Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | |
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* | Fixed some typos, courtesy of codespell | Tobias Brunner | 2017-11-15 | 4 | -4/+4 |
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* | Fixed some typos, courtesy of codespell | Tobias Brunner | 2017-08-07 | 3 | -6/+6 |
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* | ikev1: Determine transform ID before mapping integrity algorithm ID | Tobias Brunner | 2017-07-05 | 1 | -1/+1 |
| | | | | | | | | | Due to the lookup based on the mapped algorithm ID the resulting AH proposals were invalid. Fixes #2347. Fixes: 8456d6f5a8e9 ("ikev1: Don't require AH mapping for integrity algorithm when generating proposal") | ||||
* | Migrate all enumerators to venumerate() interface change | Tobias Brunner | 2017-05-26 | 3 | -6/+21 |
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* | ikev1: Send NAT-D payloads after HASH payloads in Aggressive Mode requests | Tobias Brunner | 2017-05-19 | 1 | -1/+1 |
| | | | | | | | Some implementations seem to have problems if the third AM message contains NAT-D payloads before the HASH payload. Fixes #2314. | ||||
* | ikev1: Don't require AH mapping for integrity algorithm when generating proposal | Thomas Egerer | 2016-08-25 | 1 | -6/+9 |
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com> | ||||
* | ikev1: Accept more than one certificate payload in aggressive mode | Tobias Brunner | 2016-08-17 | 1 | -2/+2 |
| | | | | Fixes #2085. | ||||
* | ikev1: Add support for extended sequence numbers | Thomas Egerer | 2016-06-29 | 1 | -3/+17 |
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com> | ||||
* | Use standard unsigned integer types | Andreas Steffen | 2016-03-24 | 48 | -415/+415 |
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* | payloads: Verify P-CSCF configuration attributes like others carrying IP ↵ | Tobias Brunner | 2016-03-10 | 1 | -0/+2 |
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* | ikev1: Send NAT-D payloads after vendor ID payloads in Aggressive Mode messages | Tobias Brunner | 2016-03-07 | 1 | -6/+6 |
| | | | | | | | Some implementations might otherwise not recognize the NAT-D payload type. Also moves SIG and HASH payloads last in these messages. Fixes #1239. | ||||
* | ikev1: Send and verify IPv6 addresses correctly | Tobias Brunner | 2016-03-03 | 1 | -0/+7 |
| | | | | | | | | According to the mode-config draft there is no prefix sent for IPv6 addresses in IKEv1. We still accept 17 bytes long addresses for backwards compatibility with older strongSwan releases. Fixes #1304. | ||||
* | ikev1: Assume a default key length of 128-bit for AES-CBC | Tobias Brunner | 2015-08-17 | 1 | -0/+11 |
| | | | | | | | | | | Some implementations don't send a Key Length attribute for AES-128. This was allowed for IKE in early drafts of RFC 3602, however, some implementations also seem to do it for ESP, where it never was allowed. And the final version of RFC 3602 demands a Key Length attribute for both phases so they shouldn't do it anymore anyway. Fixes #1064. | ||||
* | Fixed some typos | Tobias Brunner | 2015-08-13 | 1 | -1/+1 |
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* | message: Log message if unknown/disallowed payload received | Tobias Brunner | 2015-06-01 | 1 | -3/+10 |
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* | message: Log original message type of unknown payloads | Tobias Brunner | 2015-06-01 | 1 | -0/+13 |
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* | unknown-payload: Use a new private payload type and make original type available | Tobias Brunner | 2015-06-01 | 5 | -2/+25 |
| | | | | | | | | | This fixes a DoS and potential remote code execution vulnerability that was caused because the original payload type that was returned previously was used to cast such payload objects to payloads of the indicated type (e.g. when logging notify payloads with a payload type for the wrong IKE version). Fixes CVE-2015-3991. | ||||
* | ikev2: Include fragment number into message ID passed to IV gen | Martin Willi | 2015-06-01 | 1 | -0/+5 |
| | | | | | | When using a cipher with sequential IVs, we never must pass an identical IV to the IV generator. To avoid it when using IKEv2 fragmentation, use the lower bits of the 64-bit message ID as the fragment number. | ||||
* | message: Show the fragmentation numbers in message stringification | Martin Willi | 2015-06-01 | 1 | -0/+36 |
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* | utils: Use chunk_equals_const() for all cryptographic purposes | Martin Willi | 2015-04-14 | 1 | -1/+1 |
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* | encoding: Remove DH public value verification from KE payload | Martin Willi | 2015-03-23 | 1 | -73/+0 |
| | | | | | | | | This commit reverts 84738b1a and 2ed5f569. As we have no DH group available in the KE payload for IKEv1, the verification can't work in that stage. Instead, we now verify DH groups in the DH backends, which works for any IKE version or any other purpose. | ||||
* | diffie-hellman: Add a bool return value to get_my_public_value() | Martin Willi | 2015-03-23 | 1 | -2/+8 |
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* | encoding: Allow ke_payload_create_from_diffie_hellman() to fail | Martin Willi | 2015-03-23 | 1 | -1/+1 |
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* | encoding: Add getter for IKE SPIs in IKEv1 DELETE payloads | Tobias Brunner | 2015-03-23 | 2 | -0/+25 |
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* | encoding: Don't verify length of IKEv1 KE payloads | Tobias Brunner | 2015-03-20 | 1 | -0/+6 |
