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path: root/src/libcharon/encoding/message.c
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* ikev1: Send NAT-D payloads after HASH payloads in Aggressive Mode requestsTobias Brunner2017-05-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | Some implementations seem to have problems if the third AM message contains NAT-D payloads before the HASH payload. Fixes #2314.
* ikev1: Accept more than one certificate payload in aggressive modeTobias Brunner2016-08-171-2/+2
| | | | Fixes #2085.
* Use standard unsigned integer typesAndreas Steffen2016-03-241-21/+21
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* ikev1: Send NAT-D payloads after vendor ID payloads in Aggressive Mode messagesTobias Brunner2016-03-071-6/+6
| | | | | | | Some implementations might otherwise not recognize the NAT-D payload type. Also moves SIG and HASH payloads last in these messages. Fixes #1239.
* message: Log message if unknown/disallowed payload receivedTobias Brunner2015-06-011-3/+10
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* message: Log original message type of unknown payloadsTobias Brunner2015-06-011-0/+13
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* unknown-payload: Use a new private payload type and make original type availableTobias Brunner2015-06-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | This fixes a DoS and potential remote code execution vulnerability that was caused because the original payload type that was returned previously was used to cast such payload objects to payloads of the indicated type (e.g. when logging notify payloads with a payload type for the wrong IKE version). Fixes CVE-2015-3991.
* message: Show the fragmentation numbers in message stringificationMartin Willi2015-06-011-0/+36
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* utils: Use chunk_equals_const() for all cryptographic purposesMartin Willi2015-04-141-1/+1
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* ike: Only parse payloads valid for the current IKE versionTobias Brunner2014-12-051-0/+2
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* ike: Make check for known payloads depend on IKE versionTobias Brunner2014-12-051-1/+1
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* message: Include encrypted fragment payload in payload (order) rulesTobias Brunner2014-10-291-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | Otherwise fragmented CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges won't get accepted because they don't contain an SA payload. It also prevents a warning when ordering payloads. Fixes #752.
* message: Limit maximum number of IKEv2 fragmentsTobias Brunner2014-10-101-1/+11
| | | | | | | | The maximum for IKEv1 is already 255 due to the 8-bit fragment number. With an overhead of 17 bytes (x64) per fragment and a default maximum of 10000 bytes per packet the maximum memory required is 14 kB for a fragmented message.
* packet: Define a global default maximum size for IKE packetsTobias Brunner2014-10-101-6/+1
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* message: Ensure a minimum fragment lengthTobias Brunner2014-10-101-8/+18
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* message: Fragment and reassemble IKEv2 messagesTobias Brunner2014-10-101-128/+366
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* message: Handle encrypted fragment payload similar to the encrypted payloadTobias Brunner2014-10-101-16/+91
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* message: Split generate() in multiple functionsTobias Brunner2014-10-101-67/+122
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* ikev1: Move defragmentation to message_tTobias Brunner2014-10-101-2/+194
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* message: fragment() generates message and fragments and caches themTobias Brunner2014-10-101-20/+71
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* message: Make packet argument optional in generate()Tobias Brunner2014-10-101-1/+4
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* ikev1: Move fragment generation to message_tTobias Brunner2014-10-101-1/+105
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* ike: Rename encryption_payload to encrypted_payloadTobias Brunner2014-10-101-13/+13
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* ikev1: Don't cache last block of INFORMATIONAL messages as IVTobias Brunner2014-09-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | We don't expect a response with the same MID, but apparently some devices (e.g. FRITZ!Box) do that for DPDs, while still treating the response as a new exchange. By storing the last message block as IV we can't decrypt the first block of such a response. Fixes #661.
* payload: Use common prefixes for all payload type identifiersMartin Willi2014-06-041-367/+367
| | | | | The old identifiers did not use a proper namespace and often clashed with other defines.
* ikev1: Add an option to accept unencrypted ID/HASH payloadsMartin Willi2014-04-171-1/+20
| | | | | | | | | Even in Main Mode, some Sonicwall boxes seem to send ID/HASH payloads in unencrypted form, probably to allow PSK lookup based on the ID payloads. We by default reject that, but accept it if the charon.accept_unencrypted_mainmode_messages option is set in strongswan.conf. Initial patch courtesy of Paul Stewart.
* iv_gen: Provide external sequence number (IKE, ESP)Tobias Brunner2013-10-111-1/+1
| | | | This prevents duplicate sequential IVs in case of a HA failover.
* ikev1: Accept more than two certificate payloadsMartin Willi2013-10-111-2/+2
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* message: print type of configuration payloadMartin Willi2013-09-031-1/+21
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* message: print attributes for IKEv1 configuration payloads as wellMartin Willi2013-09-031-1/+2
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* linked-list: Remove barely used has_more() methodTobias Brunner2013-07-171-83/+105
| | | | | | | | This required some refactoring when handling encrypted payloads. Also changed log messages so that "encrypted payload" is logged instead of "encryption payload" (even if we internally still call it that) as that's the name used in RFC 5996.
* Allow up to 10 NAT-D payloads in IKEv1 messagesTobias Brunner2013-03-201-1/+1
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* Allow more than one CERTREQ payload for IKEv2Tobias Brunner2013-02-081-2/+2
| | | | | | There is no reason not to do so (RFC 5996 explicitly mentions multiple CERTREQ payloads) and some implementations seem to use the same behavior as had to be used with IKEv1 (i.e. each CA in its own CERTREQ payload).
* Add message rules to properly handle IKE fragmentsTobias Brunner2012-12-241-0/+8
| | | | | These are sent in unencrypted messages and are the only payload contained in such messages.
* Reset the encrypted flag when handling IKE messages that contain a fragmentTobias Brunner2012-12-241-0/+6
| | | | | Racoon sets the encrypted bit for messages containing a fragment, but these messages are not really encrypted (the fragmented message is though).
* Add support for draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03 and earlierVolker Rümelin2012-12-191-0/+12
| | | | | This adds support for early versions of the draft that eventually resulted in RFC 3947.
* Increase the limit of acceptable IKEv1 CERTREQ payloads to 20Martin Willi2012-10-241-1/+1
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* Don't print hexdumps on loglevel 1 if hash verification failsMartin Willi2012-07-201-3/+3
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* Cleaned up memory management and return values for encryption payloadMartin Willi2012-07-161-14/+11
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* Add a return value to keymat_v1_t.{get,update,confirm}_ivMartin Willi2012-07-161-9/+36
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* Use a bool return value in keymat_v1_t.get_hash_phase2()Martin Willi2012-07-161-4/+2
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* Store the major IKE version on ike_sa_id_t.Tobias Brunner2012-03-201-0/+1
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* Print IKEv1 notify types in message summaryMartin Willi2012-03-201-1/+2
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* Support IKEv1 notifies in message_t.get_notify()Martin Willi2012-03-201-1/+2
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* Accept unencrypted Aggressive Mode messages.Tobias Brunner2012-03-201-1/+2
| | | | Racoon does not encrypt the third message during Aggressive Mode.
* Encrypt payloads of third aggressive mode messageMartin Willi2012-03-201-3/+3
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* Cast keymat safely, not based on external inputMartin Willi2012-03-201-36/+44
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* Accept NULL as keymat when generating a messageMartin Willi2012-03-201-4/+10
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* Separated libcharon/sa directory with ikev1 and ikev2 subfoldersMartin Willi2012-03-201-1/+1
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* Another set of cleanups in message.cMartin Willi2012-03-201-18/+19
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