| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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add_policy()
The additional data can be helpful to identify the exact policy to
delete.
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The current "inbound" flag is used for two purposes: To define the actual
direction of the SA, but also to determine the operation used for SA
installation. If an SPI has been allocated, an update operation is required
instead of an add.
While the inbound flag normally defines the kind of operation required, this
is not necessarily true in all cases. On the HA passive node, we install inbound
SAs without prior SPI allocation.
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While we can handle the first selector only in BEET mode in kernel-netlink,
passing the full list gives the backend more flexibility how to handle this
information.
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The reqid is not strictly required, as we set the reqid with the update
call when installing the negotiated SA.
If we don't need a reqid at this stage, we can later allocate the reqid in
the kernel backend once the SA parameters have been fully negotaited. This
allows us to assign the same reqid for the same selectors to avoid conflicts
on backends this is necessary.
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Due to an unprotected incrementation, two load-tester initiators occasionally
use the same SPI under high load, and hence generate 2 IPsec SAs with the same
identifier. The responder IPsec stack will refuse to configure the second SA.
Use an atomic incrementation to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com>
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This new flag gives the kernel-interface a hint how it should priorize the
use of newly installed SAs during rekeying.
Consider the following rekey procedure in IKEv2:
Initiator --- Responder
I1 -------CREATE-------> R1
I2 <------CREATE--------
-------DELETE-------> R2
I3 <------DELETE--------
SAs are always handled as pairs, the following happens at the SA level:
* Initiator starts the exchange at I1
* Responder installs new SA pair at R1
* Initiator installs new SA pair at I2
* Responder removes old SA pair at R2
* Initiator removes old SA pair at I3
This makes sure SAs get installed/removed overlapping during rekeying. However,
to avoid any packet loss, it is crucial that the new outbound SA gets
activated at the correct position:
* as exchange initiator, in I2
* as exchange responder, in R2
This should guarantee that we don't use the new outbound SA before the peer
could install its corresponding inbound SA.
The new parameter allows the kernel backend to install the new SA with
appropriate priorities, i.e. it should:
* as exchange inititator, have the new outbound SA installed with higher
priority than the old SA
* as exchange responder, have the new outbound SA installed with lower
priority than the old SA
While we could split up the SA installation at the responder, this approach
has another advantage: it allows the kernel backend to switch SAs based on
other criteria, for example when receiving traffic on the new inbound SA.
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This allows to unroute a connection while the same connection is
currently established. In this case both CHILD_SAs share the same
reqid but the installed policies have different priorities.
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Instead we use the actual IP protocol identifier (the conversion now happens in
child_sa_t and kernel_handler_t).
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interface
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