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author | Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> | 2009-04-19 19:16:09 +0000 |
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committer | Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> | 2009-04-19 19:16:09 +0000 |
commit | 3d7a244b5470e104539580c7bc489d7b581430eb (patch) | |
tree | db1d6a47dc7d040610f94351af857ef83f05ed39 /src/scepclient/rsakey.c | |
parent | d940c7638cb964aaa66bdf96af803c678c5522c3 (diff) | |
download | strongswan-3d7a244b5470e104539580c7bc489d7b581430eb.tar.bz2 strongswan-3d7a244b5470e104539580c7bc489d7b581430eb.tar.xz |
conversion from 8 spaces to 4 spaces per tab
Diffstat (limited to 'src/scepclient/rsakey.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/scepclient/rsakey.c | 482 |
1 files changed, 241 insertions, 241 deletions
diff --git a/src/scepclient/rsakey.c b/src/scepclient/rsakey.c index dff405f59..87ec37cb2 100644 --- a/src/scepclient/rsakey.c +++ b/src/scepclient/rsakey.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ * * $Id: rsakey.c,v 1.5 2006/01/04 21:16:30 as Exp $ */ - + #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> @@ -42,62 +42,62 @@ #include "rsakey.h" /* Number of times the probabilistic primality test is applied */ -#define PRIMECHECK_ROUNDS 30 +#define PRIMECHECK_ROUNDS 30 /* Public exponent used for signature key generation */ -#define PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x10001 +#define PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x10001 #ifndef DEV_RANDOM -#define DEV_RANDOM "/dev/random" +#define DEV_RANDOM "/dev/random" #endif /** * @brief Reads a specific number of bytes from a given device/file * - * @param[in] nbytes number of bytes to read from random device - * @param[out] buf pointer to buffer where to write the data in. - * size of buffer has to be at least nbytes. - * @return TRUE, if succeeded, FALSE otherwise + * @param[in] nbytes number of bytes to read from random device + * @param[out] buf pointer to buffer where to write the data in. + * size of buffer has to be at least nbytes. + * @return TRUE, if succeeded, FALSE otherwise */ static bool get_true_random_bytes(size_t nbytes, char *buf) { - size_t ndone; - size_t got; - char *device = DEV_RANDOM; - - int dev = open(DEV_RANDOM, 0); - - if (dev < 0) - { - fprintf(stderr, "could not open random device %s", device); - return FALSE; - } - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("getting %d bytes from %s...", (int) nbytes, device) - ) - - ndone = 0; - while (ndone < nbytes) - { - got = read(dev, buf + ndone, nbytes - ndone); - if (got < 0) + size_t ndone; + size_t got; + char *device = DEV_RANDOM; + + int dev = open(DEV_RANDOM, 0); + + if (dev < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "read error on %s", device); - return FALSE; + fprintf(stderr, "could not open random device %s", device); + return FALSE; } - if (got == 0) + + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("getting %d bytes from %s...", (int) nbytes, device) + ) + + ndone = 0; + while (ndone < nbytes) { - fprintf(stderr, "eof on %s", device); - return FALSE; + got = read(dev, buf + ndone, nbytes - ndone); + if (got < 0) + { + fprintf(stderr, "read error on %s", device); + return FALSE; + } + if (got == 0) + { + fprintf(stderr, "eof on %s", device); + return FALSE; + } + ndone += got; } - ndone += got; - } - close(dev); - return TRUE; + close(dev); + return TRUE; } /** @@ -109,25 +109,25 @@ get_true_random_bytes(size_t nbytes, char *buf) * Note that highmost and lowmost bits are forced on -- highmost to give a * number of exactly the specified length, lowmost so it is an odd number. * - * @param[out] var