path: root/src/swanctl/swanctl.opt

connections { # }
	Section defining IKE connection configurations.

	Section defining IKE connection configurations.

	The connections section defines IKE connection configurations, each in
	its own subsections. In the keyword description below, the connection
	is named _<conn>_, but an arbitrary yet unique connection name can be
	chosen for each connection subsection.

connections.<conn> { # }
	Section for an IKE connection named <conn>.

connections.<conn>.version = 0
	IKE major version to use for connection.

	IKE major version to use for connection. _1_ uses IKEv1 aka ISAKMP, _2_
	uses IKEv2. A connection using the default of _0_ accepts both IKEv1
	and IKEv2 as responder, and initiates the connection actively with IKEv2.

connections.<conn>.local_addrs = %any
	Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.

	Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated. Takes
	single IPv4/IPv6 addresses, DNS names, CIDR subnets or IP address ranges.

	As initiator, the first non-range/non-subnet is used to initiate the
	connection from. As responder, the local destination address must match at
	least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.

connections.<conn>.remote_addrs = %any
	Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.

	Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated. Takes
	single IPv4/IPv6 addresses, DNS names, CIDR subnets or IP address ranges.

	As initiator, the first non-range/non-subnet is used to initiate the
	connection to. As responder, the initiator source address must match at
	least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.

	To initiate a connection, at least one specific address or DNS name must
	be specified.

connections.<conn>.local_port = 500
	Local UDP port for IKE communication.

	Local UDP port for IKE communication. By default the port of the socket
	backend is used, which is usually _500_. If port _500_ is used, automatic
	IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.

	Using a non-default local IKE port requires support from the socket backend
	in use (socket-dynamic).

connections.<conn>.remote_port = 500
	Remote UDP port for IKE communication.

	Remote UDP port for IKE communication. If the default of port _500_ is used,
	automatic IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.

connections.<conn>.proposals = default
	Comma separated proposals to accept for IKE.

	A proposal is a set of algorithms. For non-AEAD algorithms, this includes
	for IKE an encryption algorithm, an integrity algorithm, a pseudo random
	function and a Diffie-Hellman group. For AEAD algorithms, instead of
	encryption and integrity algorithms, a combined algorithm is used.

	In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
	proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
	kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
	multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.

	Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
	separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
	of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
	for interoperability.

connections.<conn>.vips =
	Virtual IPs to request in configuration payload / Mode Config.

	Comma separated list of virtual IPs to request in IKEv2 configuration
	payloads or IKEv1 Mode Config. The wildcard addresses _0.0.0.0_ and _::_
	request an arbitrary address, specific addresses may be defined. The
	responder may return a different address, though, or none at all.

connections.<conn>.aggressive = no
	Use Aggressive Mode in IKEv1.

	Enables Aggressive Mode instead of Main Mode with Identity Protection.
	Aggressive Mode is considered less secure, because the ID and HASH
	payloads are exchanged unprotected. This allows a passive attacker to
	snoop peer identities, and even worse, start dictionary attacks on the
	Preshared Key.

connections.<conn>.pull = yes
	Set the Mode Config mode to use.

	If the default of _yes_ is used, Mode Config works in pull mode, where
	the initiator actively requests a virtual IP. With _no_, push mode is used,
	where the responder pushes down a virtual IP to the initiating peer.

	Push mode is currently supported for IKEv1, but not in IKEv2. It is used
	by a few implementations only, pull mode is recommended.

connections.<conn>.encap = no
	Enforce UDP encapsulation by faking NAT-D payloads.

	To enforce UDP encapsulation of ESP packets, the IKE daemon can fake the
	NAT detection payloads. This makes the peer believe that NAT takes
	place on the path, forcing it to encapsulate ESP packets in UDP.

	Usually this is not required, but it can help to work around connectivity
	issues with too restrictive intermediary firewalls.

connections.<conn>.mobike = yes
	Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections.

	Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections. MOBIKE is enabled by default on IKEv2
	connections, and allows mobility of clients and multi-homing on servers by
	migrating active IPsec tunnels.

	Usually keeping MOBIKE enabled is unproblematic, as it is not used if the
	peer does not indicate support for it. However, due to the design of MOBIKE,
	IKEv2 always floats to port 4500 starting from the second exchange. Some
	implementations don't like this behavior, hence it can be disabled.

connections.<conn>.dpd_delay = 0s
	Interval of liveness checks (DPD).

	Interval to check the liveness of a peer actively using IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL
	exchanges or IKEv1 R_U_THERE messages. Active DPD checking is only enforced
	if no IKE or ESP/AH packet has been received for the configured DPD delay.

connections.<conn>.dpd_timeout = 0s
	Timeout for DPD checks (IKEV1 only).

	Charon by default uses the normal retransmission mechanism and timeouts to
	check the liveness of a peer, as all messages are used for liveness
	checking. For compatibility reasons, with IKEv1 a custom interval may be
	specified; this option has no effect on connections using IKE2.

connections.<conn>.fragmentation = yes
	Use IKE UDP datagram fragmentation.  (_yes_, _no_ or _force_).

	Use IKE fragmentation (proprietary IKEv1 extension or RFC 7383 IKEv2
	fragmentation).  Acceptable  values  are _yes_ (the	default), _force_ and
	_no_. Fragmented IKE messages sent by a peer are always accepted
	irrespective of  the  value  of  this option. If set to _yes_, and the peer
	supports it, oversized IKE messages will be sent in fragments.  If set  to
	_force_  (only  supported  for IKEv1) the initial IKE message will already
	be fragmented if required.

connections.<conn>.send_certreq = yes
	Send certificate requests payloads (_yes_ or _no_).

	Send certificate request payloads to offer trusted root CA certificates
	to the peer. Certificate requests help the peer to choose an appropriate
	certificate/private key for authentication and are enabled by default.

	Disabling certificate requests can be useful if too many trusted root CA
	certificates are installed, as each certificate request increases the size
	of the initial IKE packets.

connections.<conn>.send_cert = ifasked
	Send certificate payloads (_always_, _never_ or _ifasked_).

	Send certificate payloads when using certificate authentication. With the
	default of _ifasked_ the daemon sends certificate payloads only if
	certificate requests have been received. _never_ disables sending of
	certificate payloads altogether, _always_ causes certificate payloads to be
	sent unconditionally whenever certificate authentication is used.

connections.<conn>.keyingtries = 1
	Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial connect.

	Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial connect.
	Instead of giving up initiation after the first retransmission sequence with
	the default value of _1_, additional sequences may be started according to
	the configured value. A value of _0_ initiates a new sequence until the
	connection establishes or fails with a permanent error.

connections.<conn>.unique = no
	Connection uniqueness policy (_never_, _no_, _keep_ or _replace_).

	Connection uniqueness policy to enforce. To avoid multiple connections
	from the same user, a uniqueness policy can be enforced. The value _never_
	does never enforce such a policy, even if a peer included INITIAL_CONTACT
	notification messages, whereas _no_ replaces existing connections for the
	same identity if a new one has the INITIAL_CONTACT notify. _keep_ rejects
	new connection attempts if the same user already has an active connection,
	_replace_ deletes any existing connection if a new one for the same user
	gets established.

	To compare connections for uniqueness, the remote IKE identity is used. If
	EAP or XAuth authentication is involved, the EAP-Identity or XAuth username
	is used to enforce the uniqueness policy instead.

	On initiators this setting specifies whether an INITIAL_CONTACT notify is
	sent during IKE_AUTH if no existing connection is found with the remote
	peer (determined by the identities of the first authentication round).
	Only if set to _keep_ or _replace_ will the client send a notify.

connections.<conn>.reauth_time = 0s
	Time to schedule IKE reauthentication.

