diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch | 63 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 63 deletions
diff --git a/main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch b/main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 08ae206475..0000000000 --- a/main/libvncserver/CVE-2018-7225.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -From 28afb6c537dc82ba04d5f245b15ca7205c6dbb9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com> -Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 13:48:00 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Limit client cut text length to 1 MB - -This patch constrains a client cut text length to 1 MB. Otherwise -a client could make server allocate 2 GB of memory and that seems to -be to much to classify it as a denial of service. - -The limit also prevents from an integer overflow followed by copying -an uninitilized memory when processing msg.cct.length value larger -than SIZE_MAX or INT_MAX - sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg. - -This patch also corrects accepting length value of zero (malloc(0) is -interpreted on differnet systems differently). - -CVE-2018-7225 -<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/218> ---- - libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c -index 116c488..4fc4d9d 100644 ---- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c -+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c -@@ -85,6 +88,8 @@ - #include <errno.h> - /* strftime() */ - #include <time.h> -+/* PRIu32 */ -+#include <inttypes.h> - - #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS - #include "rfbssl.h" -@@ -2577,7 +2577,23 @@ rfbProcessClientNormalMessage(rfbClientPtr cl) - - msg.cct.length = Swap32IfLE(msg.cct.length); - -- str = (char *)malloc(msg.cct.length); -+ /* uint32_t input is passed to malloc()'s size_t argument, -+ * to rfbReadExact()'s int argument, to rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd()'s int -+ * argument increased of sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg, and to setXCutText()'s int -+ * argument. Here we impose a limit of 1 MB so that the value fits -+ * into all of the types to prevent from misinterpretation and thus -+ * from accessing uninitialized memory (CVE-2018-7225) and also to -+ * prevent from a denial-of-service by allocating to much memory in -+ * the server. */ -+ if (msg.cct.length > 1<<20) { -+ rfbLog("rfbClientCutText: too big cut text length requested: %" PRIu32 "\n", -+ msg.cct.length); -+ rfbCloseClient(cl); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* Allow zero-length client cut text. */ -+ str = (char *)calloc(msg.cct.length ? msg.cct.length : 1, 1); - if (str == NULL) { - rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: not enough memory"); - rfbCloseClient(cl); --- -2.17.0 - |