| | | | | | | The verification introduced with 84738b1aed95 ("encoding: Verify the length of KE payload data for known groups") can't be done for IKEv1 as the KE payload does not contain the DH group. | ||||
* | encoding: Verify the length of KE payload data for known groups | Martin Willi | 2015-03-18 | 1 | -0/+67 |
| | | | | | | | IKE is very strict in the length of KE payloads, and it should be safe to strictly verify their length. Not doing so is no direct threat, but allows DDoS amplification by sending short KE payloads for large groups using the target as the source address. | ||||
* | ikev2: Add SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify payload | Tobias Brunner | 2015-03-04 | 2 | -6/+18 |
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* | ike: Allow creation of internally used payloads | Tobias Brunner | 2014-12-12 | 1 | -1/+1 |
| | | | | | | | Since 42e0a317c64b ("ike: Only parse payloads valid for the current IKE version") payload types are checked before creating objects. This check failed for internally used payload types (e.g. proposal substructures), which have a type >= 256, i.e. outside the IKE payload type range. | ||||
* | ikev1: Use same map for AH and ESP authentication algorithms | Tobias Brunner | 2014-12-09 | 1 | -152/+120 |
| | | | | | | The transform identifier used in AH transforms is not the same as the authentication algorithm identifier used in the transform attributes in AH (and ESP) transforms. | ||||
* | ikev1: Accept IPComp proposals with 4 octet long CPI values | Tobias Brunner | 2014-12-05 | 1 | -2/+2 |
| | | | | | While they SHOULD be sent as 16-bit values according to RFC 3173 a responder MUST be able to accept CPI values encoded in four bytes. | ||||
* | ike: Only parse payloads valid for the current IKE version | Tobias Brunner | 2014-12-05 | 4 | -3/+33 |
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* | ike: Make check for known payloads depend on IKE version | Tobias Brunner | 2014-12-05 | 3 | -25/+40 |
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* | id-payload: Enable multiple calls to get_ts() for subnet traffic selectors | Tobias Brunner | 2014-12-05 | 1 | -2/+5 |
| | | | | The second call resulted in a /32 subnet previously. | ||||
* | message: Include encrypted fragment payload in payload (order) rules | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-29 | 1 | -0/+12 |
| | | | | | | | | | Otherwise fragmented CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges won't get accepted because they don't contain an SA payload. It also prevents a warning when ordering payloads. Fixes #752. | ||||
* | message: Limit maximum number of IKEv2 fragments | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 1 | -1/+11 |
| | | | | | | | | The maximum for IKEv1 is already 255 due to the 8-bit fragment number. With an overhead of 17 bytes (x64) per fragment and a default maximum of 10000 bytes per packet the maximum memory required is 14 kB for a fragmented message. | ||||
* | packet: Define a global default maximum size for IKE packets | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 1 | -6/+1 |
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* | message: Ensure a minimum fragment length | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 1 | -8/+18 |
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* | message: Fragment and reassemble IKEv2 messages | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 2 | -133/+366 |
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* | message: Handle encrypted fragment payload similar to the encrypted payload | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 1 | -16/+91 |
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* | ikev2: Add encrypted fragment payload | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 4 | -12/+454 |
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* | encrypted_payload: Encrypted payload can be constructed from plaintext | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 2 | -0/+38 |
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* | encrypted_payload: Expose generate() to generate the plaintext | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 2 | -1/+17 |
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* | encrypted_payload: Extract some utility functions | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 1 | -74/+110 |
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* | message: Split generate() in multiple functions | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 1 | -67/+122 |
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* | ikev2: Add notify for IKEv2 fragmentation | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 2 | -7/+15 |
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* | ikev1: Move defragmentation to message_t | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 2 | -2/+224 |
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* | message: fragment() generates message and fragments and caches them | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 2 | -27/+98 |
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* | message: Make packet argument optional in generate() | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 1 | -1/+4 |
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* | ikev1: Move fragment generation to message_t | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 2 | -2/+125 |
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* | ike: Rename encryption_payload to encrypted_payload | Tobias Brunner | 2014-10-10 | 7 | -99/+95 |
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