	Time to schedule IKE reauthentication. IKE reauthentication recreates the
	IKE/ISAKMP SA from scratch and re-evaluates the credentials. In asymmetric
	configurations (with EAP or configuration payloads) it might not be possible
	to actively reauthenticate as responder. The IKEv2 reauthentication lifetime
	negotiation can instruct the client to perform reauthentication.

	Reauthentication is disabled by default. Enabling it usually may lead
	to small connection interruptions, as strongSwan uses a break-before-make
	policy with IKEv2 to avoid any conflicts with associated tunnel resources.

connections.<conn>.rekey_time = 4h
	Time to schedule IKE rekeying.

	IKE rekeying refreshes key material using a Diffie-Hellman exchange, but
	does not re-check associated credentials. It is supported in IKEv2 only,
	IKEv1 performs a reauthentication procedure instead.

	With the default value IKE rekeying is scheduled every 4 hours, minus the
	configured **rand_time**. If a **reauth_time** is configured, **rekey_time**
	defaults to zero disabling rekeying; explicitly set both to enforce
	rekeying and reauthentication.

connections.<conn>.over_time = 10% of rekey_time/reauth_time
	Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.

	Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.
	To avoid having an IKE/ISAKMP kept alive if IKE reauthentication or rekeying
	fails perpetually, a maximum hard lifetime may be specified. If the
	IKE_SA fails to rekey or reauthenticate within the specified time, the
	IKE_SA gets closed.

	In contrast to CHILD_SA rekeying, **over_time** is relative in time to the
	**rekey_time** _and_ **reauth_time** values, as it applies to both.

	The default is 10% of the longer of **rekey_time** and **reauth_time**.

connections.<conn>.rand_time = over_time
	Range of random time to subtract from rekey/reauth times.

	Time range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
	rekey/reauth times. To avoid having both peers initiating the rekey/reauth
	procedure simultaneously, a random time gets subtracted from the
	rekey/reauth times.

	The default is equal to the configured **over_time**.

connections.<conn>.pools =
	Comma separated list of named IP pools.

	Comma separated list of named IP pools to allocate virtual IP addresses and
	other configuration attributes from. Each name references a pool by name
	from either the **pools** section or an external pool.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix> {}
	Section for a local authentication round.

	Section for a local authentication round. A local authentication round
	defines the rules how authentication is performed for the local peer.
	Multiple rounds may be defined to use IKEv2 RFC 4739 Multiple Authentication
	or IKEv1 XAuth.

	Each round is defined in a section having _local_ as prefix, and an optional
	unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix may be
	omitted.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.round = 0
	Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are sorted.  If
	not specified rounds are ordered by their position in the config file/VICI
	message.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.certs =
	Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.

	Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.
	The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
	directory or an absolute path.

	The certificate used for authentication is selected based on the received
	certificate request payloads. If no appropriate CA can be located, the
	first certificate is used.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.pubkeys =
	Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for authentication.

	Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for authentication.
	The public keys may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _pubkey_
	directory or an absolute path.

	Even though multiple local public keys could be defined in principle, only
	the	first public key in the list is used for authentication.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.auth = pubkey
	Authentication to perform locally (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
	_eap[-method]_).

	Authentication to perform locally. _pubkey_ uses public key authentication
	using a private key associated to a usable certificate. _psk_ uses
	pre-shared key authentication. The IKEv1 specific _xauth_ is used for
	XAuth or Hybrid authentication, while the IKEv2 specific _eap_ keyword
	defines EAP authentication.

	For _xauth_, a specific backend name may be appended, separated by a dash.
	The appropriate _xauth_ backend is selected to perform the XAuth exchange.
	For traditional XAuth, the _xauth_ method is usually defined in the second
	authentication round following an initial _pubkey_ (or _psk_) round. Using
	_xauth_ in the first round performs Hybrid Mode client authentication.

	For _eap_, a specific EAP method name may be appended, separated by a dash.
	An EAP module implementing the appropriate method is selected to perform
	the EAP conversation.

