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author | Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com> | 2013-04-18 16:26:26 +0200 |
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committer | Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> | 2013-04-19 06:15:12 +0000 |
commit | 6665cdadf07a7dc49d8e128fc8cdd368751c2bef (patch) | |
tree | f70a68c1fb61b9040a6f9f818365cac96127b2e5 /main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch | |
parent | 9e64313ac0693f81fd4bc3c1b3a8949bdb99725a (diff) | |
download | aports-6665cdadf07a7dc49d8e128fc8cdd368751c2bef.tar.bz2 aports-6665cdadf07a7dc49d8e128fc8cdd368751c2bef.tar.xz |
CVE-2013-1917 / XSA-44
CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46
CVE-2013-1920 / XSA-47
CVE-2013-1922 / XSA-48
Signed-off-by: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch | 293 |
1 files changed, 293 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch b/main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9448ea9c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +x86: fix various issues with handling guest IRQs + +- properly revoke IRQ access in map_domain_pirq() error path +- don't permit replacing an in use IRQ +- don't accept inputs in the GSI range for MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI +- track IRQ access permission in host IRQ terms, not guest IRQ ones + (and with that, also disallow Dom0 access to IRQ0) + +This is CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> + +--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c ++++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c +@@ -968,14 +968,16 @@ static void domcreate_launch_dm(libxl__e + } + + for (i = 0; i < d_config->b_info.num_irqs; i++) { +- uint32_t irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i]; ++ int irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i]; + +- LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %"PRIx32, domid, irq); ++ LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %d", domid, irq); + +- ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1); ++ ret = irq >= 0 ? xc_physdev_map_pirq(CTX->xch, domid, irq, &irq) ++ : -EOVERFLOW; ++ if (!ret) ++ ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1); + if ( ret<0 ){ +- LOGE(ERROR, +- "failed give dom%d access to irq %"PRId32, domid, irq); ++ LOGE(ERROR, "failed give dom%d access to irq %d", domid, irq); + ret = ERROR_FAIL; + } + } +--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py ++++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py +@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ class IRQController(DevController): + + pirq = get_param('irq') + ++ rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(), ++ index = pirq, ++ pirq = pirq) ++ if rc < 0: ++ raise VmError('irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq)) ++ + rc = xc.domain_irq_permission(domid = self.getDomid(), + pirq = pirq, + allow_access = True) +@@ -81,12 +87,6 @@ class IRQController(DevController): + #todo non-fatal + raise VmError( + 'irq: Failed to configure irq: %d' % (pirq)) +- rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(), +- index = pirq, +- pirq = pirq) +- if rc < 0: +- raise VmError( +- 'irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq)) + back = dict([(k, config[k]) for k in self.valid_cfg if k in config]) + return (self.allocateDeviceID(), back, {}) + +--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c +@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0( + /* DOM0 is permitted full I/O capabilities. */ + rc |= ioports_permit_access(dom0, 0, 0xFFFF); + rc |= iomem_permit_access(dom0, 0UL, ~0UL); +- rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, d->nr_pirqs - 1); ++ rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1); + + /* + * Modify I/O port access permissions. +--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c +@@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl( + goto bind_out; + + ret = -EPERM; +- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && +- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) ) +- goto bind_out; ++ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) ++ { ++ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq); ++ ++ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) ) ++ goto bind_out; ++ } + + ret = -ESRCH; + if ( iommu_enabled ) +@@ -803,9 +807,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl( + bind = &(domctl->u.bind_pt_irq); + + ret = -EPERM; +- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && +- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) ) +- goto unbind_out; ++ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) ++ { ++ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq); ++ ++ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) ) ++ goto unbind_out; ++ } + + if ( iommu_enabled ) + { +--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c +@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ int create_irq(int node) + desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED; + irq = ret; + } ++ else if ( dom0 ) ++ { ++ ret = irq_permit_access(dom0, irq); ++ if ( ret ) ++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR ++ "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n", ++ irq, ret); ++ } + + return irq; + } +@@ -280,6 +288,17 @@ void clear_irq_vector(int irq) + void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq) + { + BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq)); ++ ++ if ( dom0 ) ++ { ++ int err = irq_deny_access(dom0, irq); ++ ++ if ( err ) ++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR ++ "Could not revoke Dom0 access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n", ++ irq, err); ++ } ++ + dynamic_irq_cleanup(irq); + clear_irq_vector(irq); + } +@@ -1858,7 +1877,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + + if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && + !(IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) && +- irq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq))) ++ irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq))) + return -EPERM; + + if ( pirq < 0 || pirq >= d->nr_pirqs || irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs ) +@@ -1887,17 +1906,18 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + return ret; + } + +- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq); ++ ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq); + if ( ret ) + { +- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not permit access to irq %d\n", +- d->domain_id, pirq); ++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR ++ "dom%d: could not permit access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n", ++ d->domain_id, irq, pirq); + return ret; + } + + ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info); + if ( ret ) +- return ret; ++ goto revoke; + + desc = irq_to_desc(irq); + +@@ -1921,8 +1941,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags); + + if ( desc->handler != &no_irq_type ) ++ { ++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags); + dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: irq %d in use\n", + d->domain_id, irq); ++ pci_disable_msi(msi_desc); ++ ret = -EBUSY; ++ goto done; ++ } + setup_msi_handler(desc, msi_desc); + + if ( opt_irq_vector_map == OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_PERDEV +@@ -1951,7 +1977,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq( + + done: + if ( ret ) ++ { + cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info); ++ revoke: ++ if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) ) ++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR ++ "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n", ++ d->domain_id, irq, pirq); ++ } + return ret; + } + +@@ -2017,10 +2050,11 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d, + if ( !forced_unbind ) + cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info); + +- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq); ++ ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq); + if ( ret ) +- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not deny access to irq %d\n", +- d->domain_id, pirq); ++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR ++ "dom%d: could not deny access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n", ++ d->domain_id, irq, pirq); + + done: + return ret; +--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c +@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int + if ( irq == -1 ) + irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE); + +- if ( irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs ) ++ if ( irq < nr_irqs_gsi || irq >= nr_irqs ) + { + dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: can't create irq for msi!\n", + d->domain_id); +--- a/xen/common/domctl.c ++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <xen/paging.h> + #include <xen/hypercall.h> + #include <asm/current.h> ++#include <asm/irq.h> + #include <asm/page.h> + #include <public/domctl.h> + #include <xsm/xsm.h> +@@ -897,9 +898,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc + else if ( xsm_irq_permission(d, pirq, allow) ) + ret = -EPERM; + else if ( allow ) +- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq); ++ ret = pirq_permit_access(d, pirq); + else +- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq); ++ ret = pirq_deny_access(d, pirq); + + rcu_unlock_domain(d); + } +--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c ++++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c +@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static long evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind + if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= d->nr_pirqs) ) + return -EINVAL; + +- if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !irq_access_permitted(d, pirq) ) ++ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !pirq_access_permitted(d, pirq) ) + return -EPERM; + + spin_lock(&d->event_lock); +--- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h ++++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h +@@ -28,4 +28,22 @@ + #define irq_access_permitted(d, i) \ + rangeset_contains_singleton((d)->irq_caps, i) + ++#define pirq_permit_access(d, i) ({ \ ++ struct domain *d__ = (d); \ ++ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \ ++ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_add_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\ ++ : -EINVAL; \ ++}) ++#define pirq_deny_access(d, i) ({ \ ++ struct domain *d__ = (d); \ ++ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \ ++ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_remove_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\ ++ : -EINVAL; \ ++}) ++#define pirq_access_permitted(d, i) ({ \ ++ struct domain *d__ = (d); \ ++ rangeset_contains_singleton(d__->irq_caps, \ ++ domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i));\ ++}) ++ + #endif /* __XEN_IOCAP_H__ */ |