uninitialized mpz_t to store th random number in - * @param[in] nbits length of var in bits (known to be a multiple of BITS_PER_BYTE) - * @return TRUE on success, FALSE otherwise + * @param[out] var uninitialized mpz_t to store th random number in + * @param[in] nbits length of var in bits (known to be a multiple of BITS_PER_BYTE) + * @return TRUE on success, FALSE otherwise */ static bool init_random(mpz_t var, int nbits) { - size_t nbytes = (size_t)(nbits/BITS_PER_BYTE); - char random_buf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS/2]; - - assert(nbytes <= sizeof(random_buf)); - - if (!get_true_random_bytes(nbytes, random_buf)) - return FALSE; - - random_buf[0] |= 01 << (BITS_PER_BYTE-1); /* force high bit on */ - random_buf[nbytes-1] |= 01; /* force low bit on */ - n_to_mpz(var, random_buf, nbytes); - return TRUE; + size_t nbytes = (size_t)(nbits/BITS_PER_BYTE); + char random_buf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS/2]; + + assert(nbytes <= sizeof(random_buf)); + + if (!get_true_random_bytes(nbytes, random_buf)) + return FALSE; + + random_buf[0] |= 01 << (BITS_PER_BYTE-1); /* force high bit on */ + random_buf[nbytes-1] |= 01; /* force low bit on */ + n_to_mpz(var, random_buf, nbytes); + return TRUE; } /** @@ -136,54 +136,54 @@ init_random(mpz_t var, int nbits) * Efficiency tweak: we reject candidates that are 1 higher than a multiple * of e, since they will make the internal modulus not relatively prime to e. * - * @param[out] var mpz_t variable to initialize - * @param[in] nbits length of given prime in bits (known to be a multiple of BITS_PER_BYTE) - * @param[in] eval E-Value, 0 means don't bother w. tweak - * @return 1 on success, 0 otherwise + * @param[out] var mpz_t variable to initialize + * @param[in] nbits length of given prime in bits (known to be a multiple of BITS_PER_BYTE) + * @param[in] eval E-Value, 0 means don't bother w. tweak + * @return 1 on success, 0 otherwise */ static bool init_prime(mpz_t var, int nbits, int eval) { - unsigned long tries; - size_t len; - - /* get a random value of nbits length */ - if (!init_random(var, nbits)) - return FALSE; - - /* check if odd number */ - assert(mpz_fdiv_ui(var, 2) == 1); - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("looking for a prime starting there (can take a while)...") - ) - - tries = 1; - while (mpz_fdiv_ui(var, eval) == 1 - || !mpz_probab_prime_p(var, PRIMECHECK_ROUNDS)) - { - /* not a prime, increase by 2 */ - mpz_add_ui(var, var, 2); - tries++; - } - - len = mpz_sizeinbase(var, 2); - - /* check bit length of primee */ - assert(len == (size_t)nbits || len == (size_t)(nbits+1)); - - if (len == (size_t)(nbits+1)) - { + unsigned long tries; + size_t len; + + /* get a random value of nbits length */ + if (!init_random(var, nbits)) + return FALSE; + + /* check if odd number */ + assert(mpz_fdiv_ui(var, 2) == 1); DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("carry out occurred (!), retrying...") + DBG_log("looking for a prime starting there (can take a while)...") ) - mpz_clear(var); - /* recursive call */ - return init_prime(var, nbits, eval); - } - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("found it after %lu tries.",tries) - ) - return TRUE; + + tries = 1; + while (mpz_fdiv_ui(var, eval) == 1 + || !mpz_probab_prime_p(var, PRIMECHECK_ROUNDS)) + { + /* not a prime, increase by 2 */ + mpz_add_ui(var, var, 2); + tries++; + } + + len = mpz_sizeinbase(var, 2); + + /* check bit length of primee */ + assert(len == (size_t)nbits || len == (size_t)(nbits+1)); + + if (len == (size_t)(nbits+1)) + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("carry out occurred (!), retrying...") + ) + mpz_clear(var); + /* recursive