	If both peers support RFC 7427 ("Signature Authentication in IKEv2")
	specific hash algorithms to be used during IKEv2 authentication may be
	configured. To do so use _ike:_ followed by a trust chain signature scheme
	constraint (see description of the **remote** section's **auth** keyword).
	For example, with _ike:pubkey-sha384-sha256_ a public key signature scheme
	with either SHA-384 or SHA-256 would get used for authentication, in that
	order and depending on the hash algorithms supported by the peer. If no
	specific hash algorithms are configured, the default is to prefer an
	algorithm that matches or exceeds the strength of the signature key.
	If no constraints with _ike:_ prefix are configured any signature scheme
	constraint (without _ike:_ prefix) will also apply to IKEv2 authentication,
	unless this is disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5).

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.id =
	IKE identity to use for authentication round.

	IKE identity to use for authentication round. When using certificate
	authentication, the IKE identity must be contained in the certificate,
	either as subject or as subjectAltName.

	The identity can be an IP address, a fully-qualified domain name, an email
	address or a Distinguished Name for which the ID type is determined
	automatically and the string is converted to the appropriate encoding. To
	enforce a specific identity type, a prefix may be used, followed by a colon
	(:). If the number sign (#) follows the colon, the remaining data is
	interpreted as hex encoding, otherwise the string is used as-is as the
	identification data. Note that this implies that no conversion is performed
	for non-string identities. For example, _ipv4:10.0.0.1_ does not create a
	valid ID_IPV4_ADDR IKE identity, as it does not get converted to binary
	0x0a000001. Instead, one could use _ipv4:#0a000001_ to get a valid identity,
	but just using the implicit type with automatic conversion is usually
	simpler. The same applies to the ASN1 encoded types. The following prefixes
	are known: _ipv4_, _ipv6_, _rfc822_, _email_, _userfqdn_, _fqdn_, _dns_,
	_asn1dn_, _asn1gn_ and _keyid_. Custom type prefixes may be specified by
	surrounding the numerical type value by curly brackets.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.eap_id = id
	Client EAP-Identity to use in EAP-Identity exchange and the EAP method.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.aaa_id = remote-id
	Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method.

	Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method. Some EAP methods, such
	as EAP-TLS, use an identity for the server to perform mutual authentication.
	This identity may differ from the IKE identity, especially when EAP
	authentication is delegated from the IKE responder to an AAA backend.

	For EAP-(T)TLS, this defines the identity for which the server must provide
	a certificate in the TLS exchange.

connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.xauth_id = id
	Client XAuth username used in the XAuth exchange.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix> {}
	Section for a remote authentication round.

	Section for a remote authentication round. A remote authentication round
	defines the constraints how the peers must authenticate to use this
	connection. Multiple rounds may be defined to use IKEv2 RFC 4739 Multiple
	Authentication or IKEv1 XAuth.

	Each round is defined in a section having _remote_ as prefix, and an
	optional unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix
	may be omitted.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.round = 0
	Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are sorted.  If
	not specified rounds are ordered by their position in the config file/VICI
	message.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.id = %any
	IKE identity to expect for authentication round.

	IKE identity to expect for authentication round. Refer to the _local_ _id_
	section for details.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.groups =
	Authorization group memberships to require.

	Comma separated authorization group memberships to require. The peer must
	prove membership to at least one of the specified groups. Group membership
	can be certified by different means, for example by appropriate Attribute
	Certificates or by an AAA backend involved in the authentication.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.certs =
	Comma separated list of certificate to accept for authentication.

	Comma separated list of certificates to accept for authentication.
	The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
	directory or an absolute path.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacerts =
	Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.

	Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.
	The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_
	directory or an absolute path.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.pubkeys =
	Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for authentication.

	Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for authentication.
	The public keys may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _pubkey_
	directory or an absolute path.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.revocation = relaxed
	Certificate revocation policy, (_strict_, _ifuri_ or _relaxed_).

	Certificate revocation policy for CRL or OCSP revocation.

	A _strict_ revocation policy fails if no revocation information is
	available, i.e. the certificate is not known to be unrevoked.

