsec h
+ /var/lib/grsec h
+
+ -CAP_KILL
+ -CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
+ -CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
+ -CAP_NET_RAW
+ -CAP_MKNOD
+ -CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ -CAP_SYS_RAWIO
+ -CAP_SYS_MODULE
+ -CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ -CAP_NET_ADMIN
+ -CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
+ -CAP_NET_RAW
+ -CAP_SYS_CHROOT
+ -CAP_SYS_BOOT
+ -CAP_SETFCAP
+
+# the d flag protects /proc fd and mem entries for sshd
+# all daemons should have 'p' in their subject mode to prevent
+# an attacker from killing the service (and restarting it with trojaned
+# config file or taking the port it reserved to run a trojaned service)
+subject /usr/sbin/sshd dpo
+ / h
+ /bin/sh x
+ /bin/bash x
+ /dev h
+ /dev/log rw
+ /dev/random r
+ /dev/urandom r
+ /dev/null rw
+ /dev/ptmx rw
+ /dev/pts rw
+ /dev/tty rw
+ /dev/tty? rw
+ /etc r
+ /etc/passwd r
+ /etc/shadow r
+ /etc/grsec h
+ /home rwcd
+ /lib rx
+ /root
+ /proc r
+ /proc/*/oom_adj w
+ /proc/kcore h
+ /proc/sys h
+ /usr/lib rx
+ /usr/share/zoneinfo r
+ /var/log
+ /var/mail
+ /var/log/lastlog rw
+ /var/log/wtmp w
+ /var/run/sshd
+ /var/run/utmp rw
+ /var/empty rw
+
+ -CAP_ALL
+ +CAP_CHOWN
+ +CAP_SETGID
+ +CAP_SETUID
+ +CAP_SYS_CHROOT
+ +CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
+ +CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
+
+subject /usr/bin/ssh
+ /etc/ssh/ssh_config r
+
+subject /bin/busybox
+ +CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ +CAP_SYS_BOOT
+ /root/.ash_history rw
+ /dev/log rwc
+ /var/log rwc
+ /var/log/messages rwc
+ /var/log/wtmp w
+ /var/log/faillog rwcd
+
+subject /usr/bin/sudo
+ +CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ /dev/log rw
+
diff --git a/main/gradm/grsec-rbac.initd b/main/gradm/grsec-rbac.initd
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fe0eec55c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/gradm/grsec-rbac.initd
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/sbin/runscript
+
+start() {
+ ebegin "Enabling grsecurity RBAC policy"
+ gradm -E
+ eend $?
+}
+
+stop() {
+ ebegin "Disabling grsecurity RBAC policy"
+ gradm -D
+ eend $?
+}
+
diff --git a/main/gradm/policy b/main/gradm/policy
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5a3df439
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/gradm/policy
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+# Base grsecurity policy for Alpine.
+#
+# If you want to use a custom policy, or add on local modifications to
+# the system policy, edit below the include line or remove the include
+# line to completely remove the system policy entirely from your setup.
+#
+# Documentation on the file format as provided in the sample policy file
+# follow below for your reference:
+## Role flags:
+# A -> This role is an administrative role, thus it has special privilege normal
+# roles do not have. In particular, this role bypasses the
+# additional ptrace restrictions
+# N -> Don't require authentication for this role. To access
+# the role, use gradm -n <rolename>
+# s -> This role is a special role, meaning it does not belong to a
+# user or group, and does not require an enforced secure policy
+# base to be included in the ruleset
+# u -> This role is a user role
+# g -> This role is a group role
+# G -> This role can use gradm to authenticate to the kernel
+# A policy for gradm will automatically be added to the role
+# T -> Enable TPE for this role
+# l -> Enable learning for this role
+# P -> Use PAM authentication for this role.
+#
+# a role can only be one of user, group, or special
+#
+# role_allow_ip IP/optional netmask
+# eg: role_allow_ip 192.168.1.0/24
+# You can have as many of these per role as you want
+# They restrict the use of a role to a list of IPs. If a user
+# is on the system that would normally get the role does not
+# belong to those lists of IPs, the system falls back through
+# its method of determining a role for the user
+#
+# Role hierarchy
+# user -> group -> default
+# First a user role attempts to match, if one is not found,
+# a group role attempts to match, if one is not found,
+# the default role is used.
+#
+# role_transitions <special role 1> <special role 2> ... <special role n>
+# eg: role_transitions www_admin dns_admin
+#
+# role transitions specify which special roles a given role is allowed
+# to authenticate to. This applies to special roles that do not
+# require password authentication as well. If a user tries to
+# authenticate to a role that is not within his transition table, he
+# will receive a permission denied error
+#
+# Nested subjects
+# subject /bin/su:/bin/bash:/bin/cat
+# / rwx
+# +CAP_ALL
+# grant privilege to specific processes if they are executed
+# within a trusted path. In this case, privilege is
+# granted if /bin/cat is executed from /bin/bash, which is
+# executed from /bin/su.