call */ + return init_prime(var, nbits, eval); + } + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("found it after %lu tries.",tries) + ) + return TRUE; } /** @@ -194,158 +194,158 @@ init_prime(mpz_t var, int nbits, int eval) * These mpz_t parameters must not be initialized and have * to be cleared with mpz_clear after using. * - * @param[in] nbits size of rsa key in bits - * @return RSA_public_key_t containing the generated RSA key + * @param[in] nbits size of rsa key in bits + * @return RSA_public_key_t containing the generated RSA key */ err_t generate_rsa_private_key(int nbits, RSA_private_key_t *key) { - mpz_t p, q, n, e, d, exp1, exp2, coeff; - mpz_t m, q1, t; /* temporary variables*/ - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("generating %d bit RSA key:", nbits) - ) - - if (nbits <= 0) - return "negative rsa key length!"; - - /* Get values of primes p and q */ - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("initialize prime p") - ) - if (!init_prime(p, nbits/2, PUBLIC_EXPONENT)) - return "could not generate prime p"; - - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("initialize prime q") - ) - if (!init_prime(q, nbits/2, PUBLIC_EXPONENT)) - return "could not generate prime q"; - - mpz_init(t); - - /* Swapping primes so p is larger then q */ - if (mpz_cmp(p, q) < 0) - { + mpz_t p, q, n, e, d, exp1, exp2, coeff; + mpz_t m, q1, t; /* temporary variables*/ + + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("generating %d bit RSA key:", nbits) + ) + + if (nbits <= 0) + return "negative rsa key length!"; + + /* Get values of primes p and q */ + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("initialize prime p") + ) + if (!init_prime(p, nbits/2, PUBLIC_EXPONENT)) + return "could not generate prime p"; + + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("initialize prime q") + ) + if (!init_prime(q, nbits/2, PUBLIC_EXPONENT)) + return "could not generate prime q"; + + mpz_init(t); + + /* Swapping primes so p is larger then q */ + if (mpz_cmp(p, q) < 0) + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("swapping primes so p is the larger...") + ); + mpz_set(t, p); + mpz_set(p, q); + mpz_set(q, t); + } + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("swapping primes so p is the larger...") - ); - mpz_set(t, p); - mpz_set(p, q); - mpz_set(q, t); - } - - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("computing modulus...") - ) - mpz_init(n); - /* n = p*q */ - mpz_mul(n, p, q); - - /* Assign e the value of defined PUBLIC_EXPONENT */ - mpz_init_set_ui(e, PUBLIC_EXPONENT); - - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("computing lcm(p-1, q-1)...") - ) - /* m = p */ - mpz_init_set(m, p); - /* m = m-1 */ - mpz_sub_ui(m, m, 1); - /* q1 = q */ - mpz_init_set(q1, q); - /* q1 = q1-1 */ - mpz_sub_ui(q1, q1, 1); - /* t = gcd(p-1, q-1) */ - mpz_gcd(t, m, q1); - /* m = (p-1)*(q-1) */ - mpz_mul(m, m, q1); - /* m = m / t */ - mpz_divexact(m, m, t); - /* t = gcd(m, e) (greatest common divisor) */ - mpz_gcd(t, m, e); - /* m and e relatively prime */ - assert(mpz_cmp_ui(t, 1) == 0); - - /* decryption key */ - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("computing d...") - ) - mpz_init(d); - /* e has an inverse mod m */ - assert(mpz_invert(d, e, m)); - - /* make sure d is positive */ - if (mpz_cmp_ui(d, 0) < 0) - mpz_add(d, d, m); - - /* d has to be positive */ - assert(mpz_cmp(d, m) < 0); - - /* the speedup hacks */ - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("computing exp1, exp1, coeff...") - ) - mpz_init(exp1); - /* t = p-1 */ - mpz_sub_ui(t, p, 1); - /* exp1 = d mod p-1 */ - mpz_mod(exp1, d, t); - - mpz_init(exp2); - /* t = q-1 */ - mpz_sub_ui(t, q, 1); - /* exp2 = d mod q-1 */ - mpz_mod(exp2, d, t); - - mpz_init(coeff); - /* coeff = q^-1 mod p */ - mpz_invert(coeff, q, p); - - /* make sure coeff is positive */ - if (mpz_cmp_ui(coeff, 0) < 0) - mpz_add(coeff, coeff, p); - - /* coeff has to be positive */ - assert(mpz_cmp(coeff, p) < 0); - - /* Clear temporary variables */ - mpz_clear(q1); - mpz_clear(m); - mpz_clear(t); - - /* form FreeS/WAN keyid */ - { - size_t e_len = (mpz_sizeinbase(e,2)+BITS_PER_BYTE-1)/BITS_PER_BYTE; - size_t n_len = (mpz_sizeinbase(n,2)+BITS_PER_BYTE-1)/BITS_PER_BYTE; - chunk_t e_ch = mpz_to_n(e, e_len); - chunk_t n_ch = mpz_to_n(n, n_len); - - form_keyid(e_ch, n_ch, key->pub.keyid, &key->pub.k); - free(e_ch.ptr); - free(n_ch.ptr); - } - - /* fill in the elements of the RSA private key */ - key->p = *p; - key->q = *q; - key->pub.n = *n; - key->pub.e = *e; - key->d = *d; - key->dP = *exp1; - key->dQ = *exp2; - key->qInv = *coeff; - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("RSA key *%s generated with %d bits", key->pub.keyid - , (int)mpz_sizeinbase(n,2)) - ) + DBG_log("computing modulus...") + ) + mpz_init(n); + /* n = p*q */ + mpz_mul(n, p, q); + + /* Assign e the value of defined PUBLIC_EXPONENT */ + mpz_init_set_ui(e, PUBLIC_EXPONENT); + + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("computing lcm(p-1, q-1)...") + ) + /* m = p */ + mpz_init_set(m, p); + /* m = m-1 */ + mpz_sub_ui(m, m, 1); + /* q1 = q */ + mpz_init_set(q1, q); + /* q1 = q1-1 */ + mpz_sub_ui(q1, q1, 1); + /* t = gcd(p-1, q-1) */ + mpz_gcd(t, m, q1); + /* m = (p-1)*(q-1) */ + mpz_mul(m, m, q1); + /* m = m / t */ + mpz_divexact(m, m, t); + /* t = gcd(m, e) (greatest common divisor) */ + mpz_gcd(t, m, e); + /* m and e relatively prime */ + assert(mpz_cmp_ui(t, 1) == 0); + + /* decryption key */ + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("computing d...") + ) + mpz_init(d); + /* e has an inverse mod m */ + assert(mpz_invert(d, e, m)); + + /* make sure d is positive */ + if (mpz_cmp_ui(d, 0) < 0) + mpz_add(d, d, m); + + /* d has to be positive */ + assert(mpz_cmp(d, m) < 0); + + /* the speedup hacks */ + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("computing exp1, exp1, coeff...") + ) + mpz_init(exp1); + /* t = p-1 */ + mpz_sub_ui(t, p, 1); + /* exp1 = d mod p-1 */ + mpz_mod(exp1, d, t); + + mpz_init(exp2); + /* t = q-1 */ + mpz_sub_ui(t, q, 1); + /* exp2 = d mod q-1 */ + mpz_mod(exp2, d, t); + + mpz_init(coeff); + /* coeff = q^-1 mod p */ + mpz_invert(coeff, q, p); + + /* make sure coeff is positive */ + if (mpz_cmp_ui(coeff, 0) < 0) + mpz_add(coeff, coeff, p); + + /* coeff has to be positive */ + assert(mpz_cmp(coeff, p) < 0); + + /* Clear temporary variables */ + mpz_clear(q1); + mpz_clear(m); + mpz_clear(t); + + /* form FreeS/WAN keyid */ + { + size_t e_len = (mpz_sizeinbase(e,2)+BITS_PER_BYTE-1)/BITS_PER_BYTE; + size_t n_len = (mpz_sizeinbase(n,2)+BITS_PER_BYTE-1)/BITS_PER_BYTE; + chunk_t e_ch = mpz_to_n(e, e_len); + chunk_t n_ch = mpz_to_n(n, n_len); + + form_keyid(e_ch, n_ch, key->pub.keyid, &key->pub.k); + free(e_ch.ptr); + free(n_ch.ptr); + } + + /* fill in the elements of the RSA private key */ + key->p = *p; + key->q = *q; + key->pub.n = *n; + key->pub.e = *e; + key->d = *d; + key->dP = *exp1; + key->dQ = *exp2; + key->qInv = *coeff; + + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("RSA key *%s generated with %d bits", key->pub.keyid + , (int)mpz_sizeinbase(n,2)) + ) #ifdef DEBUG - DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, - RSA_show_private_key(key) - ) + DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, + RSA_show_private_key(key) + ) #endif - return NULL; + return NULL; } |