	_ifuri_ fails only if a CRL/OCSP URI is available, but certificate
	revocation checking fails, i.e. there should be revocation information
	available, but it could not be obtained.

	The default revocation policy _relaxed_ fails only if a certificate
	is revoked, i.e. it is explicitly known that it is bad.

connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.auth = pubkey
	Authentication to expect from remote (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
	_eap[-method]_).

	Authentication to expect from remote. See the **local** section's **auth**
	keyword description about the details of supported mechanisms.

	To require a trustchain public key strength for the remote side, specify the
	key type followed by the minimum strength in bits (for example _ecdsa-384_
	or _rsa-2048-ecdsa-256_). To limit the acceptable set of hashing algorithms
	for trustchain validation, append hash algorithms to _pubkey_ or a key
	strength definition (for example _pubkey-sha1-sha256_ or
	_rsa-2048-ecdsa-256-sha256-sha384-sha512_).
	Unless disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5), or explicit IKEv2 signature
	constraints are configured (refer to the description of the **local**
	section's **auth** keyword for details), such key types and hash algorithms
	are also applied as constraints against IKEv2 signature authentication
	schemes used by the remote side.

	To specify trust chain constraints for EAP-(T)TLS, append a colon to the
	EAP method, followed by the key type/size and hash algorithm as discussed
	above (e.g. _eap-tls:ecdsa-384-sha384_).

connections.<conn>.children.<child> {}
	CHILD_SA configuration sub-section.

	CHILD_SA configuration sub-section. Each connection definition may have
	one or more sections in its _children_ subsection. The section name
	defines the name of the CHILD_SA configuration, which must be unique within
	the connection.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.ah_proposals =
	AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.

	AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA. A proposal is a set of algorithms.
	For AH, this includes an integrity algorithm and an optional Diffie-Hellman
	group. If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial
	negotiation uses a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange using the specified
	group (refer to _esp_proposals_ for details).

	In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
	proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
	kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
	multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.

	Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
	separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
	of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
	for interoperability. By default no AH proposals are included, instead ESP
	is proposed.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.esp_proposals = default
	ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.

	ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA. A proposal is a set of algorithms.
	For ESP non-AEAD proposals, this includes an integrity algorithm, an
	encryption algorithm, an optional Diffie-Hellman group and an optional
	Extended Sequence Number Mode indicator. For AEAD proposals, a combined
	mode algorithm is used instead of the separate encryption/integrity
	algorithms.

	If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial
	negotiation use a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange using the specified
	group. However, for IKEv2, the keys of the CHILD_SA created implicitly with
	the IKE_SA will always be derived from the IKE_SA's key material. So any DH
	group specified here will only apply when the CHILD_SA is later rekeyed or
	is created with a separate CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange. A proposal mismatch
	might, therefore, not immediately be noticed when the SA is established, but
	may later cause rekeying to fail.

	Extended Sequence Number support may be indicated with the _esn_ and _noesn_
	values, both may be included to indicate support for both modes. If omitted,
	_noesn_ is assumed.

	In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
	proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
	kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
	multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.

	Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
	separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
	of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
	for interoperability. If no algorithms are specified for AH nor ESP,
	the _default_ set of algorithms for ESP is included.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.local_ts = dynamic
	Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.

	Comma separated list of local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
	Each selector is a CIDR subnet definition, followed by an optional
	proto/port selector. The special value _dynamic_ may be used instead of a
	subnet definition, which gets replaced by the tunnel outer address or the
	virtual IP, if negotiated. This is the default.

	A protocol/port selector is surrounded by opening and closing square
	brackets. Between these brackets, a numeric or **getservent**(3) protocol
	name may be specified. After the optional protocol restriction, an optional
	port restriction may be specified, separated by a slash. The port
	restriction may be numeric, a **getservent**(3) service name, or the special
	value _opaque_ for RFC 4301 OPAQUE selectors. Port ranges may be specified
	as well, none of the kernel backends currently support port ranges, though.

