main/libvncserver: upgrade to 0.9.12

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 63 deletions

diff --git a/main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch b/main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 08ae206475..0000000000
--- a/main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From 28afb6c537dc82ba04d5f245b15ca7205c6dbb9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 13:48:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Limit client cut text length to 1 MB
-
-This patch constrains a client cut text length to 1 MB. Otherwise
-a client could make server allocate 2 GB of memory and that seems to
-be to much to classify it as a denial of service.
-
-The limit also prevents from an integer overflow followed by copying
-an uninitilized memory when processing msg.cct.length value larger
-than SIZE_MAX or INT_MAX - sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg.
-
-This patch also corrects accepting length value of zero (malloc(0) is
-interpreted on differnet systems differently).
-
-CVE-2018-7225
-<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/218>
----
- libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-index 116c488..4fc4d9d 100644
---- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-@@ -85,6 +88,8 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- /* strftime() */
- #include <time.h>
-+/* PRIu32 */
-+#include <inttypes.h>
- 
- #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS
- #include "rfbssl.h"
-@@ -2577,7 +2577,23 @@ rfbProcessClientNormalMessage(rfbClientPtr cl)
- 
- 	msg.cct.length = Swap32IfLE(msg.cct.length);
- 
--	str = (char *)malloc(msg.cct.length);
-+	/* uint32_t input is passed to malloc()'s size_t argument,
-+	 * to rfbReadExact()'s int argument, to rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd()'s int
-+	 * argument increased of sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg, and to setXCutText()'s int
-+	 * argument. Here we impose a limit of 1 MB so that the value fits
-+	 * into all of the types to prevent from misinterpretation and thus
-+	 * from accessing uninitialized memory (CVE-2018-7225) and also to
-+	 * prevent from a denial-of-service by allocating to much memory in
-+	 * the server. */
-+	if (msg.cct.length > 1<<20) {
-+	    rfbLog("rfbClientCutText: too big cut text length requested: %" PRIu32 "\n",
-+		    msg.cct.length);
-+	    rfbCloseClient(cl);
-+	    return;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Allow zero-length client cut text. */
-+	str = (char *)calloc(msg.cct.length ? msg.cct.length : 1, 1);
- 	if (str == NULL) {
- 		rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: not enough memory");
- 		rfbCloseClient(cl);
--- 
-2.17.0
-