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HAVE_OPAQUE_LSA is used by default and you have to actively turn it off
except that OPAQUE_LSA is an industry standard and used pretty much
everywhere. There is no need to have special #defines for this anymore.
Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
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Fix lots of warnings. Some const and type-pun breaks strict-aliasing
warnings left but much reduced.
* bgp_advertise.h: (struct bgp_advertise_fifo) is functionally identical to
(struct fifo), so just use that. Makes it clearer the beginning of
(struct bgp_advertise) is compatible with with (struct fifo), which seems
to be enough for gcc.
Add a BGP_ADV_FIFO_HEAD macro to contain the right cast to try shut up
type-punning breaks strict aliasing warnings.
* bgp_packet.c: Use BGP_ADV_FIFO_HEAD.
(bgp_route_refresh_receive) fix an interesting logic error in
(!ok || (ret != BLAH)) where ret is only well-defined if ok.
* bgp_vty.c: Peer commands should use bgp_vty_return to set their return.
* jhash.{c,h}: Can take const on * args without adding issues & fix warnings.
* libospf.h: LSA sequence numbers use the unsigned range of values, and
constants need to be set to unsigned, or it causes warnings in ospf6d.
* md5.h: signedness of caddr_t is implementation specific, change to an
explicit (uint_8 *), fix sign/unsigned comparison warnings.
* vty.c: (vty_log_fixed) const on level is well-intentioned, but not going
to fly given iov_base.
* workqueue.c: ALL_LIST_ELEMENTS_RO tests for null pointer, which is always
true for address of static variable. Correct but pointless warning in
this case, but use a 2nd pointer to shut it up.
* ospf6_route.h: Add a comment about the use of (struct prefix) to stuff 2
different 32 bit IDs into in (struct ospf6_route), and the resulting
type-pun strict-alias breakage warnings this causes. Need to use 2
different fields to fix that warning?
general:
* remove unused variables, other than a few cases where they serve a
sufficiently useful documentary purpose (e.g. for code that needs
fixing), or they're required dummies. In those cases, try mark them as
unused.
* Remove dead code that can't be reached.
* Quite a few 'no ...' forms of vty commands take arguments, but do not
check the argument matches the command being negated. E.g., should
'distance X <prefix>' succeed if previously 'distance Y <prefix>' was set?
Or should it be required that the distance match the previously configured
distance for the prefix?
Ultimately, probably better to be strict about this. However, changing
from slack to strict might expose problems in command aliases and tools.
* Fix uninitialised use of variables.
* Fix sign/unsigned comparison warnings by making signedness of types consistent.
* Mark functions as static where their use is restricted to the same compilation
unit.
* Add required headers
* Move constants defined in headers into code.
* remove dead, unused functions that have no debug purpose.
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the OSPF API-server (exporting the LSDB and allowing announcement of
Opaque-LSAs) writes past the end of fixed on-stack buffers. This leads
to an exploitable stack overflow.
For this condition to occur, the following two conditions must be true:
- Quagga is configured with --enable-opaque-lsa
- ospfd is started with the "-a" command line option
If either of these does not hold, the relevant code is not executed and
the issue does not get triggered.
Since the issue occurs on receiving large LSAs (larger than 1488 bytes),
it is possible for this to happen during normal operation of a network.
In particular, if there is an OSPF router with a large number of
interfaces, the Router-LSA of that router may exceed 1488 bytes and
trigger this, leading to an ospfd crash.
For an attacker to exploit this, s/he must be able to inject valid LSAs
into the OSPF domain. Any best-practice protection measure (using
crypto authentication, restricting OSPF to internal interfaces, packet
filtering protocol 89, etc.) will prevent exploitation. On top of that,
remote (not on an OSPF-speaking network segment) attackers will have
difficulties bringing up the adjacency needed to inject a LSA.
This patch only performs minimal changes to remove the possibility of a
stack overrun. The OSPF API in general is quite ugly and needs a
rewrite.
Reported-by: Ricky Charlet <ricky.charlet@hp.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
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Use the array_size() helper macro. Replaces several instances of local
macros with the same definition.
Reviewed-by: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
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* ospf_apiserver.{c,h}: (ospf_apiserver_lsa_refresher) refreshers must now
return the refreshed LSA.
* ospf_te.{c,h}: (ospf_mpls_te_lsa_refresh) ditto
* ospf_api.c: trivial compiler warning fix
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Simple conversion of XMALLOC/memset to XCALLOC
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2005-11-26 Paul Jakma <paul.jakma@sun.com>
* buffer.c: (struct buffer_data) change gcc zero array
declaration to C99 incomplete array.
* stream.h: (struct stream) same
* ospf_api.c: (struct opaque_lsa) same
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* ospf_api.c: sign warnings.
* ospf_apiserver.c: sign warning and convert all the struct
in_addr initialisations so as not to make assumptions about
how this struct is organised, initialise the s_addr member
explicitely.
* ospf_packet.c: Add const qualifier to auth_key.
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* *.c: Change level of debug messages to LOG_DEBUG.
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* global: Replace strerror with safe_strerror. And vtysh/vtysh.c
needs to include "log.h" to pick up the declaration.
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