	Unless the Unity extension is used, IKEv1 supports the first specified
	selector only. IKEv1 uses very similar traffic selector narrowing as it is
	supported in the IKEv2 protocol.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.remote_ts = dynamic
	Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.

	Comma separated list of remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA. See
	**local_ts** for a description of the selector syntax.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_time = 1h
	Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying.

	Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA rekeying refreshes key
	material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange if a group is
	specified in the proposal.

	To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
	in the range of **rand_time** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
	lifetime.

	By default CHILD_SA rekeying is scheduled every hour, minus **rand_time**.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_time = rekey_time + 10%
	Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed, as time.

	Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually this hard lifetime
	is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed before.
	If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.

	The default is 10% more than the **rekey_time**.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_time = life_time - rekey_time
	Range of random time to subtract from **rekey_time**.

	Time range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
	**rekey_time**. The default is the difference between **life_time** and
	**rekey_time**.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_bytes = 0
	Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying.

	Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA
	rekeying refreshes key material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange
	if a group is specified in the proposal.

	To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
	in the range of **rand_bytes** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
	volume limit.

	Volume based CHILD_SA rekeying is disabled by default.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_bytes = rekey_bytes + 10%
	Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.

	Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually this hard
	volume limit is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed before.
	If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.

	The default is 10% more than **rekey_bytes**.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_bytes = life_bytes - rekey_bytes
	Range of random bytes to subtract from **rekey_bytes**.

	Byte range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
	**rekey_bytes**. The default is the difference between **life_bytes** and
	**rekey_bytes**.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_packets = 0
	Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying.

	Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA
	rekeying refreshes key material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange
	if a group is specified in the proposal.

	To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
	in the range of **rand_packets** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
	packet count limit.

	Packet count based CHILD_SA rekeying is disabled by default.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_packets = rekey_packets + 10%
	Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.

	Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually
	this hard packets limit is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed
	before. If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.

	The default is 10% more than **rekey_bytes**.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_packets = life_packets - rekey_packets
	Range of random packets to subtract from **packets_bytes**.

	Packet range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
	**rekey_packets**. The default is the difference between **life_packets**
	and **rekey_packets**.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.updown =
	Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.hostaccess = yes
	Hostaccess variable to pass to **updown** script.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mode = tunnel
	IPsec Mode to establish (_tunnel_, _transport_, _beet_, _pass_ or _drop_).

	IPsec Mode to establish CHILD_SA with. _tunnel_ negotiates the CHILD_SA
	in IPsec Tunnel Mode, whereas _transport_ uses IPsec Transport Mode. _beet_
	is the Bound End to End Tunnel mixture mode, working with fixed inner
	addresses without the need to include them in each packet.

	Both _transport_ and _beet_ modes are subject to mode negotiation; _tunnel_
	mode is negotiated if the preferred mode is not available.

	_pass_ and _drop_ are used to install shunt policies which explicitly
	bypass the defined traffic from IPsec processing or drop it, respectively.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.policies = yes
	Whether to install IPsec policies or not.

	Whether to install IPsec policies or not. Disabling this can be useful in
	some scenarios e.g. MIPv6, where policies are not managed by the IKE daemon.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.policies_fwd_out = no
	Whether to install outbound FWD IPsec policies or not.

	Whether to install outbound FWD IPsec policies or not. Enabling this is
	required in case there is a drop policy that would match and block forwarded
	traffic for this CHILD_SA.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.dpd_action = clear
	Action to perform on DPD timeout (_clear_, _trap_ or _restart_).

	Action to perform for this CHILD_SA on DPD timeout. The default _clear_
	closes the CHILD_SA and does not take further action. _trap_ installs
	a trap policy, which will catch matching traffic and tries to re-negotiate
	the tunnel on-demand. _restart_ immediately tries to re-negotiate the
	CHILD_SA under a fresh IKE_SA.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.ipcomp = no
	Enable IPComp compression before encryption.

