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authorRoger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>2013-04-18 16:26:26 +0200
committerNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2013-04-19 06:15:12 +0000
commit6665cdadf07a7dc49d8e128fc8cdd368751c2bef (patch)
treef70a68c1fb61b9040a6f9f818365cac96127b2e5 /main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch
parent9e64313ac0693f81fd4bc3c1b3a8949bdb99725a (diff)
downloadaports-6665cdadf07a7dc49d8e128fc8cdd368751c2bef.tar.bz2
aports-6665cdadf07a7dc49d8e128fc8cdd368751c2bef.tar.xz
CVE-2013-1917 / XSA-44 CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46 CVE-2013-1920 / XSA-47 CVE-2013-1922 / XSA-48 Signed-off-by: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch')
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch293
1 files changed, 293 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch b/main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9448ea9c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa46-4.2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+x86: fix various issues with handling guest IRQs
+
+- properly revoke IRQ access in map_domain_pirq() error path
+- don't permit replacing an in use IRQ
+- don't accept inputs in the GSI range for MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI
+- track IRQ access permission in host IRQ terms, not guest IRQ ones
+ (and with that, also disallow Dom0 access to IRQ0)
+
+This is CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
+
+--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
++++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+@@ -968,14 +968,16 @@ static void domcreate_launch_dm(libxl__e
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < d_config->b_info.num_irqs; i++) {
+- uint32_t irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
++ int irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
+
+- LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %"PRIx32, domid, irq);
++ LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %d", domid, irq);
+
+- ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
++ ret = irq >= 0 ? xc_physdev_map_pirq(CTX->xch, domid, irq, &irq)
++ : -EOVERFLOW;
++ if (!ret)
++ ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
+ if ( ret<0 ){
+- LOGE(ERROR,
+- "failed give dom%d access to irq %"PRId32, domid, irq);
++ LOGE(ERROR, "failed give dom%d access to irq %d", domid, irq);
+ ret = ERROR_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
++++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
+@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
+
+ pirq = get_param('irq')
+
++ rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
++ index = pirq,
++ pirq = pirq)
++ if rc < 0:
++ raise VmError('irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
++
+ rc = xc.domain_irq_permission(domid = self.getDomid(),
+ pirq = pirq,
+ allow_access = True)
+@@ -81,12 +87,6 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
+ #todo non-fatal
+ raise VmError(
+ 'irq: Failed to configure irq: %d' % (pirq))
+- rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
+- index = pirq,
+- pirq = pirq)
+- if rc < 0:
+- raise VmError(
+- 'irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
+ back = dict([(k, config[k]) for k in self.valid_cfg if k in config])
+ return (self.allocateDeviceID(), back, {})
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
+ /* DOM0 is permitted full I/O capabilities. */
+ rc |= ioports_permit_access(dom0, 0, 0xFFFF);
+ rc |= iomem_permit_access(dom0, 0UL, ~0UL);
+- rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, d->nr_pirqs - 1);
++ rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Modify I/O port access permissions.
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+ goto bind_out;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
+- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
+- goto bind_out;
++ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
++ {
++ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
++
++ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
++ goto bind_out;
++ }
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ if ( iommu_enabled )
+@@ -803,9 +807,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+ bind = &(domctl->u.bind_pt_irq);
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
+- !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
+- goto unbind_out;
++ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
++ {
++ int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
++
++ if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
++ goto unbind_out;
++ }
+
+ if ( iommu_enabled )
+ {
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ int create_irq(int node)
+ desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED;
+ irq = ret;
+ }
++ else if ( dom0 )
++ {
++ ret = irq_permit_access(dom0, irq);
++ if ( ret )
++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++ "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n",
++ irq, ret);
++ }
+
+ return irq;
+ }
+@@ -280,6 +288,17 @@ void clear_irq_vector(int irq)
+ void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq)
+ {
+ BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq));
++
++ if ( dom0 )
++ {
++ int err = irq_deny_access(dom0, irq);
++
++ if ( err )
++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++ "Could not revoke Dom0 access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n",
++ irq, err);
++ }
++
+ dynamic_irq_cleanup(irq);
+ clear_irq_vector(irq);
+ }
+@@ -1858,7 +1877,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
+ !(IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) &&
+- irq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq)))
++ irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq)))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if ( pirq < 0 || pirq >= d->nr_pirqs || irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
+@@ -1887,17 +1906,18 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
++ ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+ if ( ret )
+ {
+- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not permit access to irq %d\n",
+- d->domain_id, pirq);
++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++ "dom%d: could not permit access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
++ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info);
+ if ( ret )
+- return ret;
++ goto revoke;
+
+ desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
+
+@@ -1921,8 +1941,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
+
+ if ( desc->handler != &no_irq_type )
++ {
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
+ dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: irq %d in use\n",
+ d->domain_id, irq);
++ pci_disable_msi(msi_desc);
++ ret = -EBUSY;
++ goto done;
++ }
+ setup_msi_handler(desc, msi_desc);
+
+ if ( opt_irq_vector_map == OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_PERDEV
+@@ -1951,7 +1977,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+
+ done:
+ if ( ret )
++ {
+ cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
++ revoke:
++ if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++ "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
++ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
++ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -2017,10 +2050,11 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d,
+ if ( !forced_unbind )
+ cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
+
+- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
++ ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+ if ( ret )
+- dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not deny access to irq %d\n",
+- d->domain_id, pirq);
++ printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++ "dom%d: could not deny access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
++ d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
+
+ done:
+ return ret;
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int
+ if ( irq == -1 )
+ irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE);
+
+- if ( irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
++ if ( irq < nr_irqs_gsi || irq >= nr_irqs )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: can't create irq for msi!\n",
+ d->domain_id);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <xen/paging.h>
+ #include <xen/hypercall.h>
+ #include <asm/current.h>
++#include <asm/irq.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <public/domctl.h>
+ #include <xsm/xsm.h>
+@@ -897,9 +898,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
+ else if ( xsm_irq_permission(d, pirq, allow) )
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ else if ( allow )
+- ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
++ ret = pirq_permit_access(d, pirq);
+ else
+- ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
++ ret = pirq_deny_access(d, pirq);
+
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ }
+--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
++++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
+@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static long evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind
+ if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= d->nr_pirqs) )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+- if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !irq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
++ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !pirq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
+--- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
+@@ -28,4 +28,22 @@
+ #define irq_access_permitted(d, i) \
+ rangeset_contains_singleton((d)->irq_caps, i)
+
++#define pirq_permit_access(d, i) ({ \
++ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
++ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \
++ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_add_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
++ : -EINVAL; \
++})
++#define pirq_deny_access(d, i) ({ \
++ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
++ int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i); \
++ i__ > 0 ? rangeset_remove_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
++ : -EINVAL; \
++})
++#define pirq_access_permitted(d, i) ({ \
++ struct domain *d__ = (d); \
++ rangeset_contains_singleton(d__->irq_caps, \
++ domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i));\
++})
++
+ #endif /* __XEN_IOCAP_H__ */