+#
+# Configuration inheritance on nested subjects
+# nested subjects inherit rules from their parents. In the
+# example above, the nested subject would inherit rules
+# from the nested subject for /bin/su:/bin/bash,
+# and the subject /bin/su
+# View the 1.9.x documentation for more information on
+# configuration inheritance
+#
+# new object modes:
+# m -> allow creation of setuid/setgid files/directories
+# and modification of files/directories to be setuid/setgid
+# M -> audit the setuid/setgid creation/modification
+# c -> allow creation of the file/directory
+# C -> audit the creation
+# d -> allow deletion of the file/directory
+# D -> audit the deletion
+# p -> reject all ptraces to this object
+# l -> allow a hardlink at this path
+# (hardlinking requires at a minimum c and l modes, and the target
+# link cannot have any greater permission than the source file)
+# L -> audit link creation
+# new subject modes:
+# O -> disable "writable library" restrictions for this task
+# t -> allow this process to ptrace any process (use with caution)
+# r -> relax ptrace restrictions (allows process to ptrace processes
+# other than its own descendants)
+# i -> enable inheritance-based learning for this subject, causing
+# all accesses of this subject and anything it executes to be placed
+# in this subject, and inheritance flags added to executable objects
+# in this subject
+# a -> allow this process to talk to the /dev/grsec device
+#
+# user/group transitions:
+# You may now specify what users and groups a given subject can
+# transition to. This can be done on an inclusive or exclusive basis.
+# Omitting these rules allows a process with proper privilege granted by
+# capabilities to transition to any user/group.
+#
+# Examples:
+# subject /bin/su
+# user_transition_allow root spender
+# group_transition_allow root spender
+# subject /bin/su
+# user_transition_deny evilhacker
+# subject /bin/su
+# group_transition_deny evilhacker1 evilhacker2
+#
+# Domains:
+# With domains you can combine users that don't share a common
+# GID as well as groups so that they share a single policy
+# Domains work just like roles, with the only exception being that
+# the line starting with "role" is replaced with one of the following:
+# domain somedomainname u user1 user2 user3 user4 ... usern
+# domain somedomainname g group1 group2 group3 group4 ... groupn
+#
+# Inverted socket policies:
+# Rules such as
+# connect ! www.google.com:80 stream tcp
+# are now allowed, which allows you to specify that a process can connect to anything
+# except to port 80 of www.google.com with a stream tcp socket
+# the inverted socket matching also works on bind rules
+#
+# INADDR_ANY overriding
+# You can now force a given subject to bind to a particular IP address on the machine
+# This is useful for some chrooted environments, to ensure that the source IP they
+# use is one of your choosing
+# to use, add a line like:
+# ip_override 192.168.0.1
+#
+# Per-interface socket policies:
+# Rules such as
+# bind eth1:80 stream tcp
+# bind eth0#1:22 stream tcp
+# are now allowed, giving you the ability to tie specific socket rules
+# to a single interface (or by using the inverted rules, all but one
+# interface). Virtual interfaces are specified by the <ifname>#<vindex>
+# syntax. If an interface is specified, no IP/netmask or host may be
+# specified for the rule.
+#
+# New learning system:
+# To learn on a given subject: add l (the letter l, not the number 1)
+# to the subject mode
+# If you want to learn with the most restrictive policy, use the
+# following:
+# subject /path/to/bin lo
+# / h
+# -CAP_ALL
+# connect disabled
+# bind disabled
+# Resource learning is also supported, so lines like
+# RES_AS 0 0
+# can be used to learn a particular resource
+#
+# To learn on a given role, add l to the role mode
+# For both of these, to enable learning, enable the system like:
+# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -E
+# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the
+# learning phase with:
+# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy
+# To use full system learning, enable the system like:
+# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs
+# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the
+# learning phase with:
+# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy
+#
+# New PaX flag format (replaces PaX subject flags):
+# PaX flags can be forced on or off, regardless of the flags on the
+# binary, by using + or - before the following PaX flag names:
+# PAX_SEGMEXEC
+# PAX_PAGEEXEC
+# PAX_MPROTECT
+# PAX_RANDMMAP
+# PAX_EMUTRAMP
+#
+# New feature for easier policy maintenance:
+# replace <variable name> <replace string>
+# e.g.:
+# replace CVSROOT /home/cvs
+# now $(CVSROOT) can be used in any subject or object pathname, like:
+# $(CVSROOT)/grsecurity r
+# This will translate to /home/cvs/grsecurity r
+# This feature makes it easier to update policies by naming specific
+# paths by their function, then only having to update those paths once
+# to have it affect a large number of subjects/objects.
+#
+# capability auditing / log suppression
+# use of a capability can be audited by adding "audit" to the line, eg:
+# +CAP_SYS_RAWIO audit
+# log suppression for denial of a capbility can be done by adding "suppress":
+# -CAP_SYS_RAWIO suppress
+#
+# Note that the omission of any feature of a role or subject
+# results in a default-allow
+# For instance, if no capability rules are added, an implicit +CAP_ALL is used
+#
+
+#
+# Default security policy provided by packages in Alpine are installed into
+# /var/lib/grsec/policy.d as /var/lib/grsec/policy.d/$pkgname where $pkgname
+# is the package name. It is not recommended that you edit those definitions
+# unless you know what you're doing, as the Alpine system may depend on the
+# presence of those definitions.
+#
+
+include </var/lib/grsec/policy.d>
+
+#
+# If you wish to add any additions to the system policy, you may do so below
+# this line. As the configuration is read top-to-bottom, any changes you make
+# here may override the default security policy.
+#
+