	Enable IPComp compression before encryption. If enabled, IKE tries to
	negotiate IPComp compression to compress ESP payload data prior to
	encryption.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.inactivity = 0s
	Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity.

	Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity. If no traffic has
	been processed in either direction for the configured timeout, the CHILD_SA
	gets closed due to inactivity. The default value of _0_ disables inactivity
	checks.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.reqid = 0
	Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA.

	Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA. This might be helpful in some
	scenarios, but works only if each CHILD_SA configuration is instantiated
	not more than once. The default of _0_ uses dynamic reqids, allocated
	incrementally.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.priority = 0
	Optional fixed priority for IPsec policies.

	Optional fixed priority for IPsec policies. This could be useful to install
	high-priority drop policies.  The default of _0_ uses dynamically calculated
	priorities based on the size of the traffic selectors.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.interface =
	Optional interface name to restrict IPsec policies.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_in = 0/0x00000000
	Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.

	Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic. On Linux Netfilter may require
	marks on each packet to match an SA having that option set. This allows
	Netfilter rules to select specific tunnels for incoming traffic. The
	special value _%unique_ sets a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance.

	An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
	default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_out = 0/0x00000000
	Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.

	Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic. On Linux Netfilter may require
	marks on each packet to match a policy having that option set. This allows
	Netfilter rules to select specific tunnels for outgoing traffic. The
	special value _%unique_ sets a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance.

	An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
	default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.tfc_padding = 0
	Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.

	Pads ESP packets with additional data to have a consistent ESP packet size
	for improved Traffic Flow Confidentiality. The padding defines the minimum
	size of all ESP packets sent.

	The default value of 0 disables TFC padding, the special value _mtu_ adds
	TFC padding to create a packet size equal to the Path Maximum Transfer Unit.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.replay_window = 32
	IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA.

	IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA. Larger values than the
	default of 32 are supported using the Netlink backend only, a value of 0
	disables IPsec replay protection.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.start_action = none
	Action to perform after loading the configuration (_none_, _trap_, _start_).

	Action to perform after loading the configuration. The default of _none_
	loads the connection only, which then can be manually initiated or used as
	a responder configuration.

	The value _trap_ installs a trap policy, which triggers the tunnel as soon
	as matching traffic has been detected. The value _start_ initiates
	the connection actively.

	When unloading or replacing a CHILD_SA configuration having a
	**start_action** different from _none_, the inverse action is performed.
	Configurations with _start_ get closed, while such with _trap_ get
	uninstalled.

connections.<conn>.children.<child>.close_action = none
	Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed (_none_, _trap_, _start_).

	Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed by the peer. The default of
	_none_ does not take any action, _trap_ installs a trap policy for the
	CHILD_SA. _start_ tries to re-create the CHILD_SA.

	**close_action** does not provide any guarantee that the CHILD_SA is kept
	alive. It acts on explicit close messages only, but not on negotiation
	failures. Use trap policies to reliably re-create failed CHILD_SAs.

secrets { # }
	Section defining secrets for IKE/EAP/XAuth authentication and private
	key decryption.

	Section defining secrets for IKE/EAP/XAuth authentication and private key
	decryption. The **secrets** section takes sub-sections having a specific
	prefix which defines the secret type.

	It is not recommended to define any private key decryption passphrases,
	as then there is no real security benefit in having encrypted keys. Either
	store the key unencrypted or enter the keys manually when loading
	credentials.

secrets.eap<suffix> { # }
	EAP secret section for a specific secret.

	EAP secret section for a specific secret. Each EAP secret is defined in
	a unique section having the _eap_ prefix. EAP secrets are used for XAuth
	authentication as well.

secrets.xauth<suffix> { # }
	XAuth secret section for a specific secret.

	XAuth secret section for a specific secret. **xauth** is just an alias
	for **eap**, secrets under both section prefixes are used for both EAP and
	XAuth authentication.

secrets.eap<suffix>.secret =
	Value of the EAP/XAuth secret.

	Value of the EAP/XAuth secret. It may either be an ASCII string, a hex
	encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if it
	has a _0s_ prefix in its value.

secrets.eap<suffix>.id<suffix> =
	Identity the EAP/XAuth secret belongs to.

	Identity the EAP/XAuth secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities may
	be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
	multiple users.

secrets.ike<suffix> { # }
	IKE preshared secret section for a specific secret.

	IKE preshared secret section for a specific secret. Each IKE PSK is defined
	in a unique section having the _ike_ prefix.

secrets.ike<suffix>.secret =
	Value of the IKE preshared secret.

	Value of the IKE preshared secret. It may either be an ASCII string,
	a hex encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if
	it has a _0s_ prefix in its value.

secrets.ike<suffix>.id<suffix> =
	IKE identity the IKE preshared secret belongs to.

	IKE identity the IKE preshared secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities
	may be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
	multiple peers.

secrets.private<suffix> { # }
	Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _private_ folder.

secrets.private<suffix>.file =
	File name in the _private_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.

secrets.private<suffix>.secret
	Value of decryption passphrase for private key.

secrets.rsa<suffix> { # }
	Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _rsa_ folder.

secrets.rsa<suffix>.file =
	File name in the _rsa_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.

secrets.rsa<suffix>.secret
	Value of decryption passphrase for RSA key.

secrets.ecdsa<suffix> { # }
	Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _ecdsa_ folder.

secrets.ecdsa<suffix>.file =
	File name in the _ecdsa_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.

secrets.ecdsa<suffix>.secret
	Value of decryption passphrase for ECDSA key.

secrets.pkcs8<suffix> { # }
	Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _pkcs8_ folder.

secrets.pkcs8<suffix>.file =
	File name in the _pkcs8_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.

secrets.pkcs8<suffix>.secret
	Value of decryption passphrase for PKCS#8 key.

secrets.pkcs12<suffix> { # }
	PKCS#12 decryption passphrase for a container in the _pkcs12_ folder.

secrets.pkcs12<suffix>.file =
	File name in the _pkcs12_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.

secrets.pkcs12<suffix>.secret
	Value of decryption passphrase for PKCS#12 container.

pools { # }
	Section defining named pools.

	Section defining named pools. Named pools may be referenced by connections
	with the **pools** option to assign virtual IPs and other configuration
	attributes.

pools.<name> { # }
	Section defining a single pool with a unique name.

pools.<name>.addrs =
	Addresses allocated in pool.

	Subnet or range defining addresses allocated in pool. Accepts a single CIDR
	subnet defining the pool to allocate addresses from or an address range
	(<from>-<to>).  Pools must be unique and non-overlapping.

pools.<name>.<attr> =
	Comma separated list of additional attributes from type <attr>.

	Comma separated list of additional attributes of type **<attr>**. The
	attribute type may be one of _dns_, _nbns_, _dhcp_, _netmask_, _server_,
	_subnet_, _split_include_ and _split_exclude_ to define addresses or CIDR
	subnets for the corresponding attribute types. Alternatively, **<attr>** can
	be a numerical identifier, for which string attribute values are accepted
	as well.

authorities { # }
	Section defining attributes of certification authorities.

authorities.<name> { # }
	Section defining a certification authority with a unique name.

authorities.<name>.cacert =
	CA certificate belonging to the certification authority.

	The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_
	directory or an absolute path.

authorities.<name>.crl_uris =
	Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points

	Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points (ldap, http, or file URI)

authorities.<name>.ocsp_uris =
	Comma-separated list of OCSP URIs

	Comma-separated list of OCSP URIs

authorities.<name>.cert_uri_base =
	Defines the base URI for the Hash and URL feature supported by IKEv2.

	Defines the base URI for the Hash and URL feature supported by IKEv2.
	Instead of exchanging complete certificates, IKEv2 allows one to send an
	URI that resolves to the DER encoded certificate. The certificate URIs are
	built by appending the SHA1 hash of the DER encoded certificates